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ABSTRACT
This dissertation concerns the enforcement of international labour standards. In particular, it 
explores the rule against discrimination in work. Many alternative models to the state 
reporting model, to enforce labour standards, have been suggested; none, however, have 
explored the codification of those standards of international labour law, which have attained 
customary status. Accordingly, the thesis of this enquiry is that the rule against discrimination 
in work, contained within Article 2 ILO Convention G U I, is also a rule of customary 
international law binding on all states. As such, it is a source of the English common law, 
enforceable in the English courts. Such a thesis draws upon the academic critique of similar 
projects in other areas and incorporates those concerns, where appropriate, to produce a 
robust methodology to test this thesis.
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Chapter One
Introduction, hypothesis and methodology
Corpus Juris L aboro
Introduction and hypothesis
The subject of this dissertation is international labour law. The dissertation shall test a thesis 
that the rule against discrimination in work, as set-out in the relevant International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Treaty,^ has developed into a parallel rule of customary international law, 
enforceable in the domestic courts as a source of the English common law.
There are several reasons for exploring this matter. First, an enquiry into the source of norms 
regulating conduct in work is important for its own sake. Second, it is especially important 
when considered against the current policy ambition of the United Kingdom (UK) 
Government to liberalise labour protection,^ and its further contemplation to withdraw from 
the European Union^ and the European Convention on Human Rights."  ^Both of which are the 
traditional and principle sources of protection against discrimination in work in the UK. 
Third, the identification of customary labour norms is a relatively unexplored solution in the 
contemporary discourse concerning the enforcement of labour standards. Finally, the 
reception of customary international norms into the UK employment regime is largely 
unexplored.
' ILO Treaty C l l l  Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958), Articles 1 and 2.
 ^UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Policy Making the Labour Market More Flexible, Efficient 
and Fair (BiS, December 2012). See further advice of Beecroft, A,, Report on Employment Law  (BiS, 2011). 
On which see: Hepple, B., ‘Back to the future: employment law under the Coalition Government’ (2013) ILJ 
203.
 ^See speech of the UK Prime Minister Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP, 23 January 2013 to Bloomberg Media, 
London in which he set out a Manifesto commitment for the Conservative Party in 2015 to negotiate for a “new 
settlement” with the Union, which would inform an “in/out” referendum in 2017.
 ^Speech o f Home Secretary, Rt. Hon. Theresa May MP, 9 May 2013 to the Conservative Home, London, in 
which she set out that the Conservative Party would consider “leaving the Convention altogether”.
For many years, the focus of international labour law research has been to better secure the 
enforcement of standards of work contained within ILO conventions/ The role of the ILO to 
publish treaties which contain labour standards has been firmly in existence since the ILO’s 
inception in 1919. Conventions articulate broad principles agreed by Conference^ and the 
current 178 member states are then invited to ratify them. There is, however, no duty to ratify 
Conventions or the Recommendations which accompany them and which supplement the 
Conventions. Once a state has ratified a Convention, it is obliged to produce an annual report 
to the ILO setting out how it has implemented the requirements of the Convention and what 
progress it has made in doing so in the previous year. A state may, at any time, denounce an 
ILO Convention and no longer be bound by its provisions.
At the Genoa Conference in 1921, the ILO opted for a state reporting model of enforcement. 
It produced a supervisory procedure and an inter-state complaints structure, known as the 
special procedure. Reports are referred via the tripartite modef for comment, before being 
submitted to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR).^ CEACR is a classically technocratic regime, consisting of 
twenty members whose business is conducted purely in writing. CEACR passes its written 
observations to the Committee on Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the 
Conference (CACRC), whose direct comments are communicated directly to states (direct 
requests), whereas more general findings are published in the report (observations). In a 
move away fi*om the strict comitology of CEACR, the CACRC, which is based on the
 ^See: Valticos, N., ‘International labour standards and human rights: Approaching the year 2000’ (1998) 137 
International Labour Review 135; Novitz, T., ‘International Promises and Domestic Pragmatism: To what 
Extent will the Employment Relations Act 1999 Implement International Labour Standards Relating to Freedom 
of Association’ (2000) 63 Modem Law Review 379; Creighton, B., ‘The Future o f Labour: Is There a Role for 
International Labour Standards?’ in Bernard, C., Deakin, S., and Morris, G., (eds.). The Future o f  Labour Law  
(Cambridge, 2004); Alston, P., ‘Facing up to the Complexities o f the ILO’S Core Labour Standards Agenda’ 
(2005) \6  EJIL 467; Langille, B., ‘Core Labour Rights -The True Story (Reply to Alston) (2005) \6EJIL  409.
 ^This tradition has been somewhat eroded in recent years, leading to overly specific Conventions prejudicing 
states’ ability to ratify standards. See further: Alston, P., Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002).
 ^Employer Representative -  Union Representative -  Government Representative.
* Under Article 22 ILO (for Conventions to which the reporting state is a party); Article 19 ILO (for 
Conventions and Recommendations to which the reporting state is not a party); and Article 35 (on non­
metropolitan territories).
tripartite model of overview and scrutiny, is held both orally and in public. It has the power to 
question witnesses and under Article 7  ^deals now with breaches and specific subjects. 
CACRC publishes a list, akin to the planned UN Human Rights Freedom Index, 
demonstrating where states need to make progress, are making such, and where special 
circumstances apply. In the post-war tradition of human rights treaties, the ILO has a function 
for inter-state complaints under the special procedure. Additionally, in a move ahead of its 
time and at odds with the traditionalist interpretation of actors in the international realm, the 
ILO allows for direct complaint by organisations under the representation procedure. This 
model for supervision allows, once standing matters have been addressed, for the complaint 
to be examined by a tripartite group, and recommendations made and published. Given the 
heightened importance of Trade Unions and the associated Freedom of Association 
constitutional provisions, complaints of this nature are passed to the Fact-Finding and 
Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association and the Committee on Freedom of 
Association. These are tripartite groups which again publish recommendations but also build 
a body of published opinions. A separate equal treatment procedure exists that has, as yet, not 
been exercised.
However, Langille conceives this system as ‘inherently weak’,^  ^ commenting that the current 
state of ratification is due, in no small part, to complexity of many recent conventions looking 
more like ‘international versions of domestic labour law statutes’ widely considered ‘too 
detailed, too complex and unratifiable.^^ Creighton, a former ILO official, notes the current 
‘traditional system [of state reporting] is in a state of crisis of such magnitude as to raise 
serious questions about its future role and re lev an ceS im p so n  observes the same faults and 
ascribed the system ‘in d iff icu lty In d eed , over the last quarter-century an average of only 
20.1 per cent Conventions have been successfiilly ratified and with a reporting rate of
 ^Geneva Conference Standing Orders.
Article 41 ICCPR (1966).
" Langille, B., ‘Core Labour Rights -The True Story (Reply to Alston) (2005) 16 EJIL 409,411.
^^Ibid.
Simpson, W., ‘Standard Setting and Supervision -A  System in Difficulty’ in ILO, Les Normes Internationales 
du Travail: une Patromine Pour L ‘avenir (2004), pp.48.
Creighton, B., ‘The Future o f Labour: Is There a Role for International Labour Standards?’ in Bernard, C.,
Deakin, S., and Morris, G., (eds.). The Future o f  Labour Law  (2004), pp.253.
Simpson, W., ‘Standard Setting and Supervision -A  System in Difficulty’ in ILO, Les Normes Internationales 
du Travail: une Patromine Pour L ’avenir (2004), pp.47.
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between 55 and 65 per cent one has little reason to celebrate the success of the enforcement 
mechanisms of the ILO. Langille uses the case study of the Union of Myanmar’s (formerly 
Burma) to further his point that repeated mal-compliance perpetuates even where ‘all legal 
stops have been pulled’.
The specific concerns of the ILO about the enforcement of its treaties via a reporting model 
are, of course, common to many treaty regimes. International scholars have long questioned 
the principle of a self-assessed reporting system. For Robertson, the natural tendency for 
subjectivity to creep in, when states complete their own reports, is inevitable and undermines 
the objectivity of the process. Donnelly pointed to the reports that emitted fi*om the Soviet 
Bloc that were almost certainly exaggerated and contained irrelevant extracts from national 
constitutions.^^ Opsahl pointed to the multitude of tardy or non-compliant states. The Human 
Rights Committee noted that at the time of Opsahl’s article, two-thirds of states were non- 
compliant.^* McGoldrick is more optimistic however, citing that many states have improved 
their reports drastically and their punctuality has improved since their initial submissions.^® 
Robertson pointed to the heart of the problem with the current system, in that even on a true 
and punctual report the committee has no power to compel change.^^ Robertson is further 
unconvinced by Article 41 and the power to make inter-state complaints, describing it as a 
merely ‘optional p rocedureM cG oldrick  criticised the first optional protocol and the 
individual complaints procedure.^^ Given that many states have failed to ratify this protocol
Langille, B., ‘Core Labour Rights -The True Story (Reply to Alston)’ (2005) 16 EJIL 409,412.
Robertson, D., 'The Implementation System: International Measures', in Louis Henkln, (eds.) The 
International Bill o f  Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (New York: Columbia University 
Press) pp.332-369.
Donnelly, J., 'International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis', International Organizations (1986) 40(3) 
Journal o f  Peace Research 599-642.
Opsahal, 'The Human Rights Committee' (1995) in Philip Alston, ed.. The United Nations and Human Rights: 
A Critical Appraisal. (Oxford: Clarendon) pp. 369-443.
McGoldrick . D., Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development o f  the International Covenant an 
Civil and Political Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
’^Robertson, 'The Implementation System: International Measures', in Louis Henkln, ed.. The International Bill 
o f  Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (New York: Columbia University Press) pp.332-369, 
335.
^ McGoldrick, D., Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development o f  the International Covenant an 
Civil and Political Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 10.
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(notably the United States), there is no follow-up procedure and again no power to compel 
any change. Additionally, Donnelly asserted that the system is stacked in favour of the state, 
as it requires all information to come from the offending state. The complainant state is 
unlikely to receive its full co-operation. Donnelly however, does concede that the political 
pressure has forced real changes to national laws. It is in this vein, that Keith observed that 
the general acquiescence to broader rights in the Covenant has led to the creation of norms 
and acts as a way of publicising states that are lax on rights’ implementation.^"^ Finally, Keith 
noted the Committee’s ability to draw international attention to major human rights abuses in 
a way not seen before.^^
The concern of states evading their obligations under a ratified ILO convention is not limited 
to developing countries. The matter is thrown into sharp relief at the present time of global 
economic downturn, as the ILO observed in its Annual Report of 2011.^® Total global 
employment in industry declined in 2009, which is a major divergence from the historical 
annual growth rate of 3.4 per cent over the period from 2002 to 2007. In the Developed 
Economies and European Union region, employment in industry plummeted by 9.5 million 
between 2007 and 2009, while in the developing regions industrial employment grew. The 
report also warns that a narrow focus on deficit reduction and not on job creation and security 
will damage the recovering economy.
It is therefore submitted that a strong mechanism needs to be established, which more 
effectively enforces labour standards. As Alston put it, the challenge is:
‘... to devise a regime which builds upon some of the strengths of the ancient regime, 
transcends its not inconsiderable failings, maximised the potential contribution the 
Declaration ensures that its principles are clearly rooted in existing international legal 
standards, reaches out to new actors including corporations and those promulgating
Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in 
Human Rights Behaviour? (1999) 36(1) Journal o f  Peace Research 95.
Ibid., 102.
Global Economic Trends: the challenge o f  a jobs recovery (Geneva: ILO, 2011).
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private codes of conduct, and brings those groups into a creative but principled 
relationship with the ILO’/^
As to what that ‘regime’ should be, Valticos^^ and later Alston^* envisaged the promotion of 
universal human rights through the application of labour law standards conceived as human 
rights instruments. Later, Thomas, Oelz and Beudonnet specifically examined the case for 
direct application of ratified ILO conventions in domestic courts/® yet pointedly excluded an 
examination of the use of customary international labour law fi*om their study without further 
explanation. Some have come close to advocating customary law as a solution, but have 
fallen short of exploring it further. Novitz, for example, when commenting on the practice of 
some states to denounce ILO treaties, observed in some cases that it would be ‘... pointless 
because of their implicit status within the international community’. T h e  tantalising 
question raised by her observation is, to what ‘implicit status’ might be referring. Article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)^^ sets out the sources to which 
the court ‘shall apply’ when determining disputes. Article 38(l)(a) provides that a source of 
law is ‘international conventions’, such as ILO conventions. Article 38(l)(b) provides that 
alongside this source is ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law’. It is submitted that this is most likely what Novitz was referring to when she observed 
some provisions of ILO conventions had ‘implicit status’ in international law. In short, that 
some of the provisions of ILO treaties have passed into a parallel body of customary 
international law, which, because it operates independent of the treaty, would be truly
Alston, p., ‘Facing up to the Complexities o f the ILO’S Core Labour Standards Agenda’ (2005) 16 EJIL 467, 
476.
Valticos, N., ‘International labour standards and human rights: Approaching the year 2000’ (1998) 137 
International Labour Review 135-147. See also: Valticos, N., ‘Droit Intemaitonal du Travail et Droit Interne 
Français’ Travaux du Comité Français de Droit International Prive (Paris, Dalloz, 1970).
Alston, P., Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford, 2005).
Thomas, C., Oelz, M., and Beaudonnet, X., ‘The use of international labour law in domestic courts: Theory, 
recent jurisprudence, and practical implications’ in Javillier, J., C., Gemigon, B., (eds.) Les norms internationals 
du travail: unpatrimoniepour l ’avenir. Menlanges en l ’honneur de Nicolas Valticos (Geneva: BIT, 2004). 
^^Ibid. atp.254, fh.l9.
Novitz, T., ‘International Promises and Domestic Pragmatism: To what Extent will the Employment Relations 
Act 1999 Implement International Labour Standards Relating to Freedom o f Association’ (2000) 63 Modern 
Law Review 379, at p.379.
Statute o f the International Court of Justice (San Francisco, 26 June 1945; TS 67 (1946); Cmd. 70145).
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‘pointless’ to denounce, as a state would still be bound by the parallel customary rule. 
Furthermore, Rassam^"  ^and later Bullard,^^ suggested that the prohibition of child slavery and 
bonded labour, as set out in ILO Convention 182, might amount to norms of customary law. 
Both these enquiries, however, have limitations to their respective method. For example, 
Bullard’s^ ® examination of the customary status of the prohibition against child slavery makes 
assumptions as to status without adducing any methodology for independent examination by 
third parties. Similarly, Rassam’s^  ^examination of the same field makes the critical point that 
most commentators ‘blithely assert’^  ^child slavery to be prohibited by a customary norm 
without proposing an objective method for testing this thesis. It is therefore submitted that the 
international labour law field requires a comprehensive examination, based on a robust 
method, to explore how customary international law may be used to enforce labour standards 
and, in particular, the norm of non-discrimination in work contained within ILO Convention 
111.
This thesis is based on three propositions. First, that a provision within a multilateral treaty 
may generate a parallel rule of customary international law. Second, that that rule of 
customary international law may exist alongside, and independent from, the treaty provision. 
Third, that such a rule of customary international law forms a part of, or more properly, a 
source of the English common law.
Such a thesis is, of course, home out of an increasing trend to codify customary international 
standards for the purpose of defining the extent of that particular source of law for the benefit
Rassam, Y., ‘Contemporary Forms o f Slavery and the Evolution o f the Prohibition o f Slavery and the Slave 
Trade Under Customary International Law’ (1999) 39 Virginia Journal o f  International Law  303.
Bullard, M., ‘Child Labour Prohibitions are Universal, Binding and Obligatory Law, the Evolving State of 
Customary International Law Concerning the Un-empowered Child Labour’ (2002) 24 Houston Journal o f  
International Law  139, pp. 182-183; pp.I83-184.
Bullard, M., ‘Child Labour Prohibitions are Universal, Binding and Obligatory Law, the Evolving State o f  
Customary International Law Concerning the Un-empowered Child Labour’ (2002) 24 Houston Journal o f  
International Law  139.
Rassam, Y., ‘Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution o f the Prohibition o f Slavery and the Slave 
Trade Under Customary International Law’ (1999) 39 Virginia Journal o f  International Law  303.
Rassam, Y., ‘Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution o f the Prohibition o f Slavery and the Slave 
Trade Under Customary International Law’ (1999) 39 Virginia Journal o f  International Law  303, p.308.
14
of courts, practitioners and scholars/* The most recent of which was the decade-long enquiry 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) into customary international 
humanitarian law/® That study produced a handbook comprising of 161 Rules together with 
commentary, spreading to three volumes. It has quite properly been characterised as a 
‘significant contribution to the learning on, and the development of, international 
humanitarian law’."^  ^ However, the ICRC’s methodology was not as robust as it might 
otherwise have been. As Mendelson said of the ICRC study’s method:
‘Some of the leading experts in the world on customary law were members of the 
International Committee and the Principles were agreed not only by them, but by the 
whole Association -  largely without controversy’
The methodology of the ICRC study was subject to significant academic criticism. As 
Bethlehem put it:
‘...it is impossible to escape the nagging sense ... that there are too many steps in the 
process of crystallisation and of the formulation of the black letter customary rules 
' that are insufficiently clear, even by reference to the two accompanying volumes of 
practice. Too much certainty is expressed in the affirmation of the customary status of 
the Rules as formulated.’"*^
That ‘nagging sense’ held by many commentators about the methodology employed by the 
Study, was explored in detail by Scobbie in his influential chapter ‘The Approach to 
Customary International Law’ in Wilmshurst and Breau’s monograph. Perspectives on the
See, for example, the 1929 Harvard Law School draft Articles on ‘The Law o f Responsibility o f  States for 
Damage Done in their Territory to the Person or Property o f Foreigners’ (1929) 23 AJIL 131; Doswald-Beck, L., 
(eds.) San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).
Henckaerts, J., and Doswald-Black, L., Customary International Humanitarian Law  (Cambridge: CUP, 
2005).
Bethlehem, D., ‘The Methodological Framework o f the Study’ in Wilmshurst E., and Breau, S., (eds.) 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law  (Cambridge, 2007) at p. 1.
Speech o f Maurice Mendelson QC, Conference to Mark the Publication o f  the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law  (Chatham House, London: 18, April 2005). 
at p.5.
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ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law/"* Scobbie’s first concern was 
that reliance is placed upon communications between states and the ICRC/^ This does not sit 
well with the ICJ’s exclusion of travaux preparatories as relevant to the interpretation of 
treaties/® and a robust methodology should therefore exclude such communications when 
considering state practice and opinio juris. This comes against Dinstein’s similar criticism of 
the Study’s reliance placed upon documents, such as UN committee reports, which ‘can 
never contribute directly through their own practice to the creation of customary norms’ /  On 
a similar vein, Hampson criticised the reliance placed upon the statements of human rights 
bodies, as these pronouncements carmot of themselves amount to state practice/^ The general 
point as to where we look for evidence of state practice and opinio juris, has great relevance 
to a study of labour norms. The ILO produces copious reports on the application of its treaties 
by parties and, in some cases, non-parties. Whilst these documents can demonstrate a source 
of empirical evidence, they cannot create practice on behalf of the state. As such, only the 
public communications of competent organs of the state can be a source of opinio juris.
Second, Scobbie tackled the Study’s approach to the level of opinio juris required to evidence 
a binding norm, where there has already been a high level of state practice. The authors of the 
Study place great weight on Kirgis’ thesis that where a high level of practice is in evidence, 
the necessity to prove a high level of opinio juris decreases, on a ‘sliding scale’."** Where, 
Scobbie argued, the Study fell into error, was to translate Kirgis’ proposition that widespread 
practice can reduce the need for opinio juris, into a presumption of customary status in such a 
situation. The ICI has never gone that far, and established in Nicaragua^^ that an examination 
of other evidence will always be necessary before it will conclude that a given rule is 
customary, thus:
Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian 
Law (Cambridge, 2007).
Ibid. p.25 and 44.
Jurisdiction o f  the European Commission o f  the Danube Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser.B., No. 14 (1927) 32. 
Dinstein, Y., ‘The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study’ (2006) 36 Israeli Yearbook on 
Human Rights 1 at pp.5-6.
Hampson, F., ‘Fundamental Guarantees’ in Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., (eds.) Perspectives on the ICRC 
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law  (Cambridge, 2007) at p.287.
49
50
Kirgis, F., ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1987) 91 American Journal o f  International Law  146.
Nicaragua v United States (M eritsf (1987) 81 American Journal o f  International Law  116, at p.97 at [183].
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‘The mere fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for 
the Court to consider these as being part of customary international law, and as 
applicable as such to those States. The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of 
the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice’.®*
It is quite sensible to hold that state practice without anything further cannot create custom. 
However, it can usually be inferred from the context against which the state exercises the 
relevant practice whether the state is exercising that practice out of ‘courtesy, convenience or 
tradition’,®^ or whether it is motivated by a sense of a ‘legal duty’.®® Accordingly, the 
International Law Association (ILA) in their comprehensive report into the rules surrounding 
the creation of customary law suggested that:
‘16. A belief, on the part of the generality of States, that a practice satisfying the 
criteria set out in Part II corresponds to a legal obligation or a legal right (as the case 
may be) (opinio juris sive necessitatis) is sufficient to prove the existence of a rule of 
customary international law; but it is not (subject to Section 17) necessary to the 
formation of such a rule to demonstrate that such a belief exists, either generally or on 
the part of any particular State. ’®"*
The contributors to the Report explain that:
‘States actively engaged in the creation of a new customary rule may well wish or 
accept that the practice in question will give rise to a legal rule, but it is logically 
impossible for them to have an opinio juris in the literal and traditional sense, that is, 
a belief that the practice is already legally permissible or obligatory. This is true both 
individually and collectively. Hence the last clause of this Section (“it is not necessary 
to the formation of such a rule that such a belief exists, either generally or on the part 
of any particular State”) ... In practice international tribunals and, it seems. States, do 
not specifically look for evidence of opinio juris unless there is reason to believe, for 
the sorts of reasons examined in the Section 17, that practice otherwise satisfying the
51 [1986] ICJ Rep. 16, pp.97-98 at [184].
North Sea [1969] ICJ Rep. 3 at p.42 at [77]. 
Ibid.
54 ILA Report: Formation o f  Customary (General International Law) (London, 2000) p.32.
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criteria of Part II does not “count” towards the formation of customary law. 5 55
As such, the ILA held that widespread practice can amount to the creation of a customary 
rule, provided it could be reasonable inferred from the circumstances that the state was 
participating in the creation of a new legal obligation. The ILA went on to identify instances 
of practice where no opinio juris could not be inferred from a context/®
(i) Acts of mere etiquette or courtesy, outside of the legal sphere.
(ii) Acts done with an understanding that it is not creating a rule.
(iii) Acts carrying a disclaimer against creating a rule.
(iv) Ambiguous practice.
Dealing with ambiguous practice, the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf cdiSQ (henceforth 
North S e a f  held that:
‘As regards those States, on the other hand, which were not, and have not become 
parties to the Convention, the basis of their action can only be problematical and 
must remain entirely speculative.... [N]o inference could justifiably be drawn that 
they believed themselves to be applying a mandatory rule of customary 
international law. ... The essential point in this connection ... is that even if these 
instances of action by non-parties to the Convention were much more numerous 
than they in fact are, they would not, even in the aggregate, suffice in themselves 
to constitute the opinio juris'?^
We can see this comment as a reflection of the evidence before the Court in relation to the 
Convention in question, that the circumstances were ambiguous and even a greater 
demonstration of practice would not clarify that ambiguity. It is notable that the relevant 
treaty provision, dealing with the equidistance principle, could be seen as an act of etiquette 
or convention outside the legal sphere and, on the ILA thesis, not capable of giving rise to an 
inference of opinio juris in any event.
Ibid.
atpp.34-38.
W. Germany v Denmark & Netherlands [1969] ICJ Rep. 3.
58 [1969] ICJRep. 3,p.3.
18
Thus, the test, when considering the creation of new rules of customary law, is whether it can 
be reasonably inferred from a state’s conduct that it intended to create a new legal obligation 
and to be bound by it. In so doing, we should examine whether the practice falls within one of 
the foregoing categories which the ILA have drafted and which would indicate that an 
inference of opinio juris could not be drawn from the circumstances of practice. In essence, 
the test is one of context. Such was the conclusion of the American Law Institute in its 
Restatement o f the Foreign Relations Law o f the United States, where they held at paragraph 
102 that:
‘c. Opinio juris. For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international 
law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation 
{opinio juris sive necessitatis)', a practice that is generally followed but which states 
feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law. A practice initially 
followed by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states 
generally come to believe that they are under a legal obligation to comply with it. It is 
often difficult to determine when that transformation into law has taken place. 
Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not 
necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from acts or omissions.’
The American Law Institute’s commentary was expressly approved by the UK House of 
Lords in R(European Roma Rights Centre) v Secretary o f State for the Home Department.^^
Third, and on a related concern, Scobbie warned against the examination of too narrow a 
demonstration of state practice over a small period of time, usually in relation to a particular 
event. As he cautions, ‘the normative canonisation of propositions on the basis of restricted 
practice raises an obvious danger of the consolidation of norms whose implications have not 
been fully though out or thought through’.®® This is a lesser risk for a study examining labour 
norms, than it was for a study examining norms developed in and after armed conflict. The 
practice of states in their labour law is very rarely, if ever likely to be, inspired by a collective 
and very specific event on a par with armed conflict.
[2004] UKHL 55 per Lord Bingham at [71].
^  Scobbie, L, ‘The Approach to Customary International Law’ in Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., (eds.) 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary InternationalHumanitarian Law  (Cambridge, 2007) at pp.28-29.
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Fourth, the Study chose to express no opinion on the doctrine of the persistent objector, 
arguing that some authorities ‘doubt the continued existence of this doctrine’/* As Scobbie 
correctly pointed out, however, that was not the considered view of the ILA in its 
comprehensive report into the creation of customary law. As is set out in detail below, the 
ILA’s view is to be preferred and any methodology which fails to take account of a 
qualifying persistent objection from a state is flawed.
Fifth, Parks argued that physical acts should take priority to verbal acts, because ‘war is the 
ultimate test of law. Government authorised actions speak louder than peacetime government 
statements’.®^ However, that is not the view held by the ICJ in the Fisheries case.®® Scobbie, 
was of the view that verbal peacetime statements are to be preferred because ‘... a peacetime 
assessment of what the law requires is more considered, precisely because it is detached from 
the pressures of conflict’.®"* As such, Scobbie was of the view that the Study’s preference to 
verbal acts over physical ones is ‘unimpeachable’.®® This is a further matter which is unlikely 
to trouble a labour law study. As such, this thesis will be tested against verbal peacetime 
practice of states.
Sixth, some®® have criticised the level of state official to which the Study has attached the 
weight of state practice. As Aldrich commented:
‘This study [cities] ... official statements, such as the remarks of the Deputy Legal
Advisor of the United States Department of State at a 1987 meeting in Washington
DC, as well as public reports or statements by military officials or agencies of many
Study, Vol. I., 151. Commentary to Rule 45.
Parks, W.H., ‘The ICRC Study Customary Law Study: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2005) 99 Proceedings o f  
the American Society o f  International Law  208 at p.210.
United Kingdom V Norway [1951] ICJ Rep. 116 at pp. 124-125 (cf. dissenting opinion o f Judge Read at p.l91). 
^  Scobbie, I., ‘The Approach to Customary International Law’ in Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., (eds.) 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law  (Cambridge, 2007) at p.37.
Ibid.
^ See in general Parks, W.H., ‘The ICRC Study Customary Law Study: A Preliminary Assessment’ (2005) 99 
Proceedings o f  the American Society o f  International Law  208 at pp.208-209 and Schmitt. M, ‘The Law o f  
Targeting’ in Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., (eds.) Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, 2007) p. 134.
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other states that five some indication of official attitudes which respect how hostilities 
have been or should be conducted. But such materials, while helpful, fall short of 
defining with any precision the extent of contemporary state acceptance of, or 
probable state agreement with, the proposed rules of customary international 
humanitarian law made by this study.®^
In the Cumaraswamy advisory opinion,®  ^the ICJ took a looser view of this matter. The Court 
held that ‘according to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of any organ 
of a state must be regarded as an act of that state. This rule ... is of a customary character’.®* 
As such, Scobbie was dubious of this criticism, arguing that ‘... it is difficult to see how 
States may disavow, without further ado, statements and official documents emanating from 
its functionaries, however lowly, providing they are acting in an official capacity at the 
time’.^ ® Accordingly, the methodology of this thesis will give weight to the official 
statements of the executive, judicial or legislative arm of a state, provided it is made by a 
duly authorised person, acting in an official capacity at the time.
Seventh, Bethlehem commented that there is little evaluation of the weight of respective acts 
of state practice.^* This is a well-made point. In this dissertation, the greatest weight will be 
attached to legislative actions, next to judicial pronouncements, and finally to statements of 
government officials.
Eight, Bethlehem made the important note that there appears to be slight differences between 
the treaty provision and the customary rule, without explanation.^^ This is an important point. 
In this study, the starting point will be the wording of the treaty provision and if the evidence 
points to a different practice under customary law that will be the rule. However, whatever
Aldrich, G.H., ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law -  an Interpretation on behalf o f the International 
Committee o f the Red Cross’ (2005) 76 British Yearbook o f  International Law  503, at p.507.
Difference relating to Immunity from Legal Process o f  a Special Rapporteur o f  the Commission on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion o f 29 April 1999 [1999] ICJ Rep. 62.
Ibid. at p.87 at [62].
Scobbie, L, ‘The Approach to Customary International Law’ in Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., (eds.) 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law  (Cambridge, 2007) at p.40.
Bethlehem, D., ‘The Methodological Framework o f the Study’ in Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., (eds.) 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law  (Cambridge, 2007) at p. 10.
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the research demonstrates the customary norm to be, a clear explanation of that norm is 
required to avoid Bethlehem’s well-made criticism.
Finally, Scobbie pointed out that the Study, in its digest of practice, contains reference to 
statements made by insurgents.^® Whilst it is noted that the Yugoslav Appeal Tribunal 
Chamber took into account such statements when assessing custom in the Tadic case,^ "* 
custom is essentially formed by the practice of states. In any event, this point is unlikely to 
arise in a study of labour law.
The foregoing critique of the ICRC’s Study’s methodology seriously undermines the 
conclusions of the Study as a whole. There is therefore a gap in the learning on the formation 
of customary international law, which the examination of this thesis presents an opportunity 
to address via an improved methodology.
The emergence of a customary international rule from a parallel treaty provision
By Article 38(l)(b) Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945,^ ® one of the sources of 
international law is listed as being ‘general customs as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’. Such a general practice is elevated to the legal force of customary 
international law, when the practice of the states is widespread and consistent and, further, 
that practicing states act in such a manner out of a sense of legal obligation. These are the two 
requirements for a norm of customary law to come into being, abbreviated to state practice 
and opinio juris.
The rules of international labour law are, however, largely contained within multilateral 
treaties. These treaties are drafted and tendered for ratification to members of the ILO and, 
once ratified, obligations are engaged, requiring that state to implement the treaty provisions 
and to report upon its implementation to the ILO. As such, the majority of standards of 
conduct in work are already contained within an ILO treaty, enforceable by the mechanisms 
of the relevant treaty regime. This is the case for the prohibition of non-discrimination in
Scobbie, I., ‘The Approach to Customary International Law’ in Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., (eds.) 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law  (Cambridge, 2007) at p.46 
Prosecutor V Tadic (2, October 1995) IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 102-103, 107 and at 108.
Statute of the International Court of Justice (San Francisco, 26 June 1945; TS 67 (1946); Cmd. 70145).
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work/® The question, therefore, emerges whether non-parties to that treaty are to be bound by 
the provisions of the treaty.
The emergence of a universally binding norm of customary international law, in part, inspired 
by a provision of a multilateral treaty, is a challenging and controversial thesis. This is 
because, in accordance with the sovereignty of states, the basic rule of international law is 
that a treaty cannot create obligations for a third state, which is not party to the treaty, without 
its express consent. It is, however, a necessary thesis to pursue when considering 
international labour norms, and in particular, the norm of non-discrimination in work. This is 
because at the time of the publication of ILO Treaty C l l l  on Discrimination in 1958 there 
was no customary norm prohibiting discrimination in work, neither can it be argued that 
c m  crystallised an emerging norm prohibiting discrimination at the time. The only 
possibility, therefore, is that a customary norm of non-discrimination in work has since come 
into being, in part inspired by the presence and widespread ratification of C l l l  itself, 
together with the subsequent practice of states, which are both parties and non-parties, to that 
treaty. This is what Arechaga characterises as the ‘generative {de lege ferendd) effect’ of 
treaties.^^
The starting point is that international law does not expressly exclude such a possibility, as 
Article 38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969^* provides that:
‘Nothing in articles 34-37 [of the Vienna Convention] precludes a rule set forth in a 
treaty from becoming a binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international 
law, recognised as such’.
The possibility was examined in detail by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in North 
Sea}^ The case was concerned with whether West Germany was bound by the equidistance
Contained within ILO Treaty G U I.
Article 34, Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties (Geneva, 23 May 1969; TS 58 (1980); Cmnd. 7964.) 
Arechaga, J., ‘Customary International Law and the Conference on the Law of the Sea’, in Essays in 
International Law in Honour o f  Judge M. Lochs (New York, 1984), pp.577-578.
Ibid  at Article 38.
80 W. Germany v Denmark & Netherlands [1969] ICJ Rep. 3.
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principle contained within Article 6 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958/* The 
Geneva Convention was a multilateral treaty to which West Germany was not a party. It was 
contended by Denmark and the Netherlands that, notwithstanding that West Germany was 
not a party to the treaty, it was nonetheless bound by a parallel rule of customary 
international law, which had come into being since ratification of the Convention by 
contracting parties. The rule had emerged, it was argued, partly because of its own impact 
and partly on the basis of subsequent state practice. The ICJ approved the general principle of 
such a contention in the following terms:
‘71. In so far as this contention is based on the view that Article 6 of the Convention 
has had the influence and has produced the effect, described, it clearly involves 
treating that Article as a norm-creating provision which has constituted the foundation 
of, or has generated a rule which, while only convention or contractual in its origin, 
has since passed into the general corpus of international law and is now accepted as 
such by the opino juris, so as to have become binding even for countries which have 
never, and do not, become parties to the Convention. There is no doubt that this 
process is a perfectly possible one and does from time to time occur: it constitutes 
indeed one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary international 
law may be formed.
The Court cautioned, however, that such an outcome is not ‘lightly to be regarded as having 
been attained’.^ ® A robust and objective methodology is therefore required to determine 
whether a norm of customary international law has emerged fi*om a treaty provision. In North 
Sea, the Court laid down a series of minimum requirements that should form the basis of any 
such methodology. First, the treaty provision in question must be of a ‘fundamentally norm 
creating character, such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law’. 
Second, a ‘veiy widespread and representative participation in the convention’ ®^ was 
required, although the Court did not require all states in the international system or indeed, 
even a majority to have ratified a given treaty. Finally, the Court confirmed that a short
29 April 1958,499 UNTS 311. 
[1969] ICJ R ep.3,p.4I at [71]. 
Ibid.
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3, p.42 at [72]. 
Ibid. at p.42. at [73].
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period of time was no bar to the emergence of a customary norm, but held that the final and 
‘indispensible requirement’ ®^ would be that:
within the period in question ... state practice, including that of states whose 
interests are specifically affected, should have both extensive and virtually uniform in 
the sense of the provision invoked ... [and should show] a general recognition that a 
rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
As such, the Court required a demonstration of non-parties whose interests were affected by 
the treaty in question to have participated out of a sense of legal obligation. This is a crucial 
line of enquiry for any methodology in this field because the practice of states party to a 
treaty is largely performed out of a contractual obligation to that treaty; however, the practice 
of non-party states is the acid test of customary status. That task is not always easy, however. 
Accordingly, Baxter prophesised the challenge of this thesis:
‘As the number of parties to a treaty increases, it becomes more difficult to 
demonstrate what is the state of customary international law dehors the treaty ... As 
the express acceptancerx)f the treaty increases, the number of States not parties whose 
practice is relevant diminishes there will be less scope for the development of 
international law dehors the treaty.
Indeed, as the ICRC itself noted that ‘in some instances, it is not yet possible to find a rule of 
customary international law even though there is a clear majority practice in favour of the 
rule and such a rule is very desirable’.^ *
The Court’s change of direction in North Sea^^ from the traditional vision of customary norm 
creation, was swiftly followed by another landmark and progressive judgment. In Barcelona 
Traction^^ the Court held that it was not necessary, in the case of the violation of certain
^^Ibid. atp.43 at [74].
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customary norms, for a state to be directly affected by the violation if the obligation was of 
fundamental importance (an obligation erga omnes) for it to sue another state for recovery. 
The jurisprudence of the Court in these two important cases, has given rise to an on-going 
discourse as to the requirements of customary international law. The schism in the literature 
which has emerged has been styled by Roberts as being between those who subscribe to 
‘traditional custom’ versus those who advocate a more progressive thesis known as ‘modem 
custom’. I t  is notable however, that much of the traditionalist criticism of the ICJ’s major 
judgments on identifying customary mles has been motivated by a number of its highly fact 
sensitive judgments where the Court has employed, what Alvarez-Jimenez styles as being a 
‘flexible deductive approach’ As Meron observed:
‘Where a treaty concerns a particular area of law, however, even if it does not bind the 
parties to the dispute in question, the ICJ has tended to treat the texts of the treaty as a 
distillation of the customary rule, eschewing examination of primary materials 
establishing stated practice and opinio juris
In Armed Activities, f o r  example, the ICJ held that Article 3 of the Fourth Hague 
Convention had attained customary status, without working through the tests at Article 
38(I)(b) ICJ Statute. Furthermore, in the Israeli Security Barrier Advisory Opinion^^ the ICJ 
held that:
‘The principles as to the use of force incorporated in the Charter reflect customary 
international law ... the same is tme of its corollary entailing the illegality of 
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force’.
Ibid. at p.32.
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Finally, the ICJ held, in Le Grancf^, that Article 33(4) Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969) was customary without any examination of the relevant state practice or 
opinio juris. Such a broad-brushed method appeared particularly unsatisfactory because one 
of the parties to the case, the United States, was not a party to the Vienna Convention.
The reason for the ICJ taking a more flexible approach in these cases was, according to 
Alvarez-Jimenez, because the treaty provisions in question were customary by ‘widespread 
co n se n su sH o w e v e r ,  the answer is perhaps more conceptual. The treaty provisions at play 
in the foregoing cases regulate the most fundamental and crucial norms of conduct in order 
for a community of states to function. International labour law does not fall within that 
conceptual category, not least because it does not regulate the conduct between states, but 
rather regulates the employment regimes established by a state for the protection of its own 
citizens. Furthermore, the litigation of points of international labour law will, invariably, fall 
to be determined by domestic courts. As such, a flexible approach to identifying customary 
rules would not be appropriate. Instead, a rigorous methodology needs to be followed 
incorporating the strict methodology of the ICJ in its successive pronouncements on this 
matter. Having distanced this thesis from the flexible deductive approach, we can now 
approach the traditionalist anti-thesis, properly contextualised and insofar as it concerns this 
thesis.
The traditionalist critique boils down to four central objections. First, it is contended that 
transforming treaty provisions into rules of customary law introduces unwelcome normative 
concepts into the sources of international law.^ ®^  The answer to this is to be found in ICJ’s 
judgment in North Sea.^^^ the Court held that only treaty provisions which have 
enjoyed ‘very widespread and representative’ implementation by states whose interests are 
‘specifically affected’ can pass into customary international law. As such, the emergence 
of customary norms by this method remains true to the consensus model of the sources of
LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States o f  America), (Judgment o f 27 June 2001).
Alvarez-Jimenez, A., ‘Methods for the identification of customary international law in the International
Court o f Justice's jurisprudence: 2000-2009’ {20W) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 6^\ at p.691. 
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international law. Thus, as the traditionalist Franck correctly puts it, ‘a normative principle 
[enters customary law] ... only after it is demonstrably adhered to by the actual conduct of 
the large preponderance of international actors capable of violating it’.^®"^ When coupled with 
the ability of states not to be bound by an emerging customary rule by registering an early 
and persistent objection, the process of identifying customary norms which parallel an 
identical treaty provision, retains state sovereignty and thus remains positivist and not 
normative in its character.
Second, some advocates of the traditional model do concede that international treaties can be 
the ‘starting point in the development of custom’, b u t  argue that cannot amount to norm- 
generating acts in and of themselves. In essence, less weight is placed on practice in favour of 
opinio juris, when considering widespread participation in a treaty provision. This point is 
accepted. Whilst some advocate a principle of ‘instant custom’ following international 
agreement encompassed in a convent ion , the  ICJ in North Sea did not accept this theory, 
nor has it in subsequent jurisprudence in Nicaragua. What the ICJ held, instead, was that a 
treaty provision could, in principle, be a norm-creating provision if it was accompanied by 
subsequent, substantial and uniform state practice by both parties and non-parties to the 
relevant treaty out of a sense of legal obligation. As such, it is accepted that treaties can 
form the ‘starting point’ for customary norm-generation, but more is required before a 
customary norm can be identified. That principle was stated clearly in North Sea, where the 
ICJ held that:
‘The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in 
the very notion of the opinion juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must 
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The
Franck ‘Appraisals o f the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v United States (M eritsf (1987) 81 American Journal 
o f  International Law  116, at p. 119.
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frequency or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are 
many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial an protocol, which are 
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of 
courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty’.^ °^
The requirement was re-stated in Nicaragua^^^ vjYvqxq the ICJ held that it could look to the 
UN Charter and the Charter of the Organisation of American States to begin an enquiry into 
what norms were customary, but that it was not the end of the enquiry and that further 
‘collateral evidence’^^  ^was required before a conclusion of customary status could be made, 
thus:
‘The mere fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for 
the Court to consider these as being part of customary international law, and as 
applicable as such to those States .... The Court must satisfy itself that the existence 
of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice’.^
As discussed above, however, the ILA has concluded that such ‘collateral evidence’ can be 
evidenced by the context against which the practice is exercised.
Third, it is contended that much of the content of international treaties is aspirational and not 
intended to carry legal f o rc e .W h i l s t  this is quite true, the ICJ was clear in North Sea that 
not every part of a treaty could give rise to a customary norm. It was only those provisions 
which could be said to be of a ‘fundamentally norm creating character such as could be 
regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law’.^ "^^  Finally, and consequentially, it is 
argued that purported customary norms, which are not based squarely on state practice and
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3 at p.42 at [77]. 
"°[1986] ICJ Rep. 14.
Scobbie, 1., ‘The Approach to Customary International Law in the Study’ in Wilmsburst E., and Breau, S., 
(eds.) Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, 2007) at 
p.30.
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14, p.l84.
Franck, ‘Appraisals o f the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v United States (Merits)’ (1987) 81 American Journal 
o f  International Law  116, at p. 119.
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3, p.42 at [72].
29
opinio juris lack legitimacy.^It should be borne in mind that the ICJ has endorsed the 
principle that treaty provisions can, in some strict circumstances, give rise to norms of 
customary international law. The principle was again restated by the ICJ in Nicaragua v 
United States (Merits)^^^ thus:
‘The existence of identical rules in international treaty law and customary law has 
been clearly recognised by the court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cdiSQS ... those 
cases turned on the question whether a rule enshrined in a treaty also existed as a 
customary rule, either because the treaty had merely codified the custom, or caused it 
to “crystalize”, or because it had influenced its subsequent adoption. The Court found 
that this identity of content in treaty law and in customary international law did not 
exist in the case of the rule invoked ... but did not suggest that such identity was 
debarred as a matter of principle’.^
The ICJ went on to hold that treaty law and customary international law exist and are to be 
applied separately from one another, even if the content of the rule is identical. The Court 
rejected an argument from the United States that a treaty provision extinguishes any identical 
rule in customary law.
The North Sea and Nicaragua jurisprudence was most recently affirmed, albeit in fairly 
sweeping terms, by the ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion^thus:
‘It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person 
and “elementary considerations of humanity” ... that the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further, these fundamental rules are to 
be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that
115 Van Hoof, G., Rethinking Sources o f  International Law  (Hingham, 1983) at pp.289-292 and Wolfke, K.,
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contained them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international 
customary law.’^^ ^
As such, provided the strict methodology which the ICJ laid down in North is
followed, it should be possible to identify customary rules of international law which have 
developed, at least in part, because of the coming into force of an ILO convention. In such 
circumstances, the ILO convention can be said to have ‘generated a rule which, while only 
convention or contractual in its origin, has since passed into the general corpus of 
international law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as to have become 
binding even for countries which have never, and do not, become parties to the 
C o n v e n t i o n T h e  legitimacy of the creation of a rule of law following the method is 
therefore axiomatic, as it has been struck by the ICJ, which is the competent international 
organ charged with adjudicating upon such matters by the United Nations.
The jurisprudence of the ICJ on this matter was carefully considered by the International Law 
Association (ILA) in its Report on the ‘Formation of Customary (General International 
L a w ) T h e  Report was comprehensive, contributed to by a Committee of eminent 
international lawyers, and set out to provide ‘... a statement of the relevant rules and 
principles, as the Committee understands them’.^ ^^  The Report concluded that:
‘24. Multilateral treaties can provide the impulse or model for the formation of new 
customary rules through State practice. In other words, they can be the historic 
(“material”) source of a customary rule. However, there is no presumption that they 
do so. Conduct which is wholly referable to the treaty itself does not count for this 
purpose as practice: though see Part IV(C) and (D).’^^ ^
121 Ibid. atp.257 at [79].
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The ILA prudently cautioned, however, that what states do in pursuance of their treaty 
obligations is prima facie referable to the treaty, and therefore, does not count toward the 
creation of a customary rule.’^^  ^As such, the ILA concluded:
‘...the conduct of parties to a treaty in relation to non-parties is not practice under the 
treaty, and therefore counts towards the formation of customary law.’
The English courts have adopted a very similar approach. In, The Congreso di Partido,^^^ a 
case concerning the customary nature of the state immunity principle. Lord Wilberforce held 
the approach of the UK to be:
‘... there may be cases in which a multilateral convention may become part of general 
international law so as to bind non-state parties
He continued, on a similar vein to the decision in North Sea,^^^ to hold that in order for such a 
transformation to arise:
‘...the convention must bear a legislative aspect and there must be a wide general 
acceptance of it as law-making, over a period ...
The matter was thoroughly addressed, by Lord Bingham in R(European Roma Rights Centre) 
V Secretary o f State fo r  the Home Department.^ The case concerned a pre-entry clearance 
system instituted by the UK Government at Prague airport between July 2001 to 2002. British 
immigration officers, with the permission of the Czech authorities, had been posted to Prague 
Airport to "pre clear" all passengers before they boarded flights to the UK. Leave to enter 
was granted to those passengers requiring it who satisfied the officers that they intended to 
visit the UK for a purpose within the Immigration Rules. Others who required leave to enter
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including those who stated that they were intending to claim asylum in the UK and those who 
the officers concluded were intending to do so, were refused leave to enter.
It was contended that operating such a pre-clearance scheme was contrary to the UK’s 
obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (United Nations) as 
modified by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967 (United Nations). 
Alternatively, it was argued that the scheme was contrary to a rule of customary international 
law, parallel to the Convention and a separate rule of customary international law prohibiting 
discrimination on racial grounds.
Lord Bingham delivered the leading judgment on the issue of customary law. First, he held 
that the law of England accepted the principle that:
‘The existence of the Convention is no obstacle in principle to the development of an 
ancillary or supplementary body of law, more generous than the Convention in 
application
Second, he expressly adopted the passage in the ICJ’s judgment in North which sets
out the tests for identifying a rule of customary international law, which has arisen parallel to 
a treaty provision.^^^
The position was most recently revisited by the Divisional Court in R(Mohamed) v Secretary 
o f State fo r  Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs The case concerned the application of the
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1984.^^  ^The Convention had not been fully implemented into UK 
law, as such, the claimants sought to argue that a rule of customary international law had 
arisen parallel to the Convention. Expressly adopting the ratio of North Sea once again.
[2004] UKHL 55 per Lord Bingham at [23]. See further that the Northern Irish Court o f Appeal followed 
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Thomas LJ and Lloyd Jones J. held that:
‘164. It is well established that the contents of a provision in a multilateral treaty, and 
as such binding on the states parties to that treaty but not binding on other states, may 
in time attain the status of a rule of customary international law binding on all 
states.
Consistent with the conclusion in North Sea that a rule of customary international law should 
not be deemed to have arisen ‘lightly’, K e r r  and Ralph Gibson LJJ held, in JH  Rayner 
(Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department o f Trade & Industry, that a rule of customary law must 
be ‘satisfactorily evidenced.
Drawing these strands together, we can make the following conclusions. It is a principle of 
international law, repeatedly affirmed by the ICJ, that a treaty provision can generate a 
parallel customary rule. That process is, however, subject to strict rules. Those rules are in 
addition to the general rules of the creation of general customary international law. That 
transformation principle is also the law of the UK.
An account of customary international law
The methodology prescribed by the ICJ in North Sea^^^ for determining whether a treaty 
provision had given rise to a parallel customary rule, was in addition to the general rules 
concerning the creation of rules of customary international law. Hence, on the facts, the ICJ 
held that the equidistance principle (articulated at Article 6 of the Convention) was not 
sufficiently representative to give rise to a rule of customary law. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the justification for custom and its constituent elements.
Whilst custom and treaty law are the two core sources of international law, they bind their 
subjects in different ways. Treaty based obligations bind states that have expressly signalled
140 [2008] EWHC 2048 (Admin.) per Thomas LJ and Lloyd Jones J, at [164].
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their intention to be bound through a ratification process, therefore, preserving the inherent 
sovereignty of the nation state. The opposite is the case in the formation of custom, 
however. Binding customary norms can emerge to bind all states without explicit acceptance 
by all states. The justification for the recognition of widespread practice as a legal rule is 
not certain. Charlesworth, for example, holds that custom can be seen as a method of 
compensating for the inflexibility of the treaty based system. Dunbar, on the other hand, 
sees custom as an inferior source of law to treaties.Scholars have advanced three essential 
justifications, consent, co-ordination and morality.
The principle explanation for custom, as a source of law, is the theory of consent. D’Amato 
explained that the significant state practice requirement was a reflection of the need for 
evidence of the conduct of sovereign states acting out of free will.^ "^  ^The consent may be 
manifested by the omission of a state to raise an early and persistent objection to the 
development of a norm. Such consent can be inferred, as Wolfke argued, by that state’s non­
objection and continued participation in the international society of s t a t e s .S u c h  a modified 
view of strict consent is the prevailing view. As Kelsen observed ‘custom results in the 
general consent of states’,^ ^^  which is the basis of the society of nations, as Fitzmaurice 
observed:
‘.. .the real foundation of the authority of international law resides ... in the fact that 
the States making up the international society recognise it as binding upon them, and, 
moreover, as a system that ipso facto binds them as members of that society, 
irrespective of their individual wills’.
The alternative explanation for custom is that of co-ordination. As Finnis explained the:
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... recognition of the authoritativeness of particular customs affords all states an 
opportunity of furthering the common good of the international community by solving 
interaction and co-ordination problems... ’ ^
Lillich is of a similar view, finding that custom is based around a need to regulate obligations, 
which may well include those arising out of the ILO conventions. The practical appeal of 
the co-ordination theory is, of course, not inconsistent with the consent theory. It has found 
some favour with the ICJ when it explained, in the Gulf o f Marine that custom’s
purpose was to ‘ensure the coexistence and vital co-operation of the members of the 
international community
Finally, there are some that advocate morality as the basis for complying with custom. Teson 
suggested that a norm which has attained customary status has done so because it is the 
‘right, fair or best rule’ This moral based theory is, as Lepard observed, based on the 
fundamentals of Grotian reasoning, which is that international law is based on 
reasonableness.^^^
Whilst it may not be possible to present a comprehensive account for custom, all three of the 
principle justifications for custom as a source of law, complement one another on a simple 
level. We can therefore say that custom is the legal recognition of the widespread practice of 
states, acting out of their free will to create binding norms, which are necessary to regulate 
their conduct and in turn to facilitate the functioning of the international community.
Having resolved a working account for the recognition of custom as a source of law, we can 
now move to examine the dualist method for identifying customary norms. Article 38(l)(b) 
ICJ Statues defines custom as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’. There is thus 
a requirement for an objective and then a subjective enquiry by an adjudicating court.
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The weight to attach to each of these elements has led to a schism in the scholarship: between 
traditionalists, who place greater weight upon opinio juris and modernists, who see state 
practice as the central element from which one can infer the subjective element. 
Koskenniemi however, was unconvinced, arguing the folly of division in reality. The 
discourse has been thrown into sharp relief by the failure of a number of treaty regimes to 
enforce the standards sets forth within them. This has led to:
‘... a strong temptation to turn to customary law as the formal source which provides, 
in a relatively straight-forward fashion, the desired answered. In particular, if 
customary law can be construed or approach in such a way as to supply a relatively 
comprehensive package of norms which are applicable to all States, then the debate 
over the sources of international human rights law can be resolved without much 
ado.’^^^
The debate is therefore framed around the competing doctrines for identifying customary 
norm formation. As Charlesworth observed, the traditionalist argument is focused on state 
practice and opinio juris as separate categories to preserve state sovereignty and is ‘positive 
and individualistic’ in na tu re . In d eed  for Weil, the sole normative facet of custom is its 
consensual nature. That said, the rapid growth of emergent states since the fall of 
Communism in Europe and redrawing of the Balkans state boundaries has led to a challenge 
to the traditionalist sovereignty-based model. Charlesworth advanced a theory based on the 
interests of the global community of s t a t e s t h a t  is binding in so far as the international 
social consciousness is in agreement. In a globalised and increasingly interdependent world, 
Byers concluded that time-old principles of sovereignty and consent will diminish.
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The first challenge to identify the objective element of custom, which is state practice. It is 
notoriously hard, some argue impossible in certain situations. What is broadly clear, 
however, is that the actions of state institutions give rise to state practice on behalf of that 
state. The ICJ, in a series of cases, discussed above, have been quick to affirm this view.^^^ 
Contributors to the ILA 2000 Report on Custom, when considering state practice, explored 
the place of the verbal statement by representatives of a state. The ILA examined the 
literature to prove verbal statements could be a source of state practice. As Villiger 
observed, ‘there is much merit in qualifying verbal acts as State practice ... and that to do 
otherwise would hardly be possible, since States themselves as well as courts regard 
comments at conferences as constitutive State p r a c t i c e A l th o u g h  concluding verbal acts 
were indeed a source of state practice, the ILA were at pains to note that many verbal acts 
were merely statements of opinion rather than practice and should be treated accordingly. 
Whilst physical practice is important, an overstating of its importance would minimise the 
subjective element of opinio juris.
When considering which organs of the state could speak for the state, and thus contribute 
towards state practice, the ILA took a broader view. Originally, state practice could only be 
formed upon the public statements of competent branches of the state. The ILA moved, 
however, to a more modem position, choosing to accept pleadings before international 
tribunals, domestic courts and the legislator. Cmcially, however, no move was made to 
alter the status quo that cases of the ICJ do not set c u s to m .M a n y  aspects of states’ practice 
cover areas of sensitive material. Contributors, therefore, wanted to underscore the 
importance of public practice and set a minimum of communication of the practice to at least
Bemhandt ‘Customary International Law’ EPIL 898, at 900.
D ’Amato The Concept o f  Custom in International Law (Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1971) p.l91. 
See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases ICJ Reports 1969, p3.
ILA Report: Formation o f  Customary (General International Law) (London, 2000).
See generally: Brownlie, I., Principles o f  Public International Law  (5* Ed. 1998).
*’* Villiger Customary International Law and Treaties (2"^ . Ed. 1997) p.20.
" ’ At 15.
*" Strupp ‘Les regies generals du driot de la paix’ (1934) 47 p.313-315.
""*Atl8.
175
176
Ibid. Based on Lotus Case PCIJ Ser, A, No, 10, pp.23,26. 
Article 59 ICJ Statute.
38
one other state. Contributors were clear that confidential legal advice to Government 
ministers would not constitute state practice. Additionally, some of the shadier aspects of 
state security services (secret bugging of diplomatic premises, for example) would not qualify 
as practice. Questioning the precedent of the Lotus^^^ case, the ILA suggested that if the 
position was unambiguous, an abstention and therefore an omission, can count as practice. 
However, the ILA were clear that states may only exercise the objection during the 
emergence of the norm, and not after. It is also important to make clear who or what is able 
to make practice. International organisations and individuals under strict international law 
doctrine do not count as ‘actors’; however. Gunning is the main advocate for the inclusion of 
non-state actors in the creation of practice.^^^ Her argument was that non-state actors are not 
constrained by political considerations and constituencies, and that for the advancement of 
human rights their inclusion as a source of state practice is mandatory. The ILA noted, 
however, the reality of a modem global age and resolved that a clear nexus between the 
organisation in question and the State must be in existence before practice be considered. 
Additionally, the actions of sub-national govemment in general, may not count as practice. 
Disappointingly, contributors to the Report did not distinguish unitary or federal systems, 
where the Federal Govemment has no competence over State legislation. Additionally, the 
ILA did not comment on the advances in devolution. The ILA also declined to comment on 
the position of the supranational European Union and its role in the creation of custom. In so 
far as the case law of ICJ goes however, it is only the practice of states which can contribute 
towards state practice and thus the creation of customary law.
As to the quality of practice, the ILA were clear that the emerging mle must be extensive and 
virtually uniform, echoing the obiter of the ICJ in North Sea and Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 
the practice must be demonstrated to be in ‘substantial un i fo rm ityS im ila r ly ,  the ICJ in 
the Asylum^ c a s e  required ‘constant and uniform u s a g e W h i l s t  considerable practice
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must be evidenced, and that threshold is a high one, it does not require total uniformity 
among states and thus the relevance of the implied consent theory discussed above becomes 
relevant.
Turning to consider the subjective requirement: opinio juris. This ranks as particularly 
important in the traditionalist vision of custom, which based on clear and unequivocal 
expression of state intention, retaining a strong model of sovereignty. Article 38(l)(b) ICJ 
Statute makes clear that norm creation by means of international custom, evidenced by a 
general practice are ‘accepted as law’. The ILA was dubious about the traditional routes of 
opinio juris, in spite of Guggenheim’s thesis. As Byers encapsulated that ‘since 
subjective feelings [of states] are difficult to identify, the analysis of customary rules has 
almost always focused on state practice’. P u c h t a  and Savingy were clear that ‘custom was 
merely the immediate and spontaneous revelation of the common popular statement’.^ ^^  On 
the basis of this inherent uncertainty, some have questioned the role of opinio juris at all.^^°
We can see the arguments surrounding the importance of opinio juris through either a 
traditionalist or modernist lens. Roberts painted a well known dichotomy: that the modem 
view reflects a ‘substantive n o rm a t iv i ty w h ereas  traditional models can be equated with 
‘description’. T h e  key question remains, however: in what measure does state practice and 
opinio juris play in norm creation. Kirgis offered an arithmetical solution to the quandary, in 
his ‘sliding scale’ th e s is .W h i ls t  remaining within the definition of Article 38 ICJ, Kirgis 
asserted that state practice and opinio juris can be viewed as interchangeable along a sliding 
scale. Simply put, the more state practice that is in evidence the less opinio juris is required in
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this inversely proportional relationship. His view is not, however, universally accepted by the 
orthodoxy. Simma and Alston^pointed out that Kirgis’ thesis amalgamates the two distinct 
requirements of custom into a single concept. The effect of which is that the sliding scale can 
be manipulated to offer a normatively desired answer. This does not, however, cure the 
problem of identifying opinio juris. As Byers observed^ the identification of opinio juris is 
by definition, to be found in the practice of states and is thus inherently circular and artificial.
This leads to the related problem, characterised by Kammerhofer as, the "opinio juris 
paradox’. I t  is the notion that as opinio juris requires belief in the legal nature of a non- 
legal norm, the belief is therefore always mistaken. Kammerhofer examined a series of 
solutions to this paradox. The first is the consent theory, being that states consent to be 
bound. As Mendleson put it, it is the theory of ‘intimation, imitation and acquiescence’ of 
the legal authority of a norm. It has the advantage, as Walden put it, by ... recognising the 
constitutive nature of custom’. F r o m  silence and non-protest against a developing norm, 
states can be taken to have acquiesced to the creation of a new norm.^®  ^Kammerhofer was 
however dubious of this fiction, which equates silence to consent.^®  ^The second is a strict 
adherence to a requirement that states believe the rule is law. Kelsen, in an attempt to 
circumvent the paradox, suggests that the requirement is that the states believe in the
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existence of a norm, but not necessarily a legal norm?®^ However, as Kammerhofer pointed 
out, this is inconsistent with the statement of the law in North Sea, being that ‘mere usage is 
not enough’.
Thirlway,^®"  ^Walden,^®  ^and later, Lepard^®  ^all suggested a normative view, which holds that 
practice coupled with a belief that the norm should carry legal weight, is what is required to 
demonstrate opinio juris. Kammerhofer proposed, instead, a new constitutive theory based on 
two accepted propositions. First, opinio juris relies on an act of will; and second, it is the 
making of the claim not its value which is the relevant test. In other words, a claim by a state 
that a norm carries legal force does not have to be true. Accordingly, Kammerhofer cured the 
paradox thus:
‘Orthodoxy does not demand “that existence [of law] is made a condition for [its] 
creation”, but rather that the existence of the belief is made a condition for the validity 
of customary international law. The difference is the essence of the constitutive 
function — its presence, not its content, is the decisive factor in the creation of 
law.”"*’
Such an account of prospective rule creation is premised on Finnis’ justification, which holds 
that the creation of legal rules is based on two judgments by a s t a t e F i r s t ,  that it is 
appropriate to have some ‘determinate, common and stable pattern of conduct’ which holds 
as an ‘authoritative rule requiring that pattern of conduct’. Second, that such a pattern of 
conduct ‘...is appropriate, or would be if generally adopted and acquiesced in...’
Seen through that analysis, there is no true paradox. States must demonstrate sufficient
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practice and they must do so whilst claiming they do it out of a sense of legal obligation, or it 
may be reasonably inferred from the context. In such situations, even if their claim is 
mistaken, it is no bar to the creation of new legal obligations. It is the presence of the claim 
rather than the truth of its content which creates the legal obligation.
Having examined the extrinsic justification for the international community recognising and 
enforcing consistent practice as a legal rule in certain circumstances, we should finally 
examine what is the intrinsic justification for a state consenting to being bound by such a rule 
in the first place. The identification of customary law, and more particularly, the 
identification of opinio juris, is rightly characterised by Kammerhofer as something of a 
‘fiction’.Accord ing ly ,  we might well question why, in reality, a sovereign state would 
claim a norm is legally binding, inherently limiting the state’s freedom, when it knows it not 
to be the case. We might also question why states do choose to acquiesce or fail to raise an 
objection to the creation of many norms. One answer might be that they are simply unaware 
some norms are developing.^^® Whilst this may be true of a narrow set of very particular 
situations, it is hardly likely in the majority of international relations, where norms emerge 
into an international community that has never been more connected. The alternative analysis 
is that a state takes into account broader considerations when resolving whether an 
international norm exists and, later, whether or not to abide by that norm.
In his influential article,^^  ^Guzman provided a sound thesis via which we can analyse why 
states choose to create and then comply with customary norms. He premised his general 
compliance thesis on three assumptions: first that states are rational, second that they act in 
their own self-interest and third that they are aware of the impact of international law on 
behaviour.^^^ In particular, Guzman branded states as ‘rational-actors’ seeking to maximise 
the payoffs that result from their actions.^He suggested international law develops in two 
stages. First, a decision as to what the content of the law should be and second a decision 
whether to comply with the law. It is notable, for this thesis, that Guzman expressly included
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the creation of customary international law in the first stage. He accepted that there is no 
formal process for negotiating whether a norm is customary, rather he suggested that a state 
could determine the extent of its obligations by raising a persistent objection.^
Guzman argued that the decisions of states, at both stages of the above process, are 
influenced in two distinct ways. First, it can result in direct sanctions via trade, military or 
diplomacy; and second, it can lead to a Toss of reputational capital in the international 
arena’. E a r l i e r ,  Henkin, in his list of factors which influence a country’s decision to 
comply with an international legal obligation, included reputation.^Guzman suggested that 
a ‘good’ reputation can lead to benefits, such as trade and co-operation between other ‘good’ 
reputation states, and thus ‘reputation ... causes future relationships to be affected by today’s 
a c t io n sT h e re fo re ,  his thesis is that a country’s reputation has value and that value affects 
a state’s calculation of the creation and later compliance with international norms due to the 
benefit it receives. As Guzman concluded:
‘International law succeeds when it alters a states payoffs in such a way as to achieve 
compliance with an agreement when, in the absence of such law, states would behave 
differently.
We can apply Guzman’s rational-actor compliance-based thesis to this thesis. If we can 
assume that when states decide whether to declare and later comply with labour law 
customary rules, they take into account their own reputational capital. This would seem to be 
the case as the buyers of goods and services increasingly take into account their conditions in 
which they have been supplied. This may be as a result of formal corporate social 
responsibility policies or, for smaller actors, a less formal ethical consideration. As Fung, 
O’Rourke and Sahel explained of their research:
‘Seventy-five percent of Americans say they would avoid retailers whom they knew
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sold goods produced in sweatshops. And almost 90 percent said they would pay at 
least an extra dollar on a twenty-dollar item if they could be sure it had not been 
produced by exploited workers. ’ ^  ^  ^
Premised on such pressure, Connor and Dent found that western clothing firms increased the 
wages of local workers in their outsourced factories.^^® Indeed, as the Cambodian Minister of 
Commerce said in July 2006:
‘We are extending our labor standards beyond the end of the quotas because we know 
that is why we continue to have buyers. If we didn’t respect the unions and the labor 
standards, we would be killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.’
It would seem, therefore, that reputation does have a role to play in states’ decisions whether 
to create and follow labour law norms. Accordingly, Guzman’s thesis provides a justification 
as to why states either positively assert a labour law norm to be of legal status, or fail to raise 
a persistent objection and thus acquiesce to its crystallisation into a customary norm.
The reception of customary international law in the English common law
Once a norm has emerged as a rule of customary international law, the final question is how 
the rule is received and enforced in the English common law.
The notion of the law recognising long exercised customs has a rich heritage in the English 
common law. The practice is extensively considered by Blackstone in his Commentaries on 
the Laws o f England, i n  which he observed that the English common law was, in essence, a 
customary regime premised upon general usage and universal reception:
Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel Can we put an end to sweatshops? (Boston, 2001) at p.l6.
Connor, T., and Dent, K., Offside! Labour rights and sportswear production in South-East Asia (New York, 
2006).
” * Blaekstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws o f  England (London, 1765-69).
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Tt is one of the characteristic marks of English liberty, that our common law depends 
upon custom; which carries this internal evidence of freedom along with it, that it 
probably was introduced by the voluntary consent of the people.
Thus, as Bederman observed, Blackstone’s view of custom was that it formed ‘an integral 
part of English law’.^ ^^
Blackstone went on to describe that there was a dualist method to identifying a legally 
binding customary rule, being that ‘... when a custom is actually proved to exist ... the next 
inquiry is into the legality of it’.^ "^^  That dualist method is evocative of the modem objective- 
subjective model of state practice and opinio juris, prescribed at Article 38(l)(b) ICJ Statute 
for identifying customary international law. Of particular relevance to this thesis, is 
Blackstone’s requirement that the practice must be done out of compulsion, as he describes 
that ‘customs, though established by consent, must be compulsory; and not left to the option 
of every man, whether he will use them or not.’^^  ^For Allen this is tantamount to a 
requirement of opinio juris. In short, that custom is only legal binding, if it is done out of a 
sense of legal obligation. However, the English courts did not approach the test as being quite 
as literal as Allen conceived it. In Mills v Mayor o f  C o lc h e s te r for example, the court held 
the only requirement was that the custom was being exercised as of right and not ‘by leave 
asked from time to time’. As Bederman explained, this is more properly conceived whereby 
consent to a custom developing into a legal norm was manifested by repeated 
acquiescence.^^^ Thus, binding custom could be made by the ‘tacit consent of those who were 
to be governed by it’.^ ^^  Similarly, in the creation of customary international law, Wolfke 
explained the mirror doctrine of acquiescence:
Ibid., at p.74.
Bederman, D, Custom as a Source o f  Law  (Cambridge, 2010) p.37 
Blackstone, W., Commentaries on the Laws o f England (London, 1765-69)., at p.76. 
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Tf a state does not react openly against a certain practice, especially when a reaction 
may be expected, the presumption arises that it acquiesces in that practice giving rise 
to a new rule of customary international law’.^ ®^
Blackstone’s next requirement of certainty^^^ is reflected in the ICJ’s requirement for a high 
degree of consistency of practice, evidenced by ‘consistent and uniform u s a g e b e f o r e  a 
norm can emerge as customaiy international law. Blackstone’s final requirement is that the 
custom is reasonable.^^^ This is premised upon a moral view of custom^ "^  ^and is reflected by 
the ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion^^^ thus:
‘It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of international ... law ... are so 
fundamental to the respect of the human person and “elementary considerations of 
humanity” ... Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether 
or not they have ratified the conventions that contained them, because they constitute 
intransgressible principles of international customary law.’^ ^^
For Bentham, however, the idea of looking to ancient use as evidence of modem rules of law, 
as Blackstone argued, was misconceived. As he observed of the notion, ‘I know not that we 
owe any ... deference to former times’.^^^Bentham’s trenchant criticism led, in part, to 
Parliament standardising the position, with respects to customs, by passing the Prescription 
Act 1832, which provided a statutory basis for the legal recognition of practised customs, 
following evidence of fixed periods of exercise. The policy of the 1832 Act can best be 
summed up by the maxim in Coke Upon Littleton of prescriptio est titulus ex usu et tempore 
substantiam capiens ab authoritate legis?^^As Gale puts it, a right is protected by the law if it 
is ‘acquired by use or enjoyment had during the time and in the manner fixed by law’.^ ^^
Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (Dordrecht, 1993) (2"**. Ed) at p.47.
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The modem English law of custom is based on the proposition that a legal system must have 
mles, which prevent the disturbance of long-established de facto enjoyment of a custom. The 
1832 Act remains in force and is the parent statutory scheme to the recognition of subsequent 
customaiy rights.^ "^ ® As Lord Hoffmann explained in R v Oxfordshire County Council, ex 
parte SunningwellP'^^
" [the law] approached the question ... by treating the lapse of time as ... giving 
rise to a presumption that he had done some act which conferred a lawful title upon 
the person in de facto possession or enjoyment. Thus the medieval real actions for the 
recovery of seisin were subject to limitation by reference to various past events.
The lapse in time is reference to a form of legal memory, whereby the law deems a right or 
duty to have arisen following long qualifying usage. The past events were arbitrary^"^  ^and 
were merely devices to enable the operation of the legal fiction of presumed grant. The 
reference to a doctrine of legal memory, from which the law can infer a legal right to exercise
a custom, is averred to by Blackstone thus:
‘ -
‘[A custom] must have been used so long, that the memory of man runneth not to the 
contrary. So that, if anyone can shew the beginning of it, it is no good custom.
The present position is that a custom to play cricket on another’s land, for example, may 
mature into a legal right enforceable against the legal owner if it is done for the requisite time 
and has the necessary legal qualities. The enjoyment of that custom must be as o f  right. That 
is to say, it must be exercised openly, without the active protest of the legal owner and
Ga/e; (London, 2008) (18 ed.) para.4-01.
For example. Commons Registration Act 1965, Highways Act 1980, Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, 
Commons Act 2006.
R V Oxfordshire County Council, ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council [2000] 1 AC 335.
Ibid  atp.349E.
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without his permission. If the exercise of the custom is not open, or the owner actively 
protests or otherwise gives his revocable permission, then no legal right arises enforceable 
against the legal owner. In the event, the use is as o f right, the common law presumes that the 
legal owner has granted the right of others to exercise that custom by his acquiescence and 
failure to protest.
The creation of international customary law is premised on a similar legal justification. As set 
out above, the ICJ rationalises that where a course of conduct is practised with sufficient 
uniformity, without persistent objection fi*om a state and is believed to carry legal force, then 
all states are bound by the provision irrespective of a lack of an express wish to be bound. 
State sovereignty is akin to a legal owner’s absolute title to his land. In such circumstances, a 
state is taken to have acquiesced to being bound by a new legal obligation,^"^  ^just as a 
landowner is taken to have acquiesced to the creation of rights over his land, in the event of a 
lack of objection to rights being exercised. However, the ICJ explained in the Fisheries 
Case^^^ that a state will only be bound by the new norm if it knew, or could be expected to 
have known, the norm was emerging. Similarly, a land owner will only be bound in the 
common law, if the custom was being exercised openly so that:
‘... by their conduct bring home to the landowner that a right is being asserted against 
him, so that the landowner has to choose between warning the trespassers off, or 
eventually finding that they have established the asserted right against him’.^ "^ ^
There is therefore, a well-established justification in the English common law, identified by 
Blackstone and approved by Parliament, for the identification and recognition of customary 
norms. It follows that there is a sound conceptual basis upon which norms, created in the 
international sphere between states, can be received as a source of the English common law. 
Accordingly, it is a point of public policy in the UK, of some three centuries standing, that
MacGibbon, ‘Customary International Law and Acquiescence’ (1958) 33 BYblL 115. 
Fisheries Case [1951] ICJ Rep. 116, pp.138-139.
R(Lewis) V Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council [2010] UKSC 11 per Lord Walker at [30].
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the mles of international law are given effect in UK courts, as a source of the English 
common As Blackstone put it:
‘ the law of nations, wherever any question arises which is properly the object of its 
jurisdiction, is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and it is held to be a 
part of the law of the land.’^ "^^
Scholars and the courts have, however, vacillated between a ‘transformation’ and 
‘incorporation’ models. Transformation is the theory that a mle of international law (whether 
it be a treaty or a norm of customary international law) requires some form of legal or 
constitutional mechanism (most commonly an Act of Parliament) to transform it into a cause 
of action in domestic courts. Incorporation allows for courts to apply mles of international 
law without the necessity to wait for further domestic action. The latter is supportive of 
Hepple’s suggestion that domestic judges apply labour standards wherever they find them.^^^
Throughout much of the eighteenth century, the incorporation model was in favour. This 
willingness to apply mles of international law is perhaps understandable, as they were created 
by the UK itself, which was the largest state actor at the time. Lord Talbot summed up the 
position as ‘the law of nations in its full extent was part of the law of England’, a f f i r m e d  
later by Lord Mansfield.^^^ The incorporation doctrine fell out-of-favour in the late ninetieth 
century, arguably as a consequence of renewed scholastic fervour around the supremacy of 
Parliament,^^^ or perhaps as a result of new state actors capable of creating precedent 
unfavourable to the English national interest.^ '^  ^The precursor of the Court of Appeal, the
See generally: Lauterpacht, H., Ts International Law a Part o f the Law o f England?’ (1939) 25 Transactions 
o f  the Grotius Society, p.51; Faweett, J.E.S., The British Commonwealth in International Law  (London: 1963), 
Ch.2; Collier, J., Ts International Law Really Part o f the Law o f England?’ (1989) 3 8 ICLQ, p.924.
Blaekstone, Commentaries on the Laws o f  England (London, 1765-69) p.87.
Hepple, B., Rights at Work, 2004 Hamlyn Lecture, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) p.24.
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Court for Crown Cases Reserved, expressly adopted the transformation model in R v Keyn^^^ 
turning around the interpretation of the conflict of laws in England and Wales/^^
Parliamentary debate in the early twentieth Century denoted a qualification to the 
transformative doctrine, allowing for Acts of Parliament (and other state emanations) to be 
interpreted in such a way as not to avoid a conflict with an international norm. In instances 
where a conflict is unavoidable, however, the statute prevails and (in a hint of state liability 
ahead of its time) the state would have to pay the price for breach.^^^ Lord Atkin adopted the 
qualified model in Chung Chi Cheung v This approach was the prevailing attitude at the 
time of Lauterpacht’s influential article Ts international law part of the law of England’^ ^^  
which revived Blackstone’s view. Blackstone’s incorporation doctrine was later judicially 
approved in Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank o f Nigeria}^^ Court of 
Appeal unanimously approved a pure incorporation doctrine, articulated by Lord Denning 
MR thus:
‘Seeing that the rules of international law have changed - and do change - and that the 
courts have given effect to the changes without any Act of Parliament, it follows to 
my mind inexorably that the rules of international law, as existing from time to time, 
do form part of our English law. It follows, too, that a decision of this court - as to 
what was the ruling of international law 50 or 60 years ago - is not binding on this 
court today. International law knows no rule of stare decisis. If  this court today is 
satisfied that the rule of international law on a subject has changed from what it was 
50 or 60 years ago, it can give effect to that change - and apply the change in our 
English law - without waiting for the House of Lords to do it.’^ ^^
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The incorporation model, as applied in Trendtex, is the modem prevailing model in the 
English courts in civil actions?^^As Lord Lloyd put the situation pithily in R v Bow Street 
Magistrates Court ex parte Pinochet^^^ ‘we apply customary international law as part of the 
common law.’ Simon Brown LJ recently affirmed the Trendtex approach to be 
‘undoubtedly correct’ in R(Campaign fo r  Nuclear Disarmament) v The Prime Minister 
Indeed, the editors of Oppenheim’s International Law^^^ now go so far as to say the 
incorporation principle is now an ‘established mle’ of English law:
‘The application of international law as part of the law of the land means that subject 
to the overriding effect of statute law, rights and duties flowing from rules of 
customary international law will be recognised and given effect by English courts 
without the need for any specific act adopting those mles into English law.’
The approach was expressly stated in Lord Advocate’s Reference No. 1 o f2000 as being that 
‘a mle of customary international law is a mle of Scots law’.^ ^^  As Mr Justice Lloyd Jones 
recently observed of the incorporation doctrine:
‘... on the fact of things, therefore, it should be possible to sue on a cause of action 
derived from public international law’.^ ^^
^^^Nourse LJ remarked in Maclaine Watson v D r / [1988] 3 WLR 1033 that Trendexhz& ‘resolved’ the law as 
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Sir David Lloyd Jones goes on, however, to urge caution as to whether the matter is clear-cut 
in every instance. That caution is premised, in part, on the decision of the House of Lords in 
R V Jones and Milling^^^ to refuse to apply the Trendtex principle to the creation of new 
criminal offences is plainly distinguishable to customary labour standards on the nullum 
crimen sine principle. Indeed, Capps goes further to assert Lord Hoffmann (who
delivered the leading speech in Jones) was simply ‘wrong’, arguing that the decision ‘meant 
that a well-established norm, in English constitutional law, which has for many been a mark 
of this “civilized nation” for so long, had to be discarded’. I t  should be noted that subject to 
this very limited exception in criminal cases, the direct application of customary law must be 
the correct general approach otherwise customary law would be of no effect if it required 
express transformation. A state might as well just sign the relevant treaty and thus the two 
distinct sources of law at Article 38(l)(b) ICJ Statute would be improperly conflated.
Sales and Clement take a very different approach to Capps, as to the proper reception of 
international norms in domestic English law.^^  ^Arguing that dissonance between domestic 
law and international law is the ‘natural consequence of self-government by states and of 
parliamentary sovereignty [and] ... it is not the proper function of the domestic courts to 
change domestic legal principles to eliminate such dissonance
Their argument, as to the ‘cautious’ reception of customary norms, is three fold. First, it is 
argued that many of the areas in which customary norms form, are non-justiciable.^^^ This is 
easily answered in relation to this thesis. Labour law is not a field of non-justiciability in the 
sense that the exercise of Royal prerogative might be.^^  ^As such, the courts may properly
[2006] UKHL 16.
No crime unless stated by law.
Capps, P., ‘The Court as Gatekeeper: Customary International Law in English Courts’ (2007) 70(3) M odem  
Law Review A5%, Al l .
Sales, P., and Clement, J., ‘International law in domestic courts: the developing framework’ (2008) 124(Jul) 
Law Quarterly Review 388-421.
Ibid. atp.421.
Citing JR Rayner (Mincing Lane Ltd) v Department o f  Trade and Industry ('“the International Tin Council 
case) [1990] 2 AC 418 (concerning legal relations between sovereign states) and R(CND) v Prime Minister
[2002] EWHC 2759 (concerning the meaning of UN Resolution 1441).
' '^'^R(CND) V Prime Minister [2002] EWHC 2759.
53
have recourse to customary international labour law norms as a source of law. 
Furthermore, in R(Al-Jedda) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Defence^^^ and Occidental Exploration 
& Production Co. v Ecuador^^^ the courts were concerned in part with whether the necessary 
‘foothold’ in domestic law had been established. The ‘foothold’ for this thesis, as Sales and 
Clement style the test, is found at Article 2 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (1998), which requires members of the ILO to ‘promote and realise ... the 
principles arising from the fundamental rights’ contained within the four core conventions.^^® 
This was considered sufficient for the US courts to find a labour law norm had been received 
into US law.^^  ^ Second, it is argued that it is improper for the state to become bound by a rule 
of customary international law without having assented to it in any way. This is, in essence, a 
normative attack on one of the established sources of international law as provided by Article 
38(l)(b) ICJ Statute and is, in that sense, academic. In any event, the standard for the creation 
of a customary norm is high. The state must act in such a way so as to demonstrate it 
considers itself bound by the obligation.^^^ In any event, states may register an objection to 
being bound by a norm and thus avoid its effects. It is also suggested that as custom may be 
identified by reference to the conduct of the executive (rather than just the legislator) it 
conflicts with the English constitutional principle that the Crown (on whose behalf the United 
Kingdom executive acts) cannot change domestic law by means of entering into a treaty with 
other states,^^  ^therefore, the alteration of domestic law by the political acts of the executive 
is inappropriate. Whilst, the constitutional principle is well founded to fetter the power of the 
executive, it fails to give appropriate weight to the fact that the executive is comprised of 
elected persons who are accountable to Parliament. In any event, the principle is tempered by 
the other constitutional principle that customary norms form part of the English common law 
and as such, it is simply not a sustainable argument to suggest that direct incorporation of
Article 38(l)(b) ICJ Statute.
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customary international law norms into domestic law ‘might be thought to be the worst of all 
w o r l d s F i n a l l y ,  custom is created by the practice of a competent officer of the state fi*om 
any of the three branches of that state.
Revealingly, Sales and Clement question the ‘legitimacy of the law-making process ... of 
customary international law’ Whilst some do make the argument of (ill)legitimacy^^^ the 
norm creation process of the creation of customary norms is, in essence, premised on the 
conduct of states. The legitimacy comes fi*om being a part of an international community of 
states.
Whilst it is strictly beyond the ambit of this thesis to examine the normative approach to the 
reception of international norms in domestic English law, it is appropriate to engage with 
Sales and Clement’s suggested ‘detailed rule’^ ^^  on the matter. Relying on the decision of the 
US Supreme Court in Sosa v Alvarez-Machin,^^^ they advance a five-stage test for 
incorporation. First, the area in which the rule applies is one which plainly calls for co­
ordination and reciprocity between states or it is accepted that the common law should look 
outwards to the wider world to identify norms. It is clear that by instance of membership of 
the lEO, the UK is required to promote and deliver the fundamental rights of the core 
conventions.^^^ Furthermore, it is under specific obligations to engage with the tripartite 
mechanism and the Director General in respect of the implementation of conventions.^®® 
Second, it should be possible to identify the responsible authority. The responsible for the 
regulation of the UK employment regime is (currently) the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, and the Ministry of Justice which controls the running of the 
Employment Tribunal Service. Third, the area in which the rule applies must be one in which 
Parliament has abstained fi*om legislative control. This requirement is ambiguous. If  it is
Sales, P., and Clement, J., ‘International law in domestic courts: the developing framework’ (2008) 124(Jul) 
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taken to mean Parliament has not yet considered a matter, then that may apply to a good 
many labour law norms. However, the requirement is seemingly at odds with Sales and 
Clement’s previous requirement that the area of litigation has an existing ‘foothold’ in 
domestic law. Fourth, the area is one which international law has, for an extended period, 
treated as governed by general customary norms. The ILO is the longest surviving 
international organisation and states have been accepting its international authority for the 
setting of labour law norms for close to a century. Fifth, the enforcement of the rule would 
not infringe any important principle of domestic constitutional law nor offend against any 
important public interest requiring protection by the courts. This is not seriously engaged by 
the enforcement of labour rights. It is evident that even on the sceptical set of prerequisites 
the case for reception of labour norms in UK law is made out. In any event, the US Supreme 
Court was clear to underscore the reality of international norms forming part of domestic law 
in the US.
Sales and Clement’s article^®^  is a valuable contribution to the debate on customary norm 
reception, but relies principally on cases where the substance of the claim has been 
traditionally non-justiciable. Seen in that context, the obiter comments on custom do not pose 
a serious threat to this thesis, upon there has been no negative judicial comment. Indeed, if 
customary international labour law norms cannot form part of the English common law one 
has to question whether the incorporation principle is indeed an ‘establish rule’ of English 
law^ ®^  which is applied as ‘part of the English common law’.^ ®^
In spite of resistance from some commentators, the successful application of customary rules 
as a source of the English common law has risen sharply in recent years.^ ®"^  In particular, rules 
of customary international law have been engaged by such varied claims as by the Chagos
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I s l a n d e r s , a  British citizen’s treatment in Kuwait,^®  ^defendants in a fraud triaf®^ and an 
anti-nuclear weapons campaigner?®^
Bringing those arguments together into a coherent rule. An English court is bound to apply a 
rule of customary international law, as a source of the English common law, unless it would 
have the effect of creating a new criminal offence, or requires the Court to adjudicate upon a 
claim, the subject of which is non-justiciable. A new rule of labour law, therefore, would not 
engage those two prohibitions and should, as a matter of principle, be enforced as a source of 
the English common law.
Methodology
The methodology, to test this thesis, shall take the form of a series of structured questions. 
Those questions have been informed by the preceding examination of the relevant law and 
literature on the creation and reception of customary norms.
First, we should determine whether the treaty provision is of a ‘fundamentally norm creating 
character’ so as it could be regarded as forming the basis of a ‘general rule of law’.^ ®® In 
short, this requires an analysis as to whether a clear rule can be extracted from the treaty 
provision, which would be enforceable as a claim in a court.
Second, we should examine whether there has been ‘very widespread and representative 
participation’^ ®® in the relevant treaty provision. Whilst it is not possible to state a given 
percentage of states before a treaty provision can be said to have ‘very widespread’ 
participation, it should be sufficient so as to give the impression it is considered part of the 
law of a significant number of states. Further, it should be noted that the ICJ also required the
Chagos Islanders v Attorney General and Her Majesty's British Indian Ocean Territory Commissioner
[2003] EWHC 2222; cf. R(Manson) v Bow Street Magistrates ’ Court [2003] EWHC 2729 (Admin.).
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participation to be ‘representative’. As such, there should be an examination as to whether 
there is a spread of participating states across the community of nations, not confined to the 
practice of a narrow group of states with a shared interest.
Third, the practice of those states should be ‘extensive and virtually uniform’. I n  the labour 
law context, this can be analysed by relevant examining municipal legislation and the 
decisions of domestic courts and tribunals. Further, the statements of legislators concerning 
current and proposed Government policy can also be of relevance.
Fourth, the analysis should include an examination of the practice of both parties and non- 
parties to the relevant treaty provision. As both the ICJ^ ®^  and, in its fuller consideration of 
the point, the ILA in its Report held this to be a very important requirement in the assessment 
of whether a customary norm has emerged fi*om a treaty provision.^ ®"^
Fifth, have any states registered a prompt and persistent objection to the relevant rule.
Sixth, of those states, which have implemented the rule outside of a treaty obligation, it will 
have to be examined whether they have done so out 6f a sense of legal obligation. Where 
there has been a very widespread demonstration of uniform and representative state practice, 
the requirement for opinio juris diminishes?®^ it does not, however, disappear altogether, as 
the ICJ held in Nicaragua?^^ As such, an examination of the subjective motivations of the
non-party states for implementing the treaty provision will have to be undertaken. As such, it
will be examined whether a state’s practice falls within one of the following areas:
(i) Acts of mere etiquette or courtesy, outside of the legal sphere
(ii) Acts done with an understanding that it is not creating a rule
(iii) Acts carrying a disclaimer against creating a rule
(iv) Ambiguous practice
Vex North Sea [1969] ICJ Rep. 3 p.42. at [73]. 
Vex North Sea at p.43 at [74].
Vex North Sea [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, p.43 at [74].
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ILA Report: Formation o f  Customary (General International Law) (London, 2000) p.47. 
Kirgis, F., ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1982) 81 American Journal o f  International Law  146. 
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14 atp.97 at [183].
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As to exploring the relevant parts of the above questions, the ILO’s Annual Report in 2008 is 
the most up-to-date digest of state practice concerning anti-discrimination in work?®^ The 
Report presents the legislative and other measures undertaken by each state, including non- 
parties to the relevant ILO Treaty Cl 11.
Dissertation Overview
Chapter 1 introduces the subject of this dissertation and the thesis. It then proceeds to discuss 
the hypothesis, examine the relevant practice and literature, and identifies the gaps in the 
learning on this area which the thesis proposes to fill. An examination of the practice of 
identifying customary international law is then examined to inform the methodology which 
follows.
Chapter 2 explores the manner by which international labour standards are adopted and pass 
into international law and, in particular, examines the effect this special process has on the 
creation of customary international labour law. Accordingly, this Chapter details the history 
of the International Labour Organisation and its function in the international community for 
the adoption and enforcement of labour standards. The Chapter then considers the conceptual 
basis of a fundamentally norm creating provision of an ILO treaty. The Chapter closes by 
considering the historical standard setting role of the ILO and the reception of those standards 
in the municipal legal systems of a number of states.
Chapter 3 explores alternatives to enforce international labour standards other than the thesis 
of customary international law.
Chapter 4 applies the methodology outlined in Chapter 1 to test the thesis. In particular, to 
test whether a rule against non-discrimination in work exists parallel to the provision in the 
relevant ILO treaty. This Chapter also compares the provisions of the ILO treaty with the law 
of the United Kingdom.
Chapter 5 sets out the conclusions of the dissertation and evaluates to what extend the thesis 
has been proven and the appropriateness of the methodology to that task. It finally, sets out
307 Country Baselines: Annual Report on Convention C l 11 (Geneva, 2008).
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further work which could be undertaken in this field and draws together the value of the 
broader envelope of research into customary international labour law as a whole.
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Chapter Two
Context and hierarchy of labour standards
The Special Practice of Creating International Labour Standards
The process by which labour standards are negotiated, subsequently adopted and then 
enforced is unique in the international community. The principle international institution 
responsible for setting labour standards is the ILO.^ The members of the ILO meet annually 
in conference, the agenda for which is published by the ILO Governing Body, following 
submissions by members.^ The principle members of the ILO are states; however, employers’ 
and workers’ representatives from each state are also members of various bodies within the 
ILO, notably the Governing Body.
Once the Governing Body has settled upon a topic, it shall publish a detailed report setting 
out and comparing the relevant law in the member states. It shall also dispatch a 
questionnaire to the states, which they are obliged to complete prior to the Conference. This 
then forms the basis of a second report dispatched to the states and other members of the 
Governing Body. The report and draft convention is then debated, provision-by-provision, by 
a plenary session and adopted by a simple two-thirds majority. This is instead of the more 
common signing of a treaty by the contracting state parties.
At this point, it becomes clear that the practice by which states are involved in the creation of 
ILO multilateral treaties has implications for the identification of customary rules parallel to a 
given ILO treaty provision. First, the tripartite debating structure means that a state has less 
of a say in the content of a treaty than it would in a typical international model where the sole 
contributors to the content of a treaty are states. Second, this is compounded by the voting 
model, whereby a simple two-thirds majority determines the content of each treaty provision. 
Thus, as Servais puts it in his influential monograph International Labour Law:
' By Part XIII Treaty o f Peace with Germany (Treaty o f Versailles) (Versailles, 28 June I9I9; TS 4 (I9I9); 
Cmd. 153).
 ^Article 14, ILO Constitution.
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TLO conventions are shaped by the institutional framework and are thus distinct from 
classic international treaties. They are not drawn up during a diplomatic conference, 
but rather by an assembly composed of government, employer and trade union 
delegates. They are also adopted and revised by a two-thirds majority rather than 
unanimously. The formalities of signature and registration are reduced to a bare 
minimum’.^
It could be argued, therefore, that the practice of state parties to ILO instruments is more 
important and carries a heightened normative weight, when identifying a parallel customary 
rule to that contained in a given ILO treaty, because state parties to ILO instruments have had 
less of a say in the content of the treaty rule in question than they would otherwise have under 
the usual practice of international conferences. It may indeed be the case that a state engages 
in a particular labour practice for others reasons beyond that it is a signatory to the relevant 
ILO convention. Their practice may indeed differ from the treaty requirements due to them 
not having such a great hand in the determination of the treaty content as would traditionally 
be the case. As Scobbie puts it ... the search is for an indication that practice has an 
autonomous normative weight which contributes to the formation of custom and is not simply 
the fulfilment of a treaty commitment’."^
That said, a state only becomes bound by an ILO treaty when it ratifies that treaty. 
Ratification is the voluntary and sovereign act of a state whereby it undertakes to be bound by 
the provisions of the relevant international instrument. There is, however, no prescribed form 
for ratification of an ILO treaty and as we have seen, there is no formal signature process 
undertaken by the state. Article 19(5)(d) of the ILO Constitution simply provides that:
‘... if a Member obtains the consent of the authority or authorities within whose 
competence the matter lies, it will communicate the formal ratification of the 
Convention to the Director-General and will take such action as may be necessary to 
make effective the provisions of such Convention’.
 ^ Servais, J.M., International Labour Law, 2"^  ed., (Alphen, 2009) p.89.
 ^ Scobbie, I., ‘The Approach to Customary International Law’ in Wilmshurst, E., and Breau, S., (eds.) 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, 2007) p.33.
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By the act of ratification, a state also undertakes to send reports on its progress, implementing 
the Convention to the ILO^ and co-operate with the supervisory mechanism. ® Conversely, a 
state may free itself from the obligations of an ILO treaty by denouncing it under the terms of 
that treaty (which are usually contained in the final articles).
Drawing these points together, a rule contained within an ILO convention, once ratified by a 
state, is to be applied by that state arising out of its obligation to do so under the treaty. The 
method by which that rule has come about is different to the usual practice of international 
negotiation, as it includes employer’ and worker’ representatives voting on a two-thirds 
majority, which are not state actors. That difference requires an examination of the practice of 
the state parties to an ILO convention, as well as the non-state parties, as the normative 
weight attached to their implementation of a given treaty provision is arguably greater, albeit 
slightly, than a state’s normal implementation of a treaty provision negotiated in the 
traditional model.
Hierarchy of Labour Standards
When considering whether a rule of customary international law has emerged parallel to a 
treaty provision, the ICJ held in the North Sea case that the first question to be asked is 
whether the provision is of a ‘fundamentally norm creating character such as could be 
regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law’.^  As such, some sense of what is ‘norm 
creating’ must be examined when we look at an ILO convention.
Sachs set out three ‘generations’ of rights in the corpus of international law.^ First generation 
rights, pertain to the sanctity to bodily integrity (rights to life and fi*eedom firom torture). 
Second generation rights refer to due-process (fair trial). Third generation (or manifesto) 
rights, refer to the ‘solidarity’ rights (rights to healthcare, education) based around 
social/economic concerns.
Some have suggested that select second generation rights are transient. As Higgins observed, 
the process rights have powers of derogation.® Article 5 ECHR and Article 9(1) ICCPR are
Articles 22 and 23.
 ^Article 24.
’ North Sea [1969] ICJ Rep. 3, p.42 at [72].
* Sachs, A., Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (Oxford University Press: Cape Town, 1990). 
 ^Higgins, R., ‘Derogations under Human Rights Treaties’ (1976-77) BYIL 281.
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often cited as rights, signed and widely ratified, that have been curtailed in recent years in 
pursuit of anti-terror laws, for example. Dworkin’s rights thesis might well conclude that 
even some of these rights are transient, in that at the time of test the will of the 
communitarian majority will trump them. More controversial still, is the verdict of former 
ICJ Judge Alvarez commenting on France’s (ultimately unsuccessful) denunciation of 
Optional Protocol 6 ECHR. Alvarez observed that ‘states change direction according to 
political expedience’. This first generation right, the right to life, therefore, also appears to 
have a tenuous grip on rights status. The question may well be asked, which rights are rights 
at all? Fortunately, France’s attempted denunciation and the wealth of judgments leading to 
norms of international law, make it impossible to roll back the last two centuries of individual 
rights’ protection.
Sachs made a compelling argument in favour of retaining solidarity rights as political and 
aspirant rather than legal and justiciable. First, he argued that as non-elected officials, judges 
are not accountable and therefore do not have the freedom to make broader judgements. It is 
his argument that judges are there to interpret the law dispassionately and should they be 
asked to interpret on questions of resource allocation it would inevitably be controversial and 
lead to a lack of accountability for society’s greatest decisions. Second, he argued that many 
of the solidarity rights cases involve questions of deep technical knowledge that judges are 
not qualified to overrule on technical grounds. A hospital’s decision to prioritise acute 
patients over chronic ones is not a decision the Court should be able to overrule. Finally, he 
argued the separation of powers doctrine. As has already been hinted, solidarity rights are the 
domain of politics and not the courts. Sachs asserted that determining questions of budgetary 
allocation are ultra vires to the courts interpretive role.
This anti-solidarity critique may lead some to abandon the idea of solidarity rights at all. This 
would lead to a ‘slim line’ rehearsal of well known neo-classical rights, with wide gaps 
leading to greater judicial activism and in turn, to the exact criticisms offered by Sachs of a 
lack of accountability.
In considering the place of labour rights within a regional human rights regime, Gaymer in 
her detailed monograph,^® set out a useful hierarchy in applying the relevant articles of the
Gaymer, J., The Employment Relationship (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001).
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European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (‘ECHR’)^  ^ to the 
employment context. Gaymer characterises the labour ‘rights’ of the ECHR into three 
‘types’: absolute, limited and qualified. ‘Absolute’ rights are those fi-om which no 
derogation is permitted. The rights to life,^  ^fireedoms fi-om torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatm ent,fi-om  slavery and se rv itu d e ,an d  from retroactive penalty^® would, it is 
submitted, trump the collective will at the point of maximum testing and are, on a 
Dworkonian understanding,^^ rights. ‘Limited’ rights are those, which ought properly be 
referred to as fi-eedoms, licences or prescriptions as their enforceability is finite and limited 
on societal will. In other words, at the point of maximum testing, derogation would be 
permitted and thus, the individual ‘right’ does not trump the collective will and is not 
therefore, a right. This theory has recently been proven by the enactment of ‘anti-terror laws’ 
that seeks to limit, qualify or outright quash rights prohibiting detention without charge. 
Limited rights include rights to lib e rty ,fa ir  t r i a l , a n d  rights to marry and found a family.^® 
Finally, ‘qualified’ rights are those which can be revoked by society’s collective will and are 
by definition, not rights but privileges at the mercy of state and society, such as a private 
life,^  ^belief,^^ expression,^^ and freedom of assembly and association.^"^
Labour standards produced by the ILO cover a wide array of situations. Accordingly, shortly 
after the Second World War these standards were grouped together into a ‘Code’.^  ^However,
" Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950; TS 71 
(1953); Cmd. 8969).
Gaymer, J., The Employment Relationship (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) pp.233-234.
Article 2.
Article 3.
Article 4(1).
'^Article 7.
See: Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).
Article 5.
Article 6.
20 
21
^  Article 9.
^ Article 10.
Article 11.
International Labour Code (Geneva, 1952).
Article 12. 
Article 8.
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as Servais explained ‘ . the term “Code” should not be misconstrued: the provisions of the 
Code are the outcome of texts voted separately by the ILO Conference since 1919’?®
Accordingly, commentators have attempted to classify ILO standards into typography. 
Jenks^^ and later Servais^^ classified ILO standards into three broad categories, fundamental 
(rights of men and women at work), technical (provisions of labour and social security), and 
promotional standards (programmatic or solidarity in nature). These standards can also be 
seen as what virtue standards seek to promote or protect. First, we can say there are those 
which seek to protect the integrity and sanctity of the individual worker. Second, there are 
those which seek to promote the virtue of a good process in which the worker can raise 
grievances and have a fair hearing. Third, there are those which seek to promote aspirational 
or manifesto virtues.
Integrity virtue standards
This first and most prominent area of the standard-setting arena is often the least 
controversial for states to implement. These deal with fundamental integrity of the worker 
and, accordingly, are styled ‘integrity virtue’ standards. Many integrity virtue standards^® are 
contained within broad constitutional or equitable principles promoting integrity of the 
person and form the interface between labour and human rights law. They could be conceived 
as ‘first generation’^ ® or ‘red light’ in nature. It is clear that many of these standards enjoy 
separate protection as part of multilateral treaties regimes outside the labour sphere,^^ or 
contained within ‘constitutional statutes’, o r  are within regional social charters. These 
fundamental standards form the core of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Servais, J.M., International Labour Law, 2”^  ed., (Alphen, 2009) p.46.
Jenks, W. C., Law, Freedom and Welfare (London, Stevens & Sons, 1963) p.l03.
Servais, J.M, ‘Le droit international en movement: deployment et approaches nouvelles’ (1991) 5 Driot Social 
447-452, at 449.
Generally considered to be: the abolition o f child labour, freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
Sachs, A., Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (Oxford University Press: Cape Town, 1990). 
Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration in Europe (Oxford, OUP, 2003).
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1957), United Nations’ International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
See: Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) per Laws J at [62]. See also for example 
legislation such as the Equality Act 2010 or the Human Rights Act 1998.
66
Rights at Work?"^ Many might see its publication and widespread ratification to signal a sea 
change in the legal status of ILO standards. It would be a mistake, however, to assume such a 
proposition without addressing the problem of the sweeping language in which the 
Declaration was drafted. For example:
‘...to claim freely and on the basis of equality of opportunity their fair share of the 
wealth which they have helped to generate, and to achieve full their human 
potential’.^ ®
This broad language leaves the courts to steer, as Servais observed, ‘a middle course between 
extremes of laxity and activism,^® which surely presents the appropriateness of the judiciary 
determining matters of public policy. This is a task that some^^ would argue is impossible 
without wholesale reform of the institutions themselves and significant adaptations to the 
order of society. It is clear, however, that the nature of these integrity standards renders them 
likely candidates for customary status and favourable consideration for the title ‘labour 
rights’.
Process virtue standards
The second and most popular category is the process standards.^^ They are characterised by 
their focus on the virtue of process and natural justice. A promotion of process virtue has 
characterised the fundament of UK labour legislation of the past twenty years, which seeks to 
regulate thinking and procedure rather than outcomes.
It is instructive, therefore, to observe how the UK received and implemented a recent process 
norm negotiated and adopted at the regional European Union level. It concerns agency 
workers, namely those workers who are supplied to an end user, with whom they do not have 
a contract, by a third-party with whom they do.
(ILO, 1998) (www.ilolex.com). 
(ILO, 1998) p.6. (www.ilolex.com).
Servais, J.M., ‘Globalisation and Decent Work Policy: Reflections Upon a New Legal Approach’ (2004) 143 
International Labour Review 185, 192.
Rawls, J., A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1972).
Examples include: Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 (No. 14); the Medical Examination o f Young 
Persons (Underground Work) Convention, 1965 (No. 124); the Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175). 
See in terms o f classification: Sachs, A., Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (Oxford University 
Press: Cape Town, 1990).
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The inability of the agency worker to benefit fi-om the majority of employment safeguards 
has two causes: (i) an absence of an employment relationship with the end user and (ii) a 
characteristically shorter period of continuous work. The British ‘protective statutes’ ®^ 
preserve the most valuable claims inter alia unfair dismissal and redundancy purely for the 
deployment by (suitably temporally qualified) employees.
The European Council and Parliament approved the Agency Workers Directive"^® on 19 
November 2008, requiring the broad thrust of its contents to be implemented within three 
years. Article 1(1) defines the ambit of the Directive as applying to ‘workers with a contract 
of employment or employment relationship with a temporary work agency who are assigned 
to user undertakings to work temporarily under their supervision and direction’. Article 5(1) 
sets the overriding objective to be applied to this area:
‘Member States should provide for administrative or judicial procedures to safeguard 
temporary agency workers' rights and should provide for effective, dissuasive and 
proportionate penalties for breaches of the obligations laid down in this Directive’
Article 9 restates the non-regression principle prohibiting the use of secondary legislation to 
reduce rights currently on the table. Finally, Article 10, symbolic perhaps of a deeper change, 
mandates recourse to lawful challenge for mal-compliant employers (currently end users). 
This is reflective of a domestic agreement between the TUC and the CBI, 20 May 2008, 
which draws out at Clause III the need for ‘appropriate anti-avoidance measures’.
The culmination of budget air travel, flexible working, EU enlargement, pressures of 
globalisation and the diversity of working arrangements, has led to something of a legal and 
political catch up over the past decade. It was as early as 1966 that Khan-Freund alluded to a 
‘fundamental challenge’ to the classical notion of the contract of employment and more 
recently Freedland noted the ‘monolithic structure [which] characteristics employment 
relationships on a personal binary level, more complex relationships [such as temps and 
agency workers] fall outside this’."^  ^ A gradual swelling of this unorthodox working
Employment Rights Act 1996; Employment Act 2008.
40 2008/104/EC
Paragraph C (III) ‘Agency Workers: Joint Declaration by the Government, CBI and TUC’ (London: BERR, 
2008).
42 Freedland, M., The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford, OUP, 2003) p.55
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relationship occurred throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. The Court of Appeal in Dacas^^ 
first identified this complexity. Formulated by Mummery LJ as a ‘triangular relationship’.
The worker has no employment relationship with the end user, even though that is their 
common place of work. The lack of a defined relationship between the end user and the 
worker, especially troubled Mummery LJ. Citing Freedland, Mummery LJ noted ‘the 
triangular nature of the arrangement may have the effect that the worker fails to qualify as 
having a contract of employment or even as having a personal work or employment contract 
of any kind’."^"^ The Court of Appeal construed an employment relationship to give a sense of 
business efficacy to the relationship. The issue was revisited in Cable & Wireless v Muscatt^^ 
Smith LJ, following the Dacas guidance, again applied a test of ‘business efficacy’. It is 
important to note this ‘judicial interventionism’ has come in for some criticism,"^® most 
prominent amongst their criticism relates to the affront the recent precedent poses to the 
‘realities of the contractual situation’. Reynold, however, looks to the entire situation and, 
with a hint of the normative, accepts the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in the absence of the 
Secretary of State exercising his powers under Section 23(2) Employment Relations Act 
1999, to confer rights upon workers of a given description to claim, amongst other things, 
unfair dismissal."^  ^More recently, however, the Court of Appeal in James v London Borough 
o f Greenwich^^ refused to extend protection to an agency worker claiming unfair dismissal 
against the end user. It is important to remember, however, that each case is vastly dependent 
on its own facts and the recent judgment is hard to be seen as a complete reversal of the 
previous line of cases.
The European Commission has noted this class of workers is in need of protection and 
implemented both part-time and fixed term (yet not agency) workers directives 1999 and
Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd v Dacas [2004] EWCA (Civ) 217, [2004] ICR 1437, [2004] IRLR 358.
Freedland, M., The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford, OUP, 2003) p.55.
[2006] IRLR 354, [2006] EWCA Civ 220, [2006] ICR 975.
Wynn, M., and Leighton, P ‘Will the Real Employer Please Stand Up? Agencies, Client Companies and the 
Employment Status of the Temporary Agency Worker’ (2006) 35 /ZJ 320; see also, Freedland, M., ‘From the 
Personal Contract to the Personal Work Nexus’ (2006) 35 ILJ 1; Honneyball, S., and Pearce, D., ‘Contract, 
Employment and the Contract o f Employment’ (2006) 35 ILJ 30.
Reynold, F., ‘The Status of Agency Workers: A Question o f Legal Principle’ (2006) 35 l U  320, see also: 
Anderman, S., ‘The Interpretation of Protective Employment Statutes and Contracts o f Employment’ (2000) 29 
l U  223.
[2008] ICR 545; [2008] IRLR 302; [2008] EWCA Civ 35.
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associated framework agreements. Specifically, the Commission published a 
Communication Proposal fo r  a directive o f the European Parliament and Council on 
working conditions for temporary worker s . The significance of this and the agreement at 
Council between the TUC and the CBI in June 2008, was the insertion of ‘day one rights’. 
Ignoring the employment relationship momentarily, most of the protective claims contain a 
time requirement.®^ This would signal a sea change in the employment complaints scene and 
arguably another crack in the dam of temporal dependent claims.
Simultaneously, Hon. Andrew Miller MP successfully moved a private members’ Bill®^  
closely mirroring the provisions of the Commission’s 2002 proposals for a directive. The Bill 
proposed that an individual agency worker should be entitled to the same basic working and 
employment conditions as a comparable direct worker. Whilst the Bill was dropped following 
the successful negotiations of the Agency Workers Directive 2008/104, it was never clear, 
however, who the ‘comparator’ might be®® or whether this would introduce a whole new form 
of discrimination. It is important to note that this Bill would not have extended to agency 
workers, the monetary claims for inter alia redundancy and unfair dismissal.
Following a consultation exercise conducted by the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills,®"^  the Government laid before Parliament the Agency Workers Regulations 2010 (SI 
2010/93).®® The Regulations provided a symmetrical right to agency workers to receive the 
same terms and conditions of employment together with an equal access to training and 
facilities and notice of relevant vacancies. They do nothing, however, to deal with 
termination of employment by the end user and the consequential access to the most valuable 
employment rights, notably unfair dismissal, the right to receive a written statement of 
reasons for dismissal and redundancy.
Directive 1999/70/EC.
(COM (2002) 149).
With the exceptions of the automatic unfair dismissal provisions amongst others.
Temporary and Agency Workers (Equal Treatment) Bill 2007/8.
Deploying either the wide rule in Clark v Novacold [1999] IRLR 318, CA, or the newly conceived narrow 
rule in Mayor and Burgesses o f  the London Borough o f  Lewisham v Malcolm [2008] UKHL 43 concerning the 
former disability related discrimination provisions o f the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (relevant 
provisions now repealed and replaced by Equality Act 2010).
Consultation on implementation o f  the EU Agency Workers’ Directive (London: BIS, 2009) (published on 8 
May 2009).
Coming into force on I October 2011.
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To compare now this approach with that of the ILO. The Termination of Employment 
Convention 1982, set out protection for ‘workers’ on the occasion of termination®® and 
provides a number of employee type protections. Whilst the UK has not ratified this 
Convention, it does demonstrate a common thread of universal protection running through 
the labour market in the last two decades and the ILO Conventions do form the basis of 
reasoning for the European Court of Human Rights.®  ^Notably, however, the Convention 
talks of exclusions for workers ‘engaged on a casual basis for a short period’.®^ Whilst 
domestic law might help interpret the meaning of ‘working on a casual basis’,®® courts might 
struggle with the term ‘short period’ without simply retreating to the safety of fewer than 52 
weeks continuous employment. The provisions of the new Directive eradicate this difficulty 
by creating first day rights.
We must conclude with a qualified ‘no’ as to whether the Directive is something entirely 
new. Whilst, perhaps significantly, the Directive affords first day rights, which in UK 
employment claims is something out of the ordinary, it is not, however in terms of 
discrimination law or certain detriment provisions.®® The Directive also does nothing to assist 
the implementation of the Security of Employment Convention (ILO), which would see the 
most valuable claims of redundancy and unfair dismissal extended to a broader class of 
workers.
Servais suggested that an underpinning principle should prevail across the technical 
standards.®  ^A government might, for example, declare in a piece of primary legislation that 
all workers are entitled to equal compensation when they are dismissed and allow secondary 
legislation to determine the best avenue to achieve that. This is, however, surely the realm of 
the politician rather than the lawyer. A standard by standard approach and even possibly a 
subdivision of ‘process virtue’ must be undertaken to determine which are justiciable and 
customary, and which are merely advisory. It is perhaps most appropriate to deploy
Viz, (a) right to appeal, (b) period of notice, (c) severance allowance.
Van der Mussele v Belgium (1983) 6 EHRR 163 at [32] had recourse to the ILO Convention 29 on Forced 
Labour 1930.
Article 2(2)(c)
O ’Kelly V Trust House Forte [1984] 1 QB 90.
Claims under the Equality Act 2010 and unpaid wages for example are available irrespective o f time.
Servais, J. M., ‘Globalisation and Decent Work Policy: Reflections upon a New Legal Approach’ (2004) 
\A3{\) International Labour Review 185, at 194.
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Dworkin’s rights’®^ thesis at this point in addition to the settled tests for custom to separate 
labour ‘rights’ from ‘freedoms’.
As a category, the ‘process’ standards are focused on guaranteeing a minimum standard of 
treatment. The exclusion of categories of workers (such as agency workers) on procedural 
grounds represents an offence to process virtue, that is to say using procedure to frustrate an 
outcome, such a security of employment.
Solidarity virtue rights
The final category of standards is aspirant in nature.®® Conventions in this category seek to 
achieve a broader aim, set a tone, or encourage a behaviour or societal shift. They might be 
seen as ‘green light’,®"^ ‘third generational’®® or pejoratively as soft law. This area of light 
touch regulation tends to focus around welfare and associated rights; embryonic in form, 
representing the custom of the future. The move to toughen up this third category has been 
met by a cultural relativist opposition. Whilst this counter-argument is largely discredited,®® 
the trespass of the courts into matters of state allocation of funding is largely inappropriate.®^ 
It is, therefore, the duty of the standard setters to ensure their wording is of an appropriately 
aspirant nature so as to avoid conflict of executive and judicial competence in emerging 
states.
It must be said, however, that a combination of standards is a possible way forward. For 
example, the United Kingdom Equal Pay Act 1970 contained the promotional standard of 
equal pay for equal work, but performed the (now heavily criticised) trade-off between 
Unions and employers in terms of the implementation and operation. In essence, the 
provisions of the Act (now absorbed into the Equality Act 2010) dealt with inequalities 
arising by operation of sex discriminatory terms, rather than compelling equal pay between
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977). For a full discussion see: ‘Extrinsic 
Literature Review’ ante.
See: Employment Policy Convetion, 1964 (No. 122) and Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 (No. 111).
^  Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration in Europe (Oxford, OUP, 2003).
Sachs, A., Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990).
^  See: The Nature o f  Rights in literature review (below); specifically Tilley, J., ‘Cultural Relativism’ (2000) 22 
Hum. Rts. g . 511.
Although, now note Section 1 Equality Act 2010 (not yet in force) ‘socio-economic duty’.
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men and women as a matter of law. It certainly did not introduce any concept of ‘fair’ pay 
and, indeed, in its first five years acted merely as a code and only in the mid 1980s opened up 
to equal value claims.
These third-generation standards may also be seen as a tool for integration, bringing together 
social partners and civic society.®  ^Organisations like the citizens’ advice bureaux and the 
Overview and Scrutiny Committees of local authorities might have a role to play in the 
development of social policy; this, however, is firmly the domain of politics not law. Lord 
Wedderbum was clear that the adoption of aspirant standards is not an opt-out or that it 
should give rise to a ‘voluntarist’ approach, rather their adoption should lead to the 
development of later legislation through a process of feed-forward.®® Indeed, Servais goes 
further, seeing aspirant standards as setting a legal fi-amework within which given objectives 
should be pursued, with penalties for non-compliance?® a form of ACAS for social policy. 
Furthermore, parties should approach the table with bargaining power in order to facilitate 
progress; Bernard and Deakin^^ noted this was a key reason for having strong fundamental 
standards.
Mindful of Lord Wedderbum’s advice that aspirant statutes are not an invitation to opt-out, it 
is important to examine the extent to which standards of an aspirant nature would be 
enforced. The Japanese Old Persons’ Employment Stability Act 1986, for example, mandates 
employers do ‘everything within their power’ to postpone mandatory retirement to 60 or 
over. This is in many ways a model implementation from ILO emanation,^^ a state putting the 
flesh on the bones of principle within the framework established and negotiated at the ILO 
level. It is important to note that overregulation at ILO level might lead to nil or token
See: Hepple, B., (ed.) The Making o f  Labour Law in Europe: A Comparative Study o f  9 Countries up to 1945, 
(London: Mansell, 1986); Habermas, J., ‘Law as Medium and Law as Institution’ in Teubner, G., (ed.) 
Dilemmas o f Law in the Welfare State (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1986); Treu, T., ‘Strikes in Essential Services in 
Italy: An Extreme Case of Pluralistic Regulation’ (1994) 15(4) Comparative Labour Law Journal 1.
Lord Wedderbum of Charlton, ‘The Social Charter in Britain: Labour Law and Labour Courts’ (1991) 54(1) 
Modern Law Review, pp. 3-4. See also: Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
’“Servais, J. M., ‘Globalisation and Decent Work Policy: Reflections upon a New Legal Approach’ (2004) 
\A3iX) International Labour Review 185, at 198.
Bernard, C., and Deakin, S., ‘Corporate Governance, European Governance and Social Rights’ in Hebble, B., 
(ed.) Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 146.
(ILO, 1995),pp.91-92.
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implementation at state level/® the retirement issue is therefore a perfect example of 
subsidiarity at work.
Whilst it might be a sensible starting point to hold that the various standards of the ILO are of 
equal standing and enforceability (much as European Community regulations, directives, 
decisions and communications),^"^ it is clear that there are differences in obligations within 
ILO treaties. Those which protect integrity or promote process are likely to be of a 
fundamentally norm creating character, those which are aspirational in nature will not.
This raises the nuanced point as to what is ‘fundamentally norm creating’. Conceptually, this 
point is not explored or justified by the ICJ in its judgment in North Sea^^ or subsequently. 
Indeed, it is a key argument of those following the traditional customary thesis, that much of 
a multilateral treaty is not intended to carry legal force and therefore cannot, conceptually, be 
norm creating.^® It is therefore, important to examine what ‘fundamentally norm creating’ 
should mean.
‘Fundamentally norm creating’ as a new conceptual category of international rule
In essence, the ICJ’s point in North Sea is that in order to be binding as a rule of law, a 
customary norm^should be identifiable as such. It should carry the hallmarks of a legal rule 
which creates rights. The central dichotomy in the settled jurisprudence on rules and rights’ 
discourse is between ‘will’ and ‘interest’ theorists. The former, best described by Hart as the 
‘small scale sovereign’^  ^relies on a power basis. An individual has a right by virtue of his 
power of another’s duty. This is exemplified by Hoehfeld’s view that ‘every right has power 
of a c l a i m T h i s  has come in for heavy criticism; however, (from MacCormick^® amongst
See: Alston, P., Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2005) expressing concern at the over 
complex nature of some standards which focus on mere technicality rather than solid rights delivery.
Ch.2, s .l. Article 288 TFEU (Formerly Article 249 EC) provides for the EC Council and Commission to 
‘make regulations, issue Directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions’ all o f equal 
value and application.
’^[1969] ICJ Rep. 3
See for example: Franck, ‘Appraisals o f the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v United States (Merits)' (1987) 81 
American Journal o f International Law 116, at p. 119.
’’Hart, H.L.A., Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983) pp. 183.
’^Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, in W.Cook (ed.) (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1919) p.36.
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others) for its failure to account for rights over which the holder has no power (not to be 
enslaved, for example). MacCormick pointed to the further failing of this view to account for 
the proposition in the question as to whether incompetents (such as animals) have rights.^® 
Kramer, for example, argued that their lack of ability to enforce rights negated their ability to 
have them.^^
The ‘interest’ theorists rely on a different model, that of a right furthering the ‘interest’ of the 
right holder. This accounts for rights over which the beneficiary has no power. Stone (in his 
defence of tree rights) posed that ‘having a right is to have it represented’.^  ^Lyons, however, 
pointed to the oversight of third-party rights, where one may have an interest in a particular 
out come just not rights against it.^ ® Jones pointed to the additional rights of office holders, 
which (at least in theory) should not directly benefit he who exercises it.^ "^
Wenar supposed a hybrid theory,^® questioning why, ultimately a right should have a 
correlative function at all. Bandman concluded that animals have rights in rem advocated by 
humans,^® on a Kantian imperfect duty basis. Imperfect, as it is dependent on the transient 
will of the proxy to exercise and enforce those rights. Mill seized on this view, submitting 
that should anything be ‘dependant’ upon something to have rights, then they are not 
technically rights. Kant viewed the inability to enforce right against others as ultimately 
‘empty’.
Assimilating this discourse into one rule, Dworkin went behind the post-war rhetoric of 
‘rights’ to provide a framework to determine enforceable rights and discretionary principles 
setting out his position thus:
’^McKormick, ‘Rights in Legislation’, in Law. Morality and Society: Essays In Honour ofH.L.A. Hart, Hacker, 
P., and Raz, J., (eds.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977) pp. 189-209.
Kramer, ‘Getting Rights Right’, in Rights, Wrongs and Responsibilities, ed. Kramer. M., (London, 
Macmillan, 2001) pp.28-95.
Stone, D., ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ (1972) 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
450.
^^Lyons, Rights, Welfare and M ill’s Moral Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) pp.36-46.
^  Jones, Rights (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1994) pp. 31-32.
Wenar, ‘The Nature o f Rights’ (2005) 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs 223.
Bandman, ‘Do Future Generations Have a Right to Breathe Clean Air?’ (1982) 10 Political Theory 92, 102.
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... a programme that depends chiefly on principle, like an anti-discrimination 
programme, may reflect a sense that rights are not absolute and do not hold when the 
consequences for policy are very serious.
Dworkin gives the example that:
‘... fair employment practice rules [might] not apply when they might prove 
especially disruptive or dangerous
To examine this proposition in the converse: rights are only absolute (and therefore only truly 
rights) if they hold, notwithstanding sanctions that may accrue as a consequence. This ‘rights 
as trumps’ thesis requires rights to ‘trump’ a collective societal will, to denounce them before 
they can be called rights. As such, we can conclude that a provision of an ILO treaty which 
sets out a duty to act or refrain from acting in a particular way can conceptually be termed to 
be a right provided that it already has a context of entrenchment in the law of nations.
However, much of the content of multilateral labour law treaties refers to groups ‘women’, 
‘those living with disabilities’, ‘races’, etc. Donnelly was of the opinion that such group 
rights are not possible.^^ Burges disagreed, citing a collective potential of rights.^® Jones 
agreed, submitting that rights are by their nature individual.^^ Raz argued that group rights are 
not really rights, merely duties upon others unto them.^^ Howell examined the possibility of 
group and corporate rights. Group rights, as Raz suggested, demand the exercise of duties of 
other individuals to exercise them.^^ Flew was disparaging about this ‘duty n e x u s C i t i n g  
Johnson v Phillips^^ as the authority for the police duty to ensure free flowing traffic, he
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) p.83.
^^Donnelly, Human Rights, Individual Rights and Collect Rights, in ‘Human Rights in a Pluralist World: 
Individuals and Collectives’ 39, Berting. J,, et al. (eds.) (1990).
^°Burges, The Function o f Human Rights as Individual and Collective Rights, in ‘Human Rights in a Pluralist 
World Individuals and Collectives’ Id. at 63.
Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights and Peoples’ Rights’ (1999) 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 80, 82.
Raz, J., ‘The Morality o f Freedom’ (1986).
Raz, J., ‘Legal Rights’ (1984) 4 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1.
Flew, ‘Perspectives on Rights’ (1979) 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1117.
[1976] 1 W.L.R. 65atp.70.
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argued there is certainly no correlative right of motorists (as a group) to free flowing traffic. 
Coenen set down the requirements of a group right. First, it must be in the general interest of 
human beings. Second, the interest of the group should be in the public good. Finally, no one 
member of the group should be able to exercise the right (collectively strong yet individually 
weak).^^ On this formulation it appears groups, identified in an ILO treaty, may have 
‘imperfect’ rights enforced by the international community as a whole, through the ICJ, via 
the identification of customary international law.
The place of relativism in the interpretation of international norms
There then is the related problem as to whether the rights included in the ILO treaties are 
considered ‘norm creating’ by the whole international community, or rather just the Western 
developed nations and, more to the importantly, whether practice can be said to be 
‘representative’. If a given treaty provision enjoyed widespread participation by the Western 
Anglo-Saxon states, for example, should it be considered ‘norm creating’ or ‘representative’. 
Donnelly defined this as a doctrine as ‘cultural relativism’. The thesis of which argued that 
(at least some) variations from human rights instruments are exempt from legitimate criticism 
by outsiders.^^ Kant, however, argued compellingly that there are universal moral truths, in 
his categorical imperative thesis, from which there can be no exceptions and no place for 
‘relativism’ in their application.^^ The schism which must be reconciled, is between the need 
for universality of moral rules and a place for relativism, be it on cultural or other grounds.
It is true that many of the modem human rights instmments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), are distinctly centred on Western values, arising from a 
notably Western experience of war. The constant resistance of the Soviet Union to the 
inclusion of protection of property rights, and reluctance of the West to include social rights, 
for example, has caused disaffection within the treaty regime. It, therefore, leads us to 
question the necessity of fundamental universality and asks should we allow a degree of 
relativism in interpretation. Effectively, as Tilley argued, the case for relativism becomes 
more compelling the further down the rights generations one travels.^^ The case for ritual 
sacrifice, would receive little sympathy from the majority of signatory states, whereas the
Coenen, ‘Rights as Trumps’ (1992) 27 Ga. L. Rev. 463.
^^Donnelly, J., ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’ (1984) 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 400.
Kant, I., Groundwork o f  the Metaphysics o f  Morals (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
^  Tilley, J., ‘Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof (1998) 27 Millennium 275.
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case for prioritising acute medical cases over the chronic would be understood by many 
emerging democracies even with the best intentions to protect the human rights of the 
chronically sick.
Two visions of cultural relativism have arisen, agent and appraiser relativism, which were 
largely advanced by Tilley. Agent relativism states that the rightness of the deed is 
determined by the norms of the agent’s culture.^®  ^It has nothing to do with the origin or 
rationale of those norms. Tilley based his critique of this point on three grounds: (1) its 
impediment to progression, (2) the irrelevance of resolving ethical dispute by taking a poll 
and (3) it hinders moral reform of any kind. Jonathon Harrison advanced the appraiser 
argument that a statement is ‘morally right’ where it accords with the norms of the 
appraiser’s c u l tu re .T h is  too is flawed as it can produce two different outcomes and 
according with one’s culture does not create a truism or a morally correct action.
Using the salient arguments for relativism as a backbone to analysis, Tilley set out a 
convincing critique of the doctrine. The triviality argument advances that morality is always 
right in every circumstance and relies on subjective definitions. For example, ‘kindness is 
always right’ relies on the assumptions that kindness is universally the correct option and on 
the definition of kindness; therefore, the relativist argument should triumph. Tilley advanced 
that many statements, such as ‘starting a nuclear war to demonstrate military might is wrong’ 
are universally accepted and that relativism cannot succeed. Benedict observed that if 
relativism is not an alternative to universalism, if it is merely a set of commonplace remarks 
that almost any brand of universalism can acconunodate, it lacks the philosophical 
importance its defenders claim. For some statements are universally valid irrespective of 
culture. It is interesting to note that these refer more to the first generation observed by Sachs.
The ‘polygamy’ argument suggests that a standard of behaviour heralds fi*om social and 
cultural norms rather than any higher notions. Tilley is unconvinced, asserting that it only 
holds water if we parallel ‘morality’ as a set of precepts about martial customs, habits of 
dress and so on. Once we recall that morality concerns such things as slavery and genocide, 
and not the broader Victorian conception of the term, the argument loses its appeal. There is a
Tilley, J., ‘Cultural Relativism, Universalism and the Burden o f Proof (1998) 27 Millennium 275. 
Ricardo, G. M., ‘Autonomy and the Rule o f Law’ (2007) 6 Ratio Juris.
’°^Harrison, J., Our Knowledge o f  Rights and Wrong (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1971). 
^°^Benedict, ‘Partners of Culture’ 278 (1934).
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danger of overprescribing the rights. Slavery and racism, for example, might be socially 
acceptable but would fall afoul of the broader, more accepted premise to treat people with 
respect. Similarly, the ‘human sacrifice’ argument fundamentally states that good and evil are 
culturally variable. Tilley counteracted this by asserting that the proponents fail to distinguish 
between blame and moral judgments repeating the earlier point that some statements are 
universal, ‘genocide is not good’ for example.
The ‘nomad’ argument is preferable to the previous two visions. It does not rely on Victorian 
morality or negative value judgements, instead it trades on the veracity of the statement 
‘killing the old and weak is right for the nomads, but wrong for us’. Although some may 
contend that euthanasia is always wrong, the mainstream might accept its plausibility, thus 
seemingly at-odds with many sanctity of life precepts contained within international 
instruments. Tilley is clear, however, that this argument only succeeds if one ignores the 
distinction between relativism and situationism.
The ‘research’ argument is the most common in favour of relativism. It asserts that cultures 
differ radically from one another, or rather that practices are fundamentally different. Tilley 
questioned this argument first on the premise that cultures accept radically different morality. 
W.H. Davies pointed to significant overlapping over cultural morality; whereas Francis V. 
Harbour suggested the existence of a common base level of morality pervading all cultures. 
Second, Tilley argued the acceptance of divergent moral principles and their validity are two 
separate things; universal validity does not lead to acceptance. Moris Ginsbery summarised 
the relativist response, that first we can change a premise (such as, murder is wrong) so that it 
focuses on rules rather than principles; or second we accept relativism is not able to change 
the premise, but provides the best explanation of the diversity to which it applies.^®  ^As 
Ronald D. Milo retorted that basic standards must apply and the conditions in which people 
live demand universality.
Perhaps the second most popular argument in relativism is the ‘true for them’ approach. This, 
Tilley argued, confuses justification for behaviour with truth. Jung Min Choi and John W. 
Murphy advanced the theory that a series of local justifications has led to localised truths.
Davies, W.D., ‘Cultural Relativity in Ethics’ 9 S. Human. Rev. 51 (1975).
Harbour, F.V., ‘Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core’ 9 Ethics & In tl. Aff. 155 (1995). 
Grinsbery, M., ‘On the Diversity of Morals’ 101-110 (1956).
Milo, R.D., ‘Moral Deadlock’ 61 Phil. 453 (1986).
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‘total relativism’ From this we could argue that no moral judgment is universally valid. 
This is to forget Harbour, who argued the basic moral standards that have emerged. The 
‘fallibilism’ argument is a typical postmodern response that asserts that there no longer exist 
certainties. This, however, is to link fallibilism with relativism, which in Tilley’s eyes is 
enough to render the argument unsound. Ruth Benedict made the distinction between a belief 
in something being morally permissible and it actually being morally permissible.
Tilley teased out the obvious argument of empiricism. That is to say that there may be an 
acceptance of certain rights, but not their fundamental application. Although a theory voiced 
by Choi and Murphy, it does compound universalism with absolutism and transcendentalism, 
causing confusion. Tilley questioned whether empiricism would defeat J.S. Mill’s 
utilitarianism espoused in On Liberty. It is his view that it does not. Nor, he argued, does it 
refuse other conceptions of universalism, for the greatest good may not be realised by 
uncertain, flexible rights.
The ‘ethnocentrism’ argument is a thinly disguised positive natural law debate centring on 
who is right to judge and what reasoning they may use to arrive at a conclusion. Clearly, 
universalism refutes ethnocentrism and is compatible with a pluralism of cultures as 
advanced by Michael J. P e r r y . T h e  final argument is one of tolerance of others’ beliefs and 
practices. Tilley expanded this, arguing that it rests solely on the normative argument that we 
‘ought not to impose our morality on other cultures’.^ T illey  refuted this by noting that the 
fact that X practice conflicts with y  international prohibition does not directly require our 
interference with x.
As Pildes asserted, a radical universal or a radical relativism would allow for culture to be 
used as a shield for rights’ protection.^It is therefore submitted that a strong universal 
doctrine with a weak level of relativism, would counter many of the arguments against 
implementation of international obligations.
Min Choi, J., and Murphy, J.W., ‘The Politics and Philosophy of Political Correctness’ (1992).
Perry, M.J., ‘Are Human Rights Universal? the Relativist Challenge and Related Matters’ 19 Hum. Rts. Q. 
461 (1997).
Tilley, J., ‘Moral Arguments for Cultural Relativism’ 17 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 36 (1999).
Plides, ‘Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights’ (2000) 29 Journal o f  Legal Studies 309.
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It is a point of note that the ICRC, in its study of customary international humanitarian law, 
dismissed any notion of cultural relativism as material to the creation of binding customary 
norm thus:
‘ we all know of the dangers of cultural relativism. I am sure that given the fact this 
study took ten years, and was finally arrived at after consultation with a range of 
experts from all over the world, this study promises not to be tainted by cultural 
relativism’.^
Drawing these strands together. The ICJ in North Sea, when it spoke of ‘fundamentally norm 
creating’ provisions, was essentially seeking to draw a distinction between the legal rules of a 
treaty which create rights and the language of aspiration which simply fi*ames them. The 
former may create customary rules, the latter cannot. The discourse on rights reveals that a 
provision in order to be a ‘right’ must be clear and identifiable; it must also be of such a 
character that it would trump a societal will to remove it. A rule which establishes a right for 
a group must be in the public interest as a whole and as such, must seek to promote a 
legitimate aim of public policy. Finally, provided that a rule is worded such as to allow for an 
element of flexibility in implementation, a rule is suitably relativist to be enforceable.
Vortices of Custom
Inevitably there will be provisions of treaties which do not meet that test of ‘fundamental 
norm creating’ character, but nonetheless enjoy widespread and consistent practice by a 
portion of states. This poses the thought-provoking question of whether small-scale state 
practice can give rise to a customary norm. We can style this ‘vortex custom’.
The notion of regional custom creation was approved by the ICJ in the Asylum^^^ case. 
Here, the Columbian Government attempted to rely on the existence of a regional custom. 
The ICJ applied the principles of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute that the purported customary 
standard must be applied in a uniform and consistent manner across the region and must 
bind both parties as a consequence. Subsequently, there has been support for custom
’'^Matto, A., ‘The ICRC Study on Customary IHL -  An Assessment’ (2005) 87(857) IRRC Al, 42. See also 
discussion in Ch. 1 p.6.
Columbia V Peru [1950] ICJ Rep. 266.
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formed by two states^^  ^and instructive to the sub-thesis that regional vortices of custom 
can arise out the practice of a small group of states.
Generational Escalator
The theory of small vortices of norm creation in small regional subsets, sits a little 
awkwardly with the classical notion of customary international law, often conceived as an 
all states or no states model. In the field of labour relations, however, norms are more fluid, 
as different factors are at play. The classical model is therefore somewhat unsatisfactory. 
The following topography is submitted as a hierarchy of norms of customary international 
labour law:
1. A peremptory norm of labour law; ^  ^  ^
2. A fully developed norm of customary international law;
3. A fully developed norm of regional custom;^
4. A partially developed norm (this can be seen as emerging custom).
Category (1) deals with peremptory norms of international law from which no derogation 
is permitted. Category (2) is the general subject of this thesis relating to general customary 
law. Category (3) (detailed above) is the theory that norms of customary international 
labour law may arise, in small subsets (or vortices) in spite of a lack of pan-global custom. 
The vortices can be triggered by the prevailing practice of (but not limited to) regional 
trade arrangements (e.g. the EU), regional human rights bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe) 
and the protocols of trans-national corporations. Category (3) norms are a form of quasi­
norm, not yet enforceable outside their own vortex of influence; it is perfectly feasible.
See claim by Honduras in El Salvador/Honduras Case [1956] ICJ Rep. 417, at p.448.
See: Gros Espiel, ‘La Doctrine du Driot International en Amérique Latine avant la Premiere Conference 
Panamericaine’ (2001) 3 Journal o f  History o f  International Lm vp.l.
One might look to the norms governing the prohibition on the use o f child soldiers, slavery and/or forced 
labour.
Within the European context, one might look toward the prohibition on the death penalty as a quasi-norm. 
The abortive attempt by France to denounce Protocol 13 in 2004 and Turkey’s moratorium on the death penalty 
is, it is submitted, evidence of a regional quasi-norm prohibiting the death penalty.
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however, that practices within vortices might coincide with others to form a category (2 or 
1) norm. The Rome Statute (2002) and the creation of a (potentially) supranational^ 
International Criminal Court left questions of custom, long since skirted by the civil ICJ, 
potentially having to be addressed by a criminal court. Category (4) norms are strictly 
limited to their own facts and serve as a constructive aid to category (3) norms.
These standards are not static as on a fixed ladder, rather they should be seen as shoppers 
on an escalator in a department store. The shopper at the top represents a category (1) norm 
of customary international labour law, down through the categories, to the shopper joining 
the escalator at the bottom as a category (4) norm. The effects of socio-economics, world 
war, mass education, improved healthcare and even the Internet are generation specific and 
so as generations pass, standards are pushed upward through the categories with each 
passing generation thus:
C at(lJ  
Cat (2)
Cat (3)
Cat [5] Cat [4) Direction o f
Travel over time
Building upon a thesis that modem labour standards are conjoined through a historical nexus 
to an overriding objective of conflict prevention, one can also see customary international law 
and more specifically, customary international labour law, as ‘red in tooth and claw’.^ ^^  
Indeed, one can also parallel the ever adapting and evolving animal kingdom, as laws are
In instances where a member state is viewed by the Prosecutor to be ‘unwilling or unable’ to carry out the 
trial, complementarily shall apply and the ICC shall prosecute ‘in the shoes’ o f the member state.
Tennyson, A., In Memoriam A.H.H. (London, 1849).
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products of society and so older laws are driven out by stronger more relevant regulation 
thus:
‘...the face of Nature may be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp 
wedges packed close together and driven inwards by incessant blows, sometimes one 
wedge being struck, and then another with greater force.
Therefore, antiquated precedent, such as Roberts v Hopwoocf^^ holding a local authority’s 
decision to award equal pay for women unlawful, would draw derision if such an action were 
lodged a mere eighty years later. Therefore, a natural selection (or de-selection) of law has 
occurred. The wedge of inequity of pay by reason of gender has been driven out by the 
hammer blows of social change and international legal obligations.This  coincides upon the 
Darwinian thesis that over time, natural selection of laws applies and those no longer 
compatible with prevailing trends are driven out. Indeed, one does not have to look far for an 
example of this in the policy considerations of domestic politicians. Tony Blair, as UK 
Shadow Home Secretary, for example, proclaimed a particularly unpleasant murder to be 
‘...like hammer blows against the conscience of a sleeping nation’, c e m e n t i n g  yet further 
Darwin’s metaphor for society and, therefore, its laws being altered by violent events and 
ruthless evolving change. -M.--
In more dystopian language, Malthus saw human existence as a struggle in which the 
strongest survive, quite possibly leading to a similar conclusion as Darwin. Once strongest 
nations would have achieved domination through conflict, they would seek trade with one 
another and, as labour is essential for trade, put in place labour regulation.
Vortex-custom, therefore, builds upon the traditional thesis that, over time, norms are 
elevated to legal status by practice and opinio juris, but that along the way sub-norms are 
also created which bind the members of that subset.
Darwin, C., On the Origin o f  Species (London: John Murray, 1859).
[1925] A. C. 578, HL.
See Pannick, D., Sex Discrimination Law  (Oxford: GUP, 1985) p. 13: ‘there is no doubt, that by reason o f its 
international obligations and agreements, the UK was obliged to take such action and give effect to their 
provisions [amongst others the ILO Conventions]’.
October 1993, Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair M.P.: commenting on the trial o f Robert Thompson and 
Jon Venables for the murder of toddler Jamie Bulger.
Malthus, T.R., ‘An Essay on the Principle o f Population’ (1798) in Oxford Wold Classics.
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Historical Background
This examination of the history and creation of the most mature and enduring international 
institution should allow a greater understanding of the much rehearsed reasoning that trade 
staves off war and labour is essential for t r a d e . I t  is this conflict prevention strand that will 
be deployed in the sources thesis (above) as evidence of an unavoidable nexus between 
domestic and international labour standards. As Swepston observed ‘the League [of Nations] 
was to keep the physical peace, the ILO was to keep the social peace’. T h i s  dualist 
mandate was to be achieved by the creation of standards tendered for ratification by states, 
broadly speaking to ‘improve the situation of workers’. C r e d i t  for the planting of the seed 
of an international labour organisational structure must be gifted to Robert Owen and the less 
well known Jean Le Grand. The latter. Le Grand was President of the Helventian Republic in 
1798 and moved to St Moraud in Alsace in 1804 as a ribbon manufacturer where he provided 
a maximum amount of hours any worker may work in a day. It was his son Daniel, however, 
who, in 1855, addressed the Governments of Industrialised Countries stating that: ‘an 
international law concluded by the Governments of all industrialised countries is the only 
possible solution of the great social problem of restoring family life to the working classes’. It 
is notable that the first French Factory Bill predated this address by fifteen years, in 1840.
Nineteenth Century Antecedents
The rapid growth of industry led to a swift intensification of labour and with it the hackneyed 
trade-off between rights and economic development.Follows’ conception of an era of 
‘unbridled competition’ is probably the most accurate in portraying the raw expression of 
Capitalism that dominated the time. Across Europe movements religious and secular emerged 
to combat the oppression of workers. In Germany the Christian movement, led by the Bishop 
of Mainz, Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler (1811-1877), urged a return to a truer conception
Much as the Economic Coal and Steel Community concluded in the words o f French Foreign Minister, at the 
time, Robert Shuman 'make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible.' (Public statement: 9 May 
1950).
Swepston, L ‘The Future o f ILO Standards’ (1994) 117 Monthly Lab Rev. 16, 16.
Ibid.
For a full exposition o f the labour conditions o f the time see: Stafford, D. ‘The International Labour 
Organisation its Origins and its Story’ {1953) International Labour Review 109.
Follows, J., The Antecedents o f  the International Labour Organisation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951) p.5.
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of the social state. After his death, the centrist German Central Party campaigned on a social 
doctrine describing the Bishop as ‘[our] great precursor’. In France, Count Albert de Mun, in 
the tradition of Victorian non-interventionalist morality, drew middle-class attention to the 
plight of the working man. Leon Harmel meanwhile in a part philanthropic part canny- 
employer built a ‘model factory’ near Rheims to demonstrate how the interests of the 
employer and employed were at one. It was similar motives that led the Quaker Cadbury 
family to build Boumeville Cadbury Workers’ Village near Birmingham, England. Gaspard 
De Curtins invited all states contemplating factories legislation to send representatives to 
Berne, Switzerland, through a motion in the Swiss National Council. The Berne conference 
considered regulation of child labour in factories, limitation of working hours, Sunday rest 
for all and a maximum working day; echoing the progressive attitude of Le Grand some 
decades previous.
Toward the end of the ninetieth Century solidarity movements and the stirrings of the 
German Marxist ideology^lead German leaders down an enlightened path. As Bismark 
summarised it:
‘Give the healthy workman the right to employment, assure his care when he is sick, 
and his maintenance when he is old. The Socialists’ bird call will be in vain’.^ ^^
This politically motivated policy in labour regulation led to embryonic forms of welfare 
insurance, accident insurance, old age and invalidity insurance. Follows cited Bismark’s 
address to the Reichstag three years before the Kaiser’s ascendancy:
‘A normal work day ... could be established for Germany alone, if  that country were 
surrounded by a Chinese wall and were economically self-sufficient ... [if this was 
not the case, therefore] it would be necessary to establish a universal work day union 
similar to the universal Postal union and the universal wage union would have to 
embrace the United States, England and every industrial country’.
This new-found internationalism (although arguably inspired as an anti-Marxist union) was 
clearly the founding of international labour standards. Bismark was, however, dubious about 
the likelihood of such an international union in his lifetime:
Marx, K. Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (1848). 
Statement to the Reichstag (1885).
^^^Ibid.
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Tf we set out on this road alone, then we alone will have to suffer the consequences of 
our experiment and I do not believe we will succeed in persuading our neighbours to 
follow our example.’
This somewhat circular critique of unilateralism had been applied many times s i n c e a n d  
indeed is the greatest threat to the applicability of universal labour standards in the present. 
Therefore, we leave the last quarter of the nineteenth Century with the threat of proletariat 
revolution driving glacial reform out of a ruling hegemony.
Whereupon the leadership demonstrated by the Swiss National Congress, Kaiser Wilhelm II 
immediately instructed Chancellor Bismark to convene a similar (near identical) conference 
in Berlin. Switzerland, waiving her priority rights, allowed the International Conference to be 
held in the Prussian capital in 1890.^^  ^As a world conference, it is unlikely history shall 
record it as revolutionary. Whilst it did provide academic consensus on the minimum entry 
into industrial employment^^^ and underscored the principle in the (male) delegates’ minds of 
international standards, it failed to tackle core issues and set any framework for future 
progress. Pope Leo XIII dedicated. Rerum Novarum in 1891, to the condition of the working 
classes and teased out the need for international solutions to the prevailing ‘misery and 
wretchedness pressing so heavily and unjustly on the vast majority of the working classes
Undeterred by the failings of the Berlin Conference, De Curtins moved for further 
international conclave, in 1893 at Beinne, of a Congress of Workers’ Delegates. The great 
Pontiff commentator Pope Leo XIII roundly approved the retry, observing that different 
standards would allow ‘the products of industry of one nation to flourish at the expense of 
another’. This conference of representatives was immeasurably more successful, leading to 
the creation of the International Association for Labour Legislation (lALL) in 1900. It is 
important to note the use of legislation in the title for the broader aims of this project’s 
ambition in proving the ILO’s emanations as ‘customary’. For many states legislation evokes 
a greater sense of regulation than guidance of supranationalism rather than an opt-in system
"U w .
UK nuclear disarmament; UK carbon emissions targets; UK investment in renewable energy.
See: Delevigne, M. account in The Origins o f  thel.L.O  Shotwell, J., (eds.) (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1919).
Twelve years o f age.
Ginns, R., ‘Lem Harmel and the Revum Norvarum’ (1929) New Blackfriars p.6.
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and demonstrates an early willingness to subjugate to an international labour code. The Holy 
See was keen to be officially represented and paid a regular contribution. The lALL 
maintained an office in Basle and worked toward two conferences, the first to prepare draft 
recommendations and the second, with full diplomatic powers of the represented 
Governments, to adopt conventions. These were the first international labour obligations 
concerning: (i) the employment of women at night, and (ii) the prohibition of white 
phosphorus in the manufacture of matches. The first technical conference was held in Beme 
in 1905 and the two conventions were ratified by the Diplomatic Conference a year later in 
the same city. In 1913, on the same dualist model, a technical conference was convened and 
recommended further conventions, but the outbreak of war in June 1914 prevented their 
ratification.
War as catalyst fo r  social change and baptism offire fo r  the ILO
It is a peculiar, although perhaps a psychologically accountable feature of the human 
condition that in the wake of events beyond humanity’s capacity to understand we look to the 
divine and the normative first for explanation and then for solutions. As it was in the months 
that post-dated the Armistice, the allied powers set about giving life to a phoenix of social 
justice to rise from the ashes of human destruction, reasoning that whilst states are trading 
they are not fighting and whilst they trade they require sound standards of labour. The Allies’ 
view was encapsulated in the Preamble of the ILO Constitution; ‘universal and lasting peace 
can be established only if it is based on social justice’. As Swepson conceived the role of the 
ILO was to ‘keep the social peace by adopting standards that would improve the situation of 
workers’, whilst the League of Nations was charged with ‘keep[ing] the physical peace’. I t  
is notable that in reaching for the divine, the allies focused on the practical, on setting a 
‘minimum guarantee of moral and material order as regards labour legislation, trade union 
rights, migration, social insurance, hours of work, and industrial hygiene and safety
Throughout the developments in the nineteenth Century, Britain’s moral conscience toward 
workers (or more accurately its fear of communism) was less acute than European 
counterparts and therefore UK involvement in the 1890 Berlin and 1905 Beme conferences 
was minimal. The drafting process of the Peace Treaties saw a vastly increased British
Swepson, L., ‘The Future o f ILO Standards’ (1994) 117 Monthly Labour Review 16.
Delevigne, M. account in The Origins o f  the LL.O Shotwell, J (ed) vol. 11 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1919).
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involvement. Perhaps stirred into co-operation by the first campaign with a home fi-ont/"^  ^
vast British casualties or perhaps by a hint of a novus ordo seclorum, a new epoch, where 
the post-war order would not be a pax-Britannica but a multilateral redrawing of the Western 
hegemony around democracy and justice. Indeed, it was not until 1916 that a dedicated 
ministry of labour was established and not until the appointment of Ernest Bevin later that 
year that inspection and the realm of factories were transferred from the Home Office. At the 
time of the Peace Conference, however, the fledgling Ministry had responsibilities for labour 
exchanges, unemployment insurance service, trade boards, conciliation work, labour statistics 
and Whitley councils. The Intelligence Division of the Ministry of Labour wrestled with 
the conundrum of whether to sign up to immediate obligations or devise machinery for 
ratification before the competent authority (Parliament).
The UK delegation was headed by the Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes, a former member of the war 
cabinet. Edward Phelan of the Ministry of Labour immediately travelled to the conference to 
broker a common position with Professor Shotwell of the U.S. delegation, producing the 
‘Document 25’ memorandum of constitution. Much as Kaiser Wilhelm II had propelled the 
1890 conference some thirty years earlier. President Woodrow Wilson "^^  ^(symbolically of the 
transfer of world governance from a Europe of monarchs to a new world of democratic 
leaders) offered to host the first meeting of the International Labour Conference in 
Washington D.C. The U.S. offered up. President of the American Federation of Labour, 
Samuel Gompers, to head the commission to draft the ILO constitution. Ultimately however, 
the U.S. electorate had no appetite for further foreign folly and President Wilson, whilst 
honouring his prior commitments, went no ftirther.
Interestingly, following an all-party ballot for a Director, French socialist and minister of 
munitions, Albert Thomas, was chosen to head the ILO. This was intriguing as Thomas had 
had no part in the International Labour Commission drafting process of the constitution. 
Thomas quickly adopted the now familiar tripartite working model: workers’ representative, 
employers’ representative and governmental representative. The new Director established
The Great War saw the first use o f aerial bombardment o f UK civilians by Zeppelin Gotha G bombers. By 
the end of the war, 51 raids had been undertaken, in which 5,806 bombs were dropped, killing 557 people and 
injuring 1,358.
994,138 total deaths with 1,663,435 wounded.
A joint body o f employers and workers.
Wilson was a committed internationalist and advocate for the rights o f peoples through self-determination.
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himself as something of a freethinker and, contrary to the wishes of his socialist workers’ 
constituents, established Papal endorsement ,and appointed a catholic priest to his staff.
The ILO was finally bom via Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles 1919,^ "^  ^drafted at the 
Peace Conference first of Paris then Versailles. It was designed to reflect the belief that 
universal and lasting peace can be accomplished only if it is based on social justice. The aims 
of the ILO are set out in the preamble and Article 427 of the Treaty to bring about labour 
reforms by the adoption on the part of all nations of more humane labour systems. As an 
autonomous body associated with the League of Nations, it enjoyed an early freedom, based 
on the premise of the inseparability of peace and social justice,^"^  ^a common thread the author 
shall deploy as prima facie evidence in Part II of a nexus between domestic law and ILO 
emanations. Drake writing fifty years after its creation noted the conceptual balancing act the 
ILO was condemned to perform between its (arguably conflicting) commitments to full 
employment on the one hand and expanding rights on the other. Primarily entmsted by the 
international community with the duty to compile duty imposing Conventions and guiding 
Recommendations, the ILO sought to represent a ‘World Industrial Parliament’ building up 
a "'corpus juris of social justice’. T h o m a s  conceives its two duties in more abstract terms: 
first to establish universal human conditions of labour^^®and second to provide authoritative 
statistics of labour .Perhaps  the greatest duty of the ILO is in its unofficial power to 
promote collectivism; for before its establishment, isolated moves to reform were quickly 
trounced by a fear of unfair competition by less enlightened states. The ILO if not 
incentivised, certainly removed the disincentive to reform. Given the prominence of state- 
sovereignty in the international law regime at the time, it is surprising that Drake saw the role
This mirrors the papacy o f Pope Leo XIII some thirty years previously which was quick to place its 
ecclesiastical and then social weight behind this fledgling institution ‘in which the word has put its trust’ Rerum 
Novarum o f the Quadragesino Anno, 1889.
Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty o f Versailles) (Versailles, 28 June 1919; TS 4 (1919); Cmd. 153).
ILO Constitution 1919, Preamble.
Drake, C.D., ‘ILO -  The First Fifty Years’ (1969) 32 Modern Law Review 664-667, 664.
Jenks, W.C., (Principle Director of the ILO) Law, Freedom and Welfare (Address to Conference: 1963). 
^^^Ibid.
Thomas, writing in 1921, interestingly notes the importance o f state sovereignty and cultural sensitivities 
which perhaps are o f less prominence today, talking as he does o f ‘differences o f climate, habits and customs of  
economic opportunity and industrial tradition’ at 262 ante.
Thomas, A. ‘The International Labour Organisation, Its Origins, Development and Future’ (1921) 1 
International Labour Review 261, 261-2.
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of ILO, in its early days, as ‘regulatory’ such a ‘green light’ area of the law that mandates 
a specific change in behaviour and attitude rather than purely punishing mal-compliance on 
Harlow and Rawling’s conceptualisation/^^
The Inter-war Years
The greatest challenge to the infant ILO was its need to be a workable accelerant for change, 
rather than an astral projection of the ‘pure but thin atmosphere of academic abstraction’/^ "^  
Whilst the war acted as a catalyst for the removal of ‘injustice, hardship and privation’ the 
peace heralded the challenge of the maintenance of public goodwill toward the Organisation. 
In achieving this goal, the ILO was broadly successful; the introduction of Article 24 allows 
any of the members of the trio to submit complaints for non-observance of a convention. 
Additionally, as Landy noted, in his quantitative study of observance, that in 63% of cases a 
follow-up after a failure to implement (full or partial) was achieved. In a would be nod of 
support toward the author’s thesis, Drake observed the cumulative effect of ILO emanations 
were a ‘variegated corpus of quasi-norms
Balancing the primacy of state sovereignty with a growing demand fi*om workers’ unions for 
delivery firom this new institution, the ILO toiled with methods of enforcement. At the time 
of the Genoa Conference in 1921, in an era prior to state reporting, the ILO heard 
submissions from workers’ leaders. They advanced a model of ILO as moral defender, akin 
to the Medieval Papacy. Whilst for some this enfeebled portrayal may represent a thesis 
mortem, it is the author’s contention that this only serves to prove how far international 
labour standards had come.
The unavoidable nexus ofpeace and social justice as Astraea Redux^^^
In the conflict ridden days of 1941, the ILO introduced the International Labour Code unsure 
as to whether it would be realised as ‘the last will and testament of the Organisation’ or ‘an
Drake, C D., ‘ILO -  The First Fifty Years’ (1969) 32 Modern Law Review 664-667, 665.
Law and Administration in Europe (OUP, 2003).
Thomas, A. ‘The International Labour Organisation, Its Origins, Development and Future’ (1921) I 
International Labour Review 261, 263.
^^^Ibid.
Landy, E. A., The Effectiveness o f  International Supervision (London: 1965) V.II, pp. 198.
Drake, C. D., ‘ILO -  The First Fifty Years’ (1969) 32 Modem Law Review  664-667, 665.
‘Justice Returns’ see, Dryden, J., Astraea Redux (1660).
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essential part of the title deeds to its future’ In these cataclysmic times, the original drafter 
of the ILO constitution and former member of the Ministry of Labour delegation to the Paris 
Peace Conference, Edward Phelan, had become ILO Director. In 1944, he convened a 
conference in Philadelphia, significant perhaps as it had been the first industrialised city in 
the United States and therefore, the most reliant on its workforce. This direction affirming 
declaration, in many ways, contributes nothing new to the mission of the ILO, but just as 
crucially removes none of its aims. There is a reaffirmation of the nexus between conflict 
prevention and peace, and a teasing out of a number of fundamental or ‘core’ principles, viz:
(a) that labour is not a commodity, (b) freedom of expression and association are central to 
employment, (c) poverty constitutes a danger to prosperity and (d) that all human beings, 
irrespective of race, creed or sex have the right to pursue both their material well-being and 
their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and of 
equal opportunity.^^® President Roosevelt, much like President Wilson before him, was keen 
to endorse this new advance in international labour law ‘[this declaration] sums up the 
aspirations of an epoch ... of equal significance of the Declaration of Independence’. Once 
again, the ILO found itself the focus of a global collective conscience keen to believe in jus  
cogens. In a hint of a criticism toward the sustainability of the Keynesianist hegemony, the 
ILO in 1944 drew up plans to ease the transition from massive public works investment to 
post-war retractionalism. Given this economic backdrop coupled with a re-drawing of power 
lines, the time was ripe for a review of the ILO constitution. As it was at the Commission of 
the Montreal Conference (1946) members reaffirmed their commitment to raising labour 
standards and the tripartite system, and also commissioned studies into the key industries. 
Amongst conventions on equal pay, a new concept of social security was introduced to the 
field of international labour. In spite of a massive 85% loss of staff, the ILO emanations 
continued to mark ‘either a continuation of past action or a major step forward in translating 
commitments of the ILO’s post-war programme into practical terms’.
Cold-war -  glacial reform
The ILO’s corporate shift from standard setter to informal assistant to implementation was in 
part the destructive legacy of the Cold War. The emergence of Soviet expansion was initiated
International Labour Office, The International Labour Code (1951), LXV.
'^°Appendix I: International Labour Organisation 26* Session constituting the Declaration o f Philadelphia. 
‘ILO Since the War’ {\953) International Labour Review 220.
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with the annexation of Hungary which, in 1954, led to a fifty-year slow down in the global 
pace of labour reform. The ILO, however, enjoyed newfound status as the first specialised 
agency of the United Nations; yet saw its social and economic responsibilities pass to other 
organs and eventually pass to the human rights committees of the 1960s.^ ®^
The ILO in its publication ‘Origins and History’ makes a spirited promotional disposition 
of the Cold War years, listing a number of key changes, viz: the creation of a universal 
character, industrialised countries becoming a minority among developing countries, fivefold 
increase of the budget and the quadrupling of officials. The establishment of the Geneva- 
based International Institute for Labour Studies in 1960, the International Training Centre in 
Turin in 1965 and the Organisation won the Nobel Peace Prize on its 50th anniversary in 
1969. From 1977-80 the Organisation struggled with the loss of a quarter of its income 
following the US withdrawal, but in spite of this it played a key part in the supporting of the 
Solidamosc Union in Poland. In the final Cold War phase, Belgium Director Michel 
Hansenne placed social justice back at the forefi*ont of the ILOs aims and moved on a course 
of decentralisation away jfrom the Geneva headquarters. Unfortunately, these years saw a 
retraction fi*om international organisations, in an era of boycotts and denunciations, the ILO 
was characterised by new commissions and increased bureaucratic expansion.
1990s -  changing expectations
The end of the Cold War heralded an expansion in the field of international law; with the 
development of a workable concept of international justice, international arbitration and the 
re-emergence of global labour rights. It is a notable observation that throughout the ninety 
years since the creation of the ILO, major advances have coincided with conflict 
resolution;delivering strong prima facie evidence of the author’s sub-thesis that conflict 
prevention is the unwritten aim of the ILO and binds all domestic labour law to the ILO.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1966).
ILO Publication ‘Origins and History’ (www.ilo.org) (accessed 20 December 2008).
164 1 9 1 9  o f Versailles, 1944 Declaration o f Philadelphia and 1998 Declaration o f Fundamental Principles
and Rights and commitment to ‘decent’ work.
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On 18 June 1998, the ILO, in an emerging trend, convened to reaffirm basic fundamental 
principles and a year later, to commit itself to the distinctly normative goal of ‘decent work’. 
The International Labour Conference adopted a Declaration of ‘fundamental principles’/®^  
viz; (a) fi*eedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining, (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, (c) the effective 
abolition of child labour and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation.^®®
The effect of this Declaration on labour standards is as yet hard to determine; what is clear, 
however, fi*om the perspective of the creation of a corpus juris laboro is that a set of ‘core’ 
standards appear to have added status in international terms, a status perhaps even customary, 
but certainly elevated and significant. This is consistent with the actions and reasoning of 
other world institutions. At the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, in 
March 1995, for example, national representatives committed themselves to:
‘pursue the goal of ensuring quality jobs, and safeguarding the basic rights and 
interest or workers and to this end, freely promote respect for relevant International 
Labour Organisation Conventions, including those on the prohibition of forced child 
labour, the freedom of association, the right to organise and bargain collectively, and 
the principle of non-discrimination’.^ ®^
Indeed, not more than a year later at the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Ministerial 
Conference at Singapore a Final Declaration was drafted affirming that;
‘We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognised core 
labour standards. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the competent body 
to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in
Adopted by the International Labour Conference, 86* Session, Geneva, June 1998. [Hereinafter, the 
Declaration].
Article 2 Declaration o f 1998: on Fundamental Principles and Rights (henceforth Declaration). It is notable 
that far from a sweeping new era o f rights creation, the rights herein affirmed are the subject o f previous 
conventions viz: the Freedom o f  Association and Protection o f the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) 
and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29); the Abolition o f Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); the Minimum Age 
Convention, 1973 (No. 138); the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100); the Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. III).
Commitment 3 (i) (United Nations, 1995, p .15).
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promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered by 
increased trade and further trade liberalisation contribute to the promotion of these 
standards
It was under this global tapestry that the ILO Director General proposed the need for a 
conference to settle a Declaration of Fundamental Rights.^ ®® This renewed global focus on 
human rights was traceable, in part, to the election of Kofi Annan on 1®^ January 1997 to the 
office of Secretary General of the United Nations. His commitment to human rights is deeply 
woven into the tapestry of his leadership and is epitomised in his farewell address citing three 
great issues for the international community viz: an unjust world economy, world disorder, 
and widespread contempt for human rights and the rule of law.^ ^® Whilst few commentators 
would cite this decade of rights abuse routing as detrimental to the ILO, it certainly provided 
it with renewed cause to redefine its place in the hierarchy of rights’ enforcement culminating 
in the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Rights. Swepson cited four primary competitors to 
the ILO’s mandate, viz: (a) the ascent of global banking in the wake of the Bretton-Woods 
agreement (1944); (b) the multilateral ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(both of 1966); (c) the increase of regional agreements, most pertinent to this study being the 
Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1957) and; (d) United Nations Resolutions.^^^
As the Declaration itself is symbolic of a reason alternative for the ILO, it demands a degree 
of factual analysis of its contents. The first and most important product of the Declaration is a 
production of global affirmation of the fundamental principles (Article 1). This, for the 
purposes of the author’s mission to prove emanations customary in nature, is a vital citation 
in his argument. This is coupled with the content of Article 2, which obliges states (even non-
WTO, (1996), para.4.
Report to the 85* Session (1997) of the International Labour Conference on The ILO, standard setting and 
globalisation (ILO, 1997).
16* September 2006.
Viz; UN Convention on the Rights o f Migrant Workers and Members o f their Families (1990) (failing 
adoption in the wake o f only two ratifications). UN Convention on the Rights o f the Child (1990) (adopted and 
ratified by over 130 member states). Also the significance o f the United Nations Development Programme’s 
failed introduction o f the a Human Freedom Index as a measure o f global rights protection, in direct conflict 
with the ILO’s secondary duty to codify global labour statistics.
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ratifying ones) to ‘respect, promote and to realise the principles concerning these 
fundamental rights’. This clearly sets these principles upon a pedestal and as Kellerson noted 
at the time of its drafting ‘confirms the status of the [fundamental] Conventions embodying 
them as core labour standards’. The broader social and economic drivers for these 
fundamentals are outlined in the Preamble to the Declaration:
‘[i]n seeking to maintain the link between social progress and economic growth, the 
guarantee of fundamental principles and rights at work is of particular significance in 
that it enables the persons concerned to claim fi*eely and on the basis of equality of 
opportunity their fair share of the wealth which they have helped to generate and to 
achieve fully their human potential’.
We can declare the common thread throughout all ILO declarations, emanations and 
conventions as the nexus between war and labour standards, and here economic prosperity 
and social justice. Indeed at Article 3 the ILO creates an additional duty for itself, in the 
formal creation of an obligation to assist implementation, further cementing the 
Organisation’s role as standard setter, norm creator and bar raiser. This characterisation might 
well appear familiar, if it were not for the creation of a ‘follow up’ procedure. Based on 
Article 19(5)(e) of the Constitution (whereby members states are obliged to report the 
Governing Body), the ILO adopted an annex to the Declaration at its 273^ ^^  Session in 
November 1998. This two-faceted codicil enunciated a formal state reporting system upon 
which a global report was drafted. Throughout the Session, representatives lamented the lack 
of UN style sanctions to mandate compliance with labour standards. It is difficult for the ILO 
to seek independence from other human rights instruments in the field of labour law whilst 
seeking the enforcement powers of the UN. It is submitted, however, that such formal 
structures are reliant, at least in part, upon a system of non-derogable core norms. The 
significance of the 1998 Declaration is first to reaffirm core principles and second to aspire to 
a ‘high road’ of normative standards. The Session concluded, in terms reminiscent of the 
implantation of environmental standards at the Rio Declaration 1992, that social progress is 
linked with economic growth or perhaps more accurately, that social progress is not at the 
expense of economic growth.
Kellerson, H., ‘The ILO Declaration o f 1998 on Fundamental Principles and Rights: A Challenge for the 
Future’ (1998) 137 In t’l Lab. Rev. 223, 225; Gerbracht, B. D., ‘Export Processing Zones and Free Trade 
Agreements: Lessons from North American Agreements on Labour’ (2007) Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems.
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In the wake for the quest for the ‘high road’ the ILO, in 1999, set itself a new goal of decent 
work for all, with the aim of ‘the creation of not merely jobs, but jobs of acceptable 
quality’ The ILO document continues, that this broad normative vision be realised through 
four strategic objectives: full employment, improved levels of socio-economic security, 
universal respect for fundamental principle and rights at work, and the strengthening of social 
dialogue/^"^ Fields conceived a tripartite model for the fruition of the ideal of ‘decent work’, 
comprising of: the need for jobs, the honouring of core labour standards and the pursuit of 
further improvements in job quality/^®
Conclusions on the History of the ILO
The ILO has in some aspects come frill circle from its aspirant and normative antecedents to 
the 1999 ‘Decent Work’ objective. Whilst the universal enforceability of many of the ILO’s 
current emanations might be a challenging thesis to defend, it is as it once was, striving for 
what are now accepted as ‘core’ standards.
Influence of ILO standards
The ILO standards are principally codified in published conventions which member states are 
invited to^ratify. In order for this process to enable some standards to crystallise into parallel 
rules of customary international law, it is necessary to examine how a number of states, of 
different cultural heritages engage with the international regime and implement those 
standards. In particular, it is important to discern whether a significant number of states treat 
the provisions of ILO treaties as being fundamentally norm creating. Furthermore, it is 
material to understand the ‘raw’ effect of ILO standards on a legal system, without the 
influence of other legal and political structures, which might adopt standards in a similar 
field. For that reason, the following states have also been analysed at the appropriate point in 
their history, so as to appreciate the pure effect of the ILO standard setting regime.
ILO, (1999) pp.3.
Fields, G,, ‘Decent Work and Development Policies’ (2003) In t’l  Lab. Rev. 239, 240. Discussed in greater 
detail in Ch.2.
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Japan
Japan’s workforce is close to that of the UK’s entire population/^® of which 65% are 
‘employed’. As a nation, Japan has taken a highly purposive approach to the place of 
international obligations in general. The Constitution of Japan, for example, provides at s.98 
that, ‘treaties and established laws o f  nations [my emphasis] shall he faithfully observed’. 
This appears a unique codified recognition of the binding force of customary international 
law in a municipal constitution. Furthermore, unlike the UK’s interpretative aid argument,^^^ 
Japanese case law is full of examples of the binding force of international obligations.
This should, however, be held against a powerful internal lobby which could broadly be 
characterised as culturally relativist. First, Japan’s economy is made up of a large number of 
small enterprises that purport not to be able to afford to implement higher standards. 
Secondly, on a more cultural rather than economic level, it is submitted that some 
Conventions contain (Western) assumptions contrary to Japanese society. The latter is 
broadly a generational point, the former whilst also weakened proportionate to Japan’s 
success and international integration, was cured in the early days by the inclusion of ‘special 
country’ clauses. These contained lower targets to the mainstream standard. The position in 
more recent times can be summarised by Iwao Ayusawa thus:
‘... under the direct or indirect influence of the ILO, Japan began to present a “new 
look” [after the First World War], as it were, in labour laws, as compared with the 
days prior to World War I ... . The Government was conscious that every possible 
improvement in labour conditions needed to be made, since Japan was in a position of 
prestige and responsibility as a permanent member of the Governing Body of the ILO. 
This fact was constantly on the lips of the men who were urging the necessity for 
more advanced labour laws’.^ ®^
176 50,000,000 (of a total, 110,000,000).
Sheering Chemicals v Falkman (1982) 1 QB at page 18D, per Lord Denning MR, although this is in some 
doubt, see Attorney General’s advice (7, March 2003), para. 34.
Most notably: Japan v Hasegawa et a l  (Supreme Court, 2 April 1969).
Ayusawa, I., A History o f  Labour in Modern Japan (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1966) p.l78.
98
Tadashi Hanami^^® has produced the continued commentary on the position of Japan and the 
ILO, and classifies influences on Japanese statutes between ratified and un-ratified 
Conventions, specifically around the following: wages, workers’ health, social-security, trade 
union rights, working hours, young persons, maternity, discrimination and forced labour. It is 
appropriate to deal with each briefly, noting the influence the standard has had on the law.
Japan ratified the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100) 1951, in 1967. Interestingly, this 
required almost no alteration to the main statutory source of workers’ rights, the Labour 
Standards Law 1947, in that it accepted the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ between 
men and woman on the grounds of sex as follows at Ch.l Article 4:
‘Article 4 (Principle of Equal Wages for Men and Women)
An employer shall not engage in discriminatory treatment of a woman as compared
with a man with regard to wages by reason of the worker being a woman.’
Taking a characteristically purposive approach, however, Japan’s Ministry of Labour set 
about encouraging a broader social c h a n g e .F i r s t  it raised the profile of female workers and 
second, it attempted to encourage more into the labour market. This had the predictable effect 
of a greater demand for equal pay and status, in spite of this Japan still struggled to achieve 
the spirit together with the letter of the Convention. Most pointedly, a number of employers 
refused to change their attitudes and continued to discriminate on the grounds of gender. 
On a broader level, however, Japan’s difficulties would be understood in the UK. The 
preponderance of women in part-time, temporary or agency-sourced jobs left them vulnerable 
and beyond overarching protection. Furthermore, due to family commitments, women were 
in a much worse position to take advantage of employment schemes that rewarded length of 
service, age, education, etc.^^^
Former Dean of the Department o f Law, Sophia University, Tokyo.
Refleeting the principle above that standards can be fundamental and promotional at once; also they can have 
aspects of ‘green’ light law per Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration in Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
See for example: Nawadaya et al v Akita Sogo Bank (Akita District Court, 10 April 1975); Yamamoto v Tsu 
City (Tsu District Court, 21 February 1980).
One could draw the parallel with a common UK employer’s criteria for redundancy (LIFO last in first out).
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Japan, in common with most members, has ratified the main Conventions concerning 
occupational health and sa fe ty /T h ese  have had an immediate and direct effect in the 
delivery of protection on the factory floor. Japan enacted the Industrial Safety and Health 
Law 1972 incorporating much of the foregoing Conventions. Furthermore, the publication of 
Convention 139 prompted a swift amendment of the Industrial Safety and Health Law and the 
Pneumoconiosis Law, both of 1960.
In a further example of the direct effect of ILO conventions on Japanese domestic legislation 
is in the social security f i e l d . T h e  Labourers’ Accident Compensation Insurance Law 1974 
was expressly amended to alter the level of compensation in line with the Employment Injury 
Benefits Convention (No. 121) 1964. Later the Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention (No. 102) 1952 (ratified by Japan in 1976) caused the direct amendment of the 
Health and Insurance Law together with the Employees’ Pension Insurance Law; particularly 
to make provision for the payment of invalidity benefit at the termination of sickness benefit. 
Here again, is an example of an area of municipal law directly affected by ILO standards. We 
might reasonably conclude that if (in an unlikely event) Japan denounced these, the statute 
would remain. At the very least, it might require an express repeal which, having failed to 
register the objection at the time of publication, would leave Japan open to claims that the 
prevailing state practice had been to give effect to the ILO standard, thus rendering the repeal 
pointless.
In terms of protection of freedom of association and rights to organise, the Japanese private 
sector worker is constitutionally protected. He is also protected by sweeping protection by the 
Trade Union Law 1949, which affords unfettered rights to organise and gives legal effect to 
collective agreements. The subsequent ILO Conventions, concerning freedoms to organise
Radiation Protection Convention (No.115), 1960; Guarding o f Machinery Convention (N o .ll9 ) 1963; 
Occupational Cancer Convention (No. 139), 1974.
In which Japan has ratified most core Conventions including: Workmen’s Compensation (Occupational 
Diseases) Convention (No. 18) 1925; Equality o f Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention (No. 19) 
1925; the Workmen’s Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention (Revised) (No.42) 1934.
The International Committee o f the Red Cross came to a similar conclusion in ‘Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2005) 87(857) IRRC 175 at 183, in that a signature to a treaty provision can 
demonstrate state practice -  broadly reflecting the approach o f the ICJ in the Nicaragua case.
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and collectively bargain^ presented Japan, therefore, with little trouble to ratify as the 
legislative agenda was already on the same line.
The fate of the public sector worker is far less secure, however, with major domestic 
inhibitions on unionised activity. This seeming imparity has seen a series of complaints 
brought before the ILO Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association. The ILO 
Committee did, however, note some realities of running a democratic society, notably that 
certain prohibitions on strike action were necessary where their effect would cause ‘serious 
hardship to the national community’. In a typically conciliatory form, however, the 
Committee did note that such a prohibition could only be imposed where an ‘adequate, 
impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration procedure’ existed. Following this 
apparent ILO endorsement of Japanese process, the unions abandoned their petitioning to the 
Committee in favour of domestic lobbying.
The picture of Japanese international harmony is not, however, without dissent. The House of 
Work (Industry) Convention (No.l) 1919 is directly incompatible with the Labour Standards 
Law 1949. The Convention provides that ‘when the hours of work on one or more days of the 
week are less than eight, the eight-hour limit may be exceeded on the remaining days but by 
no more than one hour’. The 1949 municipal law sets the limit of one hour only for workers 
under 18.
The Conventions aimed at the protection of young persons applies irrespective of a 
relationship to the employer, whereas the Japanese municipal law does not apply to 
cohabiting relatives in employment. Furthermore, the municipal law allows for persons over 
12 to be engaged in work of light labour that is not injurious to health and welfare, whereas 
the Convention (No. 138) sets the age a year older at 13.
Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the Right to Organise Convention (No.87) 1948 and the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) 1949.
See for example: Case No. 179 and 172 concerning apparent discrepancy between workers’ (or more 
specifically non-employees) in the public and private sectors.
The police and army for example, see: 187* Report o f the Committee on Freedom of Association (1978) 
Series B, No.3.
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The same municipal act allows for a new mother to return to work five weeks after giving 
birth, upon a request and doctor’s note. The Conventions (No. 3) of 1919 and (No. 103) of 
1952 do not permit any such early return.
Unusually, whilst the Constitution and various municipal laws provide sweeping prohibitions 
on discrimination on an almost unprecedented number of grounds (race, nationality, religion, 
political ideology, social status and sex), these only apply during employment and not at the 
point of recruitment. The relevant Convention (No. I l l )  of 1958, provides for the same 
grounds, but commencing from recruitment.
In sum, Japan has enjoyed a productive relationship with the Conventions of the ILO. 
Hanami summarised the situation thus:
‘[t]he influence of the ILO in Japan, especially in the post-war period, has been very 
effective in promoting and facilitating good industrial relations and better working 
conditions
This demonstrates two things with respects to this project. First, promotional standards might 
work and Servais was, indeed, correct. Second, Hepple’s conclusion that their inclusion 
would trigger a ‘race for the top’ may indeed hold water. In a broader sense it demonstrates a 
highly influential place for the ILO in the law making of the nation state and as the foregoing 
analysis has shown, its Conventions do enjoy a degree of direct effect in municipal law. 
Japan’s strong political endorsement of ILO standards is to evidence a high degree of state.
Spain
Having endured a bloody civil war, a socialist hegemony in the 1930s, a post-war fascist 
dictatorship and a package holiday explosion, Spaniards might be forgiven for not having 
labour rights at the top of their agenda. In a further nod of support to the author’s thesis, 
however, (that labour rights are linked to trade and trade is linked to conflict prevention) 
successive Spanish administrations have taken to heart both the spirit and letter of ILO
Hanami, T., ‘The Influence o f ILO Standards on Law and Practice in Japan’ (1981) 120 Int, Lab. Rev. 765, 
111.
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Conventions. Furthermore, the moral authority of the ILO is frequently deployed together 
with hints at customary status.
Joaquin Lafita^^  ^has provided a useful commentary of the influences on Spanish legislation, 
especially from the ILO. Interestingly he observed, the periods of greatest harmonisation 
coincided with the Socialist Government then later under Franco’s fascist administration. 
Lafrta explained that in the case of the Socialists, it was part of its broader equalities agenda, 
and in Franco’s case harmonisation calculated to demonstrate the trade union laws could 
protect workers’ rights without ratifying the relevant convention. In an interesting move of 
state practice toward the ILO, Spain recommended the creation of a Study G r o u p , t o  
examine the situation of labour and trade union protection in Spain. Lafrta noted the two 
distinct roles the ILO has in Spanish eyes. First, as a forum for the discussion of international 
and social problems and second, as a ‘sounding board for international pressures’ (in short a 
place for political manoeuvring).
The most troublesome conventions are those concerning the freedom to associate. Spain is no 
exception and has endured a long line of complaints to the Committee on Freedom of 
Association, concerning, inter alia, the restrictions on the right to strike, the detention of 
trade union leaders, penal legislation and the Public Order Courts. In a further signal of 
support to the author’s thesis, the Committee noted the failure of Spain to ratify the relevant 
conventions, but held it liable to give them effect as a member of the ILO. This was in spite 
of the classic statement from the Spanish Government that Conventions are only binding 
upon the Members who ratify them. Nonetheless, the post-Franco Government did enact a 
series of statutes aimed at bringing Spanish labour law in line with ILO conventions with Act 
No. 19(1, April 1977), and Nos. 87 and 98 (20, April 1977). Furthermore, on the back of the 
Committee’s findings it incorporated ILO principles into its Constitution, following a 
national referendum on 6 December 1978. For completeness, the Ministry of Justice 
provided, by order on 4, October 1975, that the Prisons Regulations were to be interpreted in 
line with the Convention; and the Royal Legislative Decree (No.2 1977) abolished the Public
^^^Valticos, N., Droit International du rrav/o/(Paris, Dalloz, 1970) pp.587-588 : noting the right to associate 
freely is applicable without the need for ratification (arguably customary).
Former Labour Attaché, Embassies o f Spain.
Initially published in the Official Bulletin (Geneva, ILO).
Lafita, J., ‘The Influence o f International Labour Conventions on Labour Law and Social Change in Spain’ 
(1979) nS(4)In t’1. Lab. Rev.
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Order courts. This clearly demonstrates a nexus between the ILO and treatment of the 
Spanish worker and an element of direct effect (even when it does not meet with 
Governmental approval).
Spain’s attitude to minorities and women in the workforce has been patchy. Decree No. 2310 
(20, August 1970) s.2(3), for example, provided that a married woman’s acceptance of 
employment was subject to the permission of her husband. Following pressure from the 
Committee of Experts^^^ this was expressly repealed by Act No, 16 (8, April 1976), which at 
s. 10(2) provides that all women regardless of their civil status, can enter into contracts of 
employment of any kind and exercise, in the same way as men, all rights connected with their 
professional activities. It should be noted that from the accession of Prince Juan Carlos to 
Head of State in July 1974, through the death of General Franco in November 1975 and up to 
the first democratic elections in 1977, there was a growing international pressure on Spain to 
accede to and implement the intention of a series of human rights instruments.
It is said that Spain’s basic (that is to say fundamental) labour laws follow a monist model^^^ 
(that is to say they do not go through a legislative process post-ratification). Indeed as 
Velasco noted, there is a distinct willingness of the Spanish Supreme Court to apply 
international obligations raw. It is a fair conclusion to draw, hbwever, that as in many 
states, deploying jus cogens of international law in Spain as a first instance pleading is 
unusual.
Additionally, the ILO and its Conventions are also responsible for legislation concerning 
collective bargaining,minimum working conditions,^^°social security,^®  ^and occupational 
health and safety.^^^ On a broader level, tripartite discussions started to take place directly 
mirroring the ILO model and the Parliamentary debates surrounding the adoption of the 1978
Report of the Committee of Experts, 63’^‘* Session, (ILO, 1977) pp. 52 and 233.
Ibid.
Velasco, J., G., ‘A Propsito de un Convenio de law OIT aplicado por el Trimbunal Central de Trbajo’ (1975) 
4 Revista de Politica Social 129-135. C.f. the decision o f the Court o f Appeal in R v Secretary o f  State fo r  
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex p  Council o f  Civil Service Unions, Another [1984] IRLR 353, especially 
ratio o f Lord Lane CJ at p.359.
Collective Bargaining Act (19, December 1973).
Contracts o f Employment Act (8, April 1976).
General Social Security Act (30, May 1974) and Article 41 Constitution o f Spain 1978.
Royal Legislative Decree No. 36 (16, November 1978).
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Constitution were heavily influenced by Spain’s membership of the ILO. In a nod to the 
constitutional principles of the ILO, Article 35 provides that:
(1) All Spaniards have a duty to work and the right to employment, to free choice of 
profession and occupation, to advancement through work and sufflcient remuneration 
to satisfy their needs and those of their families, without any discrimination on the 
grounds of sex;
(2) The law shall establish a Workers’ Charter’.
This demonstrates a number of key findings. Most importantly, it reveals a legislative
willingness to enact normative and subjective concepts, such as ‘sufficient’ remuneration, 
which is supposed to ‘satisfy the needs’ of the family. This is legal thin ice and places the 
courts in an impossible situation to settle arbitrary notions of sufficient wage mechanisms that 
satisfy needs, whereas this ought properly be the domain of a legislature. The move to codify 
labour rights is a positive one, however, and will bring a greater nexus between worker and 
rights. Later on and more specifically, the Constitution deals with rights to organise and 
collectively bargain, but excludes public servants and members of the armed forces (Article 7 
and 28). Furthermore, it recognises a right to strike at Article 28(2) in the following 
uncompromising terms: ‘workers shall have the right to strike in defence of their interests’. 
But in an interesting nod to the report of the Committee on Freedom of Association upon a 
Japanese referral of the same year,^ ®^  Spain instituted an essential service protection:
‘The law governing the exercise of this right shall establish the precise guarantees for 
ensuring the maintenance of essential community services’.
This is further evidence of the body of emanations (more than simply conventions
themselves) influencing the constitutional law of a member state.
This brief examination of the labour laws of Spain has focused on the period 1968-1978. 
Starting toward the end of the Franco era, through his hand over to Juan Carlos in July 1974 
and death in November 1975, to the first democratic elections in June 1977 and ends with the 
drafting of the new Constitution in 1978. It is deliberately prior to Spain’s membership of the 
European Economic Community (later European Union) in 1986. The analysis, therefore.
187* Report o f the Committee on Freedom of Association (1978) Series B, No.3.
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provides a useful snapshot of the ILO’s impact on a democratic Spain unadulterated by the 
EEC’s own labour agenda. In 1978, Spain had ratified more ILO conventions than any of its 
fellow members and was deemed to have been ‘highly satisfactory’ at their implementation 
by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. It 
recognised the moral power of the ILO, in setting up a ‘Study Group’ to monitor labour and 
trade union rights. Also it demonstrated state practice, recognising the enforceability of ILO 
conventions.
Africa in General
It does, at first glance, appear inadequate to examine an entire continent through one lens. It 
is clear however, that the citizens of Africa’s states live under a specific, if not unique, set of 
political conditions. Furthermore, Afiican administrations have, long before other ILO 
member states, had to come to grips with the notion of the migrant worker. This atypical 
worker, (often quasi-nomadic) still enjoys a ‘personal work n e x u s a n d  yet follows few 
‘norms’ of domestic employment. As Pim saw, ‘political boundaries clearly mean very little 
to the Native worker’.^ ®^ Indeed, the vulnerability of this class of worker was identified as 
early the 1930s,^^  ^a time when many of the workers in the ILO member states worked in a 
similar area for life. ^
The effect of decolonisation by various European countries had a marked effect on the labour 
development of African states and goes a little way to explaining the zeal with which ILO 
Conventions and Recommendations are taken up. Nigeria is a prime example of recent 
independence and emerging democratic self-governance.
Nigeria
The period leading to Nigerian independence on 1 October 1960 is instructive to its attitude 
toward the ILO. The Federation of Nigeria is four times the size of the United Kingdom and 
the eighth most populous country on earth. Having enjoyed observer status at the ILO since
A concept o f Professor Freedland’s see: Freedland, M., ‘From the Contract o f Employment to the Personal 
Work Nexus’ (2006) ?>5{\) Industrial Law Journal 1-29.
Pim, A., Report o f the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial Position o f  Northern Rhodesia, 
(London: 1938).
Benson, W., ‘Some International Features o f African Labour Problems’ (1939) 39 In t’l. Lab Rev.3A.
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1955, Nigeria was an enthusiastic supporter, leading one Government spokesperson to 
remark:
‘The Governments of the Federation have given and will continue to give practical 
support to the ideals and aspirations of the International Labour Organisation. Our 
labour policies have for more than twenty years been based on the standards 
established by the International Labour Organisation’.
This is an interesting demonstration of the state practice of an emerging African state and as 
the ensuring analysis will show, is combined with a high degree of opinio juris, thus provides 
a demonstrable customary argument in Nigeria.
Perhaps the area that has enjoyed the most abrupt turnaround in its fortunes is the law toward 
forced labour. The position of the United Kingdom (and by continuation that of Nigeria) was 
summarised in 1926 by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies thus:
‘Voluntary labour has always proved inadequate in Nigeria and recourse is had to 
“enlisted” for essential public works and services. All the railways and most of the 
roads in Nigeria have involved the use of this compulsory labour ... [t]he necessity 
for the use of compulsory labour on railways and road construction seems likely to 
continue, and the amount of labour which can be fairly so employed, varying as it 
does with the density of the local population, necessarily limits the rate of 
construction of new railways in Nigeria.
Four years later, however, the Forced Labour Convention (1930) was ratified by the United 
Kingdom and declared applicable in Nigeria, taking the form of the Forced Labour Ordinance 
(No. 22, 1933). This had the effect of theoretically removing almost all forms of forced 
labour and in practice was tantamount to abolition. This sentiment is reflected in Nigeria’s 
submission to the ILO that the enactments were:
International Labour Conference, 40* Session, Geneva, 1957: Record o f  Proceedings (Geneva: ILO, 1958)
p.112.
Ormbsy-Gore, W. G. A., Report on Visit to West Africa (London: H.M. Stationary Office, Cmd. 2744, 1926) 
p.l33.
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‘ . a formal step taken to bring the labour legislation of the Federation of Nigeria into 
complete conformity with requirements of the Convention’
Furthermore, the Government in 1942 issued guidance that servicemen’s contracts should, at 
Regulation 5: ‘as far as possible conform to the Articles of the [Forced Labour] Convention’. 
This is beyond the requirements of the Convention and signals a high level of opinio juris 
toward the prohibitions on forced labour in Nigeria.
As mentioned in the introduction, migration has exercised African legislators for longer than 
their fellow ILO members. The Department of Labour noted three significant pinch points: (i) 
manner of recruitment, (ii) transport of workers and (iii) conditions of employment. Noting 
this as a major problem the Government gave statutory effect to the main Conventions^^® in 
1945 through the Labour Code Ordinance. In searching for direct effect of the ILO in national 
legislation, one need look no further than this: the Government as it did, reproduced verbatim 
the text of the above two Conventions.
Interestingly, Nigeria has taken the security of women in employment very seriously from an 
early start. In 1912, the Employment of Women Proclamation of Northern Nigeria (No. 8, 
1912) incorporated the prohibition on women in industrial settings working at night, together 
with the ban on white phosphorous agreed at the Berne Convention (1906). The early 
Conventions aimed at limited night-work was easily incorporated by Nigeria, who 
characteristically went further and reproduced verbatim the text of the Conventions.
A similar pattern continued in minimum wage fixing conventions, young persons and young 
persons at sea culminating in the Labour Code Ordinance of 1945, which implemented ‘the 
provisions of those international labour Conventions to which the Nigerian Government had 
from time to time assented, but which had not been placed on the Nigerian statute book’.^ ^^
For all the successes, the ILO has not been able to penetrate many aspects of Nigerian labour 
relations including: freedom of association, employment services or the abolition for criminal
Summary o f  Reports on Ratified Conventions, Report III (Part 1), International Labour Conference, 40* 
Session, Geneva, 1957, (Geneva, ILO, 1957) p.281.
Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention (1936) and the Contracts of Employment (Indigenous 
Workers) Convention (1939).
Annual Report on the Department o f  Labour and on the Resettlement o f  Exservicemen (Lagos: 1945) 
para.61.
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sanctions for breaches of employment contracts. Furthermore, whilst it is true that the ILO 
has had an unrivalled impact upon the labour law of the Federation of Nigeria (possibly 
greater even than that of the United Kingdom), one has to enquire whether reproduction of 
Conventions into statute delivers substantive protection (as opposed formal theory). This 
project came about to rectify the problems of formalised systems of rights delivery from the 
ILO to the factory floor. The power of the ILO and the belief in its power, however, is in 
amble evidence in Nigeria. Indeed, many Conventions have resulted in wholesale changes to 
the domestic law rather than mere tinkering to avoid the sanction.
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Chapter Three
Alternative enforcement mechanisms to customary international law
The thesis of this dissertation is that the principle of non-discrimination in work, articulated 
in ILO Treaty Cl 11, is customary in nature. The thesis is directed to furthering the learning 
on promoting the application of labour standards. A number of alternatives have, however, 
been advanced. This chapter explores those alternatives and rationalises why customary 
international law is the most attractive solution.
Sanctions
Maupain examined the example of Myanmar (formerly Burma) (as a habitually non- 
complaint state) and laments the decidedly soft law nature of ILO reactions to egregious mal- 
compliance.^ Currently, the ILO has recourse only to a name and shame model in its annual 
state reports; this is clearly an inadequate reaction to the state, such as Myanmar. Maupain 
resurrected the suggestion to impose trade sanctions upon non-compliant states, first touted at 
the World Trade Conference in Seattle (November 1999)^ albeit sceptical of the legality of 
such, Maupain is clear that the ILO has a role to play in rights enforcement. It remains, 
however, a fundamentally consensual process, which lacks the universal justiciability of a 
system of customary international labour law.
Sanctions and support.
The link between international trade and labour standards was tentatively floated at Seattle,^ 
but received little support. The nexus recently has been revisited by Barry and Reddy"  ^with 
the aim of encouraging compliance with ‘essential standards’,^  including access to western 
trading blocks and the possible removal of custom and boarder tariffs.® Barry and Reddy 
proposed the constitution of the Agency for Trade and Labour Standards (ATLAS) as a 
means of securing basic labour standards. It is submitted, however, that even putting aside the
’ Maupain ‘ILO in Myanmar’ in Alston P., (eds.) Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2005).
 ^It should be noted that WTO sanctions are now formally off the agenda. See OECD, 2000b (WTO, 2003) p.51. 
 ^World Trade Conference, 1999.
 ^Barry, C., and Reddy, S., International Trade and Labour Standards: A Proposal fo r  Linkage (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008).
 ^fhW. p.61.
 ^Ibid. p.79.
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political difficulties (demonstrated at Seattle 1999) the proposal lacked the security and 
certainty of customary norms, which can be used by private citizens in domestic courts. As 
Fuller observed the question of enforcement abides,^ however, it is resolved by this thesis, as 
customary norms automatically transfiguring into domestic law.
Conceiving Labour Rights as Human Rights
This is the broad thesis of Philip Alston, set out principally in the Collected Courses of the 
Academy of European Law in Florence.^ Sceptical of Hepple’s confidence in the tripartite 
union orientated system, he presented a well-reasoned critique, noting Government apathy, 
declining union membership and the exclusion from law-making of influential trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) as major stumbling blocks. Alston shared the inspiration for this project 
that the ILO had begun to produce standards and reports rather than talking in the language of 
rights. This is an important distinction between formal and substantive rights delivery, to 
which Macklem in his chapter proposed a read-across argument with Alston’s view. It is 
widely accepted that certain aspects of the international human rights instruments deliver 
substantive and justiciable ‘rights’. It was Macklem’s theory that a sufficient minimal content 
of general ‘right’ exists in some ILO conventions and, therefore, should be considered 
‘human rights’ and enjoy the same enforceability. It is asserted, however, that justiciability by 
the back door is not recognised at international law.
Autonomous and heteronomous standards
Servais styled recent standards ‘autonomous and heteronomous ... alternatives to social 
regulation’.® This approach relied on the political commitment of conventional standard 
setting; it is, however, immaterial if an instrument has attained customary status. Often styled 
‘soft law’, this relies on political agreement and is weak. It comprises of economic measures, 
training initiatives, information programmes and the commencement of technical standards.
’ Fuller, L., ‘International Trade and Labour Sanctions’ (2008) Ethics & International Affairs 75, at 77.
® Alston, P., Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2005).
 ^ See: Servais, J. M., ‘Working Conditions and Globalisation’ in Blanpain, R., and Engels, C., (ed.) 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialised Market Economies (7* ed.) (The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2001 ) pp.339-364.
I l l
The UK has adopted a similar approach to the dismissal and disciplinary procedure; 
concerned that the ridged ‘Disciplinary and Dismissal Procedure’ ®^ encouraged litigation and 
favoured formal rather than substantive justice. The Labour Government tasked Michael 
Gibbons in 2007, a member of the Better Regulation Commission, to conduct a review of 
dispute resolution in the workplace. His conclusions^^ were largely incorporated into the 
Employment Act 2008.^^ The Act repealed the old procedure and introduced a new process 
deploying the advisory, conciliation and arbitration service (ACAS) as (i) supporter (in the 
form of a new hotline), (ii) a framework (in the form of a strengthened code of practice) and 
(iii) arbitrator (via a free conciliation service). In practical terms this means that (i) dismissals 
shall no longer be deemed automatically unfair where a rigid process has not been followed; 
(ii) employees shall no longer be barred from bringing a claim in the employment tribunal 
without first raising the matter with the employer and (iii) Employment Tribunal powers to 
increase or decrease awards and extend time limits shall be repealed.This does away with 
the necessity for automatic punishment, moving away from a positivist interpretation of 
Benthamite ‘dog law’ ®^ to a normative conception of the law (or lore), a form of natural 
justice demanding an examination of the substance rather than the process. The legal sanction 
is at the vanguard of the fundamentalist positivist thesis. Austin saw the sanction through this 
absolutist lens,^® but Bentham conceived a ‘carrot and stick’ argument, holding that the 
‘coercive methods’ and ‘alluring motives’ of the sovereign (Parliament in our case) are the 
proper m e th o d . In  recent times Morrison agreed, noting the ‘naïve empiricism’ of Austin’s
Formally Schedules 2 to 4 o f the Employment Aet 2002 and in the Employment Act 2002 (Dispute 
Resolution) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/752.
” See, HL Hansard, 7 December 2006, col. 139WS.
Gibbons, M., Better Dispute Resolution -  A Review o f  Employment Dispute Resolution in Great Briton 
(London, DTI, March 2007).
Receiving Royal Assent on 13 November 2008 and came into force on 6 April 2009.
By Section 207A Trade Union Labour Relations Act 1992 inserted by Seetion 3(2) Employment Act 2008. 
See: Bentham, J., O f Laws in General, in Hart, H. L. A., (ed.) The Collected Works o f  Jeremy Bentham 
(London, Althlone Press, 1970).
Austin, J., The Province o f  Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses o f  the Study o f  Jurisprudence (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1954).
Bentham, J., O f Laws in General, in Hart, H. L. A., (ed.) The Collected Works o f  Jeremy Bentham (London, 
Althlone Press, 1970); see also, Lamond, G., ‘The Coerciveness of Law’ (2000) 20 O.J.L.S. 39.
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sanctions argument^ ^  and thus, even on a positivist interpretation, law without sanction is 
valid law nonetheless.
Free Market
Second, one might suggest the realms of private international law as a laissez faire, Adam 
Smith,solution to implementing social policy. Article 6 Rome Convention allows for a 
choice of law for ‘individual employment contracts’, encouraging a vision of cherry-picking 
and synthesis. By continuation, transnational corporations are formed leading to a ‘hybrid 
labour law, tom between its old protective function and the new aspiration toward 
flexibility’.^ ® Additionally, the rise of the collectively bargained agreement and codes of 
conduct of the larger multinational companies forms a sphere of regulation that might form 
the basis for an interpretative aid. It is likely that the transient nature of companies would 
lead to an unacceptable legal uncertainty should any of these regulations^^ be accepted as the 
basis of law. Servais^^ went further, noting the degree to which the employer would agree to 
be bound as a sticking point for permanent implantation. As an alternative, however, 
Malaurie offered up the ‘social pact’, whereby non-govemmental organisations come 
together to pursue social (employment) aims; this approach has been especially well received 
in France.-^ It is submitted, however, that this approach would suffer from an uncertainty of 
commitment and without the stick of enforcement would not lead to an effective change in 
behaviour. Harlow and Rawlings^"  ^would conceive such an approach as distinctly ‘green 
light’ in nature. It is perhaps unwise, however, to implement new law relying merely on the 
moral commitment of profit driven corporations for enforcement.
Morrison, W, L., John Austin (London, Edward Arnold, 1982), Ch.6.
Smith, A., The Wealth o f  Nations (London: W.Strahan & T. Cadell, 1776).
Cassin, R., ‘L’gomme, sujet de drot international, et la proteetion des drotis de l ’homme dans la société 
universelle’ (1950) 1 La Techniques et les Principles des Droits Publics 67-91, 68.
Such as company codes o f conduct.
Servais, J, M., ‘Globalisation and Decent Work Policy: Reflections upon a New Legal Approach’ (2004) 
International Labour Review 185, at 189.
Malaurie, G., ‘Le Boom des Associations’ (1999) Problèmes Economiques, pp. 22 et seq.
Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration in Europe (London, OUP, 2003).
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Social Co-operation and Responsibility
The use of ‘professional organisations whose aims are to promote and defend the interest of 
employers and workers respectively’^ ® is the common thread that runs through international, 
regional and domestic regulation. Indeed, the use of agencies, such as the Citizens’ Advice 
Bureaux, has in recent years appeared alongside trades unions.^® It has the advantage of not 
coming from a particular political platform, comprised largely of volunteers and a number of 
professionals providing advice pro bono. Furthermore, from a view of political lobbying they 
can claim a non-political and broad mandate, unlike the trade specific union. Servais noted 
the transient nature of such organisations’ force, especially their dependence on media 
coverage and financial sponsorship.^^ This is, however, to be questioned. Some of the larger 
social charities (e.g. Citizens’ Advice Bureaux) being the most prevalent and uniform, enjoy 
a status and social standing that an established professional organisation does not. This is to 
be contrasted with the suggestion by leading retailers, to provide a similar service.^^ Servais 
was correct, however, to note the decline in union memberships® and questioned whether 
there is a place in the tripartite model for another partner. There must be however, a note of 
balance struck because organisations of civil society are arguably only an enabling tool 
assisting citizens to find the rights to which they are entitled and as a mirror reflecting the 
types of enquiry they receive (reporting a flurry of complaints about the treatment of agency 
workers, however, does not provide the answer to the problem). It would be perhaps 
improper, therefore to place disproportionate weight on their ability to alter social policy in a 
legal sense.®®
Servais, J, M., ‘Globalisation and Decent Work Policy: Reflections upon a New Legal Approach’ (2004) 
143(1) International Labour Review 185, at 189; see also standard definition offered throughout: Freedom of  
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 1948 (No.87); the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (No.87); the Rural Workers’ Organisations Convention 1975 (No.l41).
(ICFTU, 1996) p.81.
Servais, J, M., ‘Globalisation and Decent Work Policy: Reflections upon a New Legal Approach’ (2004) 
International Labour Review 185, at 190.
As a consequence of the Legal Services Act 2007. See: Gibb. F., ‘Lawyers baked-bean protest over 
Government plans for ‘Tesco Law’ The Times (12 May 2009).
Servais, J, M., ‘Globalisation and Decent Work Policy: Reflections upon a New Legal Approach’ (2004) 
143(1) International Labour Review 185, at 190, he cites as little as 10-15% of Members’ workforce as 
unionised.
See for example: ‘A quoi sert le travail social?’ (‘what’s the point o f social work’) Esprit (March-April 1998).
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The Global Market as the Regulator
The benefits of regional state arrangements (such as the EU) are well rehearsed. A trickle- 
down effect of improved rights through deregulation, however, has rarely been amongst 
them. This is nonetheless the thesis of labour lawyer Bob Hepple, whose economic and 
international view of labour law closely mirrors that of Khan-Freud.
Hepple set-out the core of his thesis with his usual clarity that:
‘The reconciliation of global trade and labour rights will not come from relocating 
labour law within the sphere of international trade law ... [but from] shaping the 
many new strands of transnational labour regulation that are emerging so as to spread 
the benefits of growing trade and investment to the poorest, to protect basic human 
rights, and to contribute to social justice and democracy’.®^
Hepple argued that the ILO produced too many standards that take no account for differences 
in state development. In a theory akin to the ‘multi-track’ approach to implementation 
adopted by the European Commission,®^ he reasoned that international organisations should 
be more sensitive to the varying levels of state development.®® The answer, he suggested, lay 
in the formulation of a mechanism to ensure transnational corporations (TNCs) further 
minimal norms of labour standards. ®"^ Far fi*om agreeing with the mainstream that a 
development of supranational labour law waters down the domestic competence of 
employment legislation, Hepple was keen to stress the ‘comparative institutional advantage’®® 
of co-ordinated market economies.®® This consensual power is reminiscent of the ‘pooled 
sovereignty’ argument touted by the European Commission prior to the ratifications of the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992). Both arguments are, however, subjective and the will of the nation 
state to legislate in the employment arena can only be truly compelled by binding
Hepple, B., Labour Law and Global Trade (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) pp,3.
See: Stubb, A., ‘A Categorisation o f Differentiated Integration’ (2008) 34 Journal o f  Common Market Studies 
283.
Whilst a theory of cultural relativism is not mentioned throughout Hepple’s thesis, it is surely implied and 
should be accounted for ante.
Hepple, B., Labour Law and Global Trade (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) pp.87.
Ibid, at pp.3.
Ibid. at pp.253.
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supranational legislation or the force of customary international law. Furthermore, the EU is 
currently globally unique and would be unlikely to work if it were wholly dependent on 
unanimity of states’ consent (rather than the qualified majority voting (‘QMV’) in use for a 
large number of employment regulations).
If one ignores the political difficulties and economic uncertainties of the pooled-resources 
model,®  ^the collective power to improve the conditions of workers at grass roots level is 
undisputed. Hepple cited three beneficial outcomes. First, he argued that it can be used to 
generate a ‘race for the top’®^ amongst TNCs. This is a somewhat quizzical approach, given 
that the first priority of corporations is to remain trading and to do what is required to 
maximise profit margins to pay shareholder dividends; there is therefore, no incentive and 
even less of an obligation to race for the top. Second, it would lead to a quasi-codification of 
the strands of labour law; materialising as global treaties, regional organisations, local and 
transnational actors. This unofficial codification is primarily concerned with process rather 
than reality and would therefore be far inferior to a customary regime in rights delivery. 
Hepple then advocated the imposition of legal obligation on TNCs to observe their own 
codes. This is a somewhat ham-fisted method of contriving customary status. Indeed as 
private actors, the role of employees of TNCs at international arbitration is minimal and they 
must to look to their host or mother state to enforce rights. The reliance on the state 
enforcement of TNCs’ private codes renders the process a pale and weak imitation of the 
customary regime. Finally, Hepple dedicated considerable time to the analysis of the role of 
the union in effecting labour improvements. It is important to note that freedom of 
association and union involvement is central to the ILO, in the direct complaints procedure 
and place in the tripartite structure. This is something of a historical hangover and the 
heightened role of the union in the ILO structure appears questionable in the current global 
workplace; as Hyman noted, ‘being a union member has ceased to be a social norm’.®® This is 
especially relevant as global membership of unions declines, especially in the United 
Kingdom, where in 2002 fewer than 30% of the workforce were unionised."^®
Ibid. p.8.
Ibid., at p.24.
Hyman, R., ‘Shifting Dynamics in International Trade Unionism: Agitation, Organisation, Diplomacy, 
Bureaucracy’ (2005) A6{2) Labour History 137, 140.
Office o f  National Statistics; Labour Force Survey (2002).
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One of the largest US employers, Walmart, is opposed to unionisation, which according to 
Meyerson amounts to not recognising unions in contravention of Article 2 C.87 Concerning 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (1950)/^ The 
power of the union and singular acts of solidarity, as advanced by Atleson,"^  ^are not a 
sufficiently strong method of rights enhancement at international law. Hepple’s statement that 
‘labour law is now inevitably global law and not just the concern of the nation state’"^® is a 
well observed (yet not universally accepted) theory, upon which the primary thesis of this 
work is based. It is my view, however, that the solutions proposed in this work will bring 
about the outcome Hepple seeks. Only by a development and codification of customary 
international labour law would the problem of lax implementation of international rights be 
addressed.
The Response of the Thesis
As discussed in the hypothesis, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted 
the shortcomings of the treaty and reporting model together with the glacial pace toward 
implementation and sought the universal blanket of customary law to cure evaders of 
international obligations in humanitarian law."^ "^  Alston noted the similar fimstrations of labour 
lawyers and argued that:
‘The challenge for the future is to devise a regime which builds upon some of the 
strengths of the ancient regime, transcends its inconsiderable failings, maximised the 
potential contribution of the Declaration ensures that its principles are clearly rooted in 
existing international legal standards, reaches out to new actors including corporations 
and those promulgating privates codes of conduct, and brings those groups into a 
creative but principled relationship with the ILO’."^®
Meyerson, ‘Wall Mart Loves Unions (in China)’, (2004) Washington Post (P ‘ December).
Atleson ‘The Voyage of the Neptune Jade’ in Conaghan, J., Michael, R,. and Klare, K., Labour Law in an Era 
o f  Globalisation: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford, OUP, 2002).
Hepple, B., Labour Law and Global Trade (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) p.9.
See: Henckaerts, J., and Doswald-Black, L., Customary International Humanitarian Law  (CUP, 2005).
Alston, P., ‘Facing up to the Complexities o f the ILO’S Core Labour Standards Agenda’ (2005) 16 EJIL 467, 
476.
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We have provided an answer to Alston’s multifaceted challenge/® First, we have provided a 
‘regime’ which builds upon the strengths of the ‘ancient regime’, because the codification of 
norms is a long established aim of the ILO. It will be recalled that following the Second 
World War, the ILO sought to group its standards together into an international ‘labour 
code’.^ ^^ A handbook of norms of conduct in work, which have attained customary status, is 
therefore true to the ancient regime of the ILO. Second, in advancing the place of customary 
law we have ‘transcended the not inconsiderable failings’ of the ILO’ and its state reporting 
model of enforcement. This is because, as Kellenberger observed, customary law is ‘self­
executing’ by citizens from within the member states themselves, and therefore, bypasses 
the problems of governments failing to deliver rights to their citizens. Third, we have 
provided a means of demonstrating that the principles of the Declaration of Fundamental 
Rights at Work (1998) are ‘clearly rooted’ in ‘international standards’, because by Article 
38(l)(b) ICJ Statue, a rule of custom is a source of international law.
It was Dworkin who conceived arguments of policy as ‘arguments intended to establish 
collective goals’"^® and it is these principles that Hepple argued should form the basis of 
judgment in ‘hard cases’.®® In searching for such a bedrock of principles, Hepple directs 
judges to the corpus of international law, and inevitably, to the ratified labour standards of the 
ILO, which judges might be prepared to apply raw.®^
It was arguably this line of reasoning that led Dickinson CJ to hand down the following 
Judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada:
‘[w]ork is one of the most fundamental aspects of a person’s life, providing the
individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role in
Alston, P., ‘Facing up to the Complexities of the ILO’S Core Labour Standards Agenda’ (2005) 16 European 
Journal o f  International Law 467, at p.476.
International Labour Code (Geneva, 1952).
ICRC Study, Vol.l, ix-xi.
Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) p.90.
Hepple, B., Rights at Work, 2004 Hamlyn Lecture, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) p.24. 
i.e. without further domestic implementation; see: Council o f  Civil Service Unions v Minister fo r the Civil 
Service [1985] AC 374, HL.
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society. A person’s employment is an essential component of his or her sense of 
identity, self-worth and emotional well-being.’®^
Clearly, Dickinson CJ was applying a broader, normative and arguable human rights based 
framework to what is a distinctly ‘contractual relationship’;®® a framework, we might 
reasonably conclude, assembled from the post-war corpus of second generation process 
rights, some of which might properly be said to be customary in nature.®"^
It appears, therefore, that nature and form of customary law make it apt to react to the 
challenges of enforcing labour standards in the 21®* century.
The context against which international (especially economic) agreements are formed is of 
crucial importance. Many treaties are supplemented by a social clause, which obliges the 
contracting parties to guarantee minimum rights for its workers within the framework of 
international economic regulations. This, as Servais observed, is based on the simple 
reasoning that if a country was allowed to keep its workers in deplorable conditions it 
would be able to export at a much lower price and thus gain an unfair advantage over its 
competitors. ®® In a similar vein, the US North saw the Confederate South as having a 
significant competitive advantage with the use of slave labour, in the nineteenth century. 
The overriding objective of the ILO to secure uniformity in standards (evidenced recently 
by the 1998 Declaration) elevates its conventions to universally recognised standards of 
labour, which are apt for customary norms to crystallise around. Indeed, the role of the ILO 
as sole labour standard setter is now recognised by the World Summit for Social 
Development (1995, Copenhagen) and confirmed at the WTO ministerial meeting in 
Singapore in 1996. The standards themselves, not only emanating from an Organisation 
whose unique role as an international actor is confirmed, are adopted via a process 
calculated to achieve near universality thus:
Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta) [1987] 1 SCR 313 at 368; followed by lacobucci 1, in 
Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd  [1997] CLLC 210029 (SCC) a decade later.
See: Freedland, M., The Personal Contract o f  Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Examples include: Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 (No.l4); the Medical Examination o f Young 
Persons (Underground Work) Convention, 1965 (No. 124); the Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No.l75); 
and more generally Article 6 and 7 ECHR (1957). See in terms o f classification: Sachs, A., Protecting Human 
Rights in a New South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Servais, J.M. International Labour Law  (Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, 2009) p.34.
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‘The entire mechanism, however, consisting as it does of successive rounds of 
consultation and negotiation by a Conference committee, is aimed at obtaining the 
broadest possible support with a view to widespread ratification and unrestricted 
implementation. ... The negotiated character of the preparatory process therefore 
implies, if the ILO standards are to have a genuine and universal impact, the active 
participation of all delegations is required’®®
Further, the conventions are negotiated to avoid conflict with other international 
instruments as indeed are treaties adopted by the UN and its other specialised agencies. For 
example Article 8, para.3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966®^  
provides that:
... nothing in this article shall authorise States Parties to the International Labour 
Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise to take legislative measures which would 
prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees 
provided for in that Convention’.®^
Irrespective of whether a state has ratified an ILO Convention, the established international 
principle of good faith requires states to conduct their affairs in accordance with their 
international obligations and furthermore, not to act to fimstrate their policy objectives. ®® 
Therefore, the United Kingdom, which is a founding member of the ILO and signatory to 
its Constitution and Declaration of Fundamental Principles 1998, could not adopt a 
unilateral position contrary to its ratified conventions and be said to be acting in good faith. 
Furthermore, even if the UK had not ratified a given convention, it could not be said to be 
acting in good faith if it legislated contrary to the spirit of ILO policy. Custom is therefore, 
a neat solution to a situation where there is an absence of legislative progress yet an 
abundance of state practice.
Servais, J.M. International Labour Law (Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, 2009) p.47 para.77. 
(New York, 16 December 1966; TS 6 (1977); Cmd. 6702).
^*See also Article 22, para.22 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).
^^See: Re Certain Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253; Re Norwegian Loans Case (France v 
Norway) [1957] ICJ Rep 9; Re Free Zones o f Upper Savoy and the District o f  Gex (1932) PCIJ Series A/B No 
46.
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There has been some resistance to have recourse to the provisions ILO conventions as a 
source of the UK law. At first instance, Glidewell J. summed up what appeared to be the 
prevailing quandary of the English common law judge in the GCHQ case:
T find it is far fi*om easy to decide what the proper interpretation of the ILO 
Conventions is, partly no doubt because the construction of such conventions when in 
dispute is not normally a proper subject for this court’. ®®
This does not however, absolve the English judge from his responsibilities toward obligations 
that either the Government has committed him to interpret, or via an operation of 
international law, he is bound to interpret. Lord Scarman in the House of Lords set out the 
position thus:
‘There is a presumption, albeit rebuttable, that our municipal law will be consistent 
with our international obligations’.®*
We can safely interpret ‘international obligations’ widely to include custom, in line with 
Article 38(1) Statute of the International Court of Justice which sets out the sources of 
international obligations as:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law:
(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.’ [My emphasis at (b)].
What is not clear, however, is the circumstance in which the presumption in favour of 
applying international obligations could be successfully rebutted? Lord Denning MR set out
R v  Secretary o f  State fo r Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex p  Council o f  Civil Service Unions, Another
[1984] IRLR 309, 324.
Attorney General v BBC (1981) AC 303, 354D, HL. Furthermore, ICRC coneludes at (2005) 87(857) IRRC 
175, at 197 that ‘rules o f CIL should be included in ... national legislation’.
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the test forjudges in this regard, requiring them to apply international law so far as is possible 
(then revert back to domestic law, one imagines), thus:
‘What should be the policy of the law in restraining publication? On such a 
question, I take it that our law should conform so far as possible with the provisions 
of the European Convention of Human Rights’.®^
Sceptics of the author’s thesis might well point to the judgment handed down by the Court 
of Appeal in R V Secretary o f  State fo r  Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex p  Council o f  
Civil Service U n i o n s in which Lord Lane CJ dismissed both international treaty 
obligations and furthermore the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association’s report thus:
‘Consequently, if it be necessary for this court to reach a conclusion upon the 
construction of the Conventions, we are respectfully driven to a conclusion different 
from that reached by the Committee on Freedom of Association.’®"*
Lord Fraser went further in the House of Lords by asserting explicitly that ‘the [ILO] 
Conventions are not part of the law in this country’. ®®
One might reasonably conclude that ILO treaty and custom have little effect in English courts 
on the strength of the above pronouncement from Lord Fraser and the Lord Chief Justice, 
rendering this project a futile exercise by continuation. Whilst we may confine the GCHQ 
case to its own set of exceptional facts,®® doubt might still persist as to the willingness of 
English judges to apply international law raw. This would, however, ignore the heritage of 
much of UK labour law and disregard the supranational power of the European Union. Much
Sheering Chemicals v Falkman (1982) 1 QB at page 18D; later citied with approval by Donaldson LJ Cheall v 
^P£X[1982] IRLR 362.
[1984] IRLR 353 
at 359.
[1985] A C 374atp.403.
^^The Cheltenham based Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is undeniably a central plank o f  
the United Kingdom’s intelligence and national security machinery; monitoring millions o f electronic 
communications (so-called ‘traffic’) . A threat to the functioning of that institution (however small) imperilled 
the UK’s national security. It is submitted that it was this argument that, more than any employment law 
reasoning, swayed their lordships to against a unionised GCHQ. Indeed, Lord Brightman deployed it as his sole 
ground for dismissal at [1984] 3 All ER 935, 960.
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of the secondary legislation created by the Council and the Commission (less the Parliament), 
for example, frequently reproduces verbatim the text of ILO Conventions, which in turn 
forms part of UK legislation.®^ Indeed on occasion, the text of the Convention skips directly 
into statute without further processing. The UK Equality Act 2010 at Section 66(1) implies 
(as the preceding Equal Pay Act 1970 at Section 1 implied) a non-discrimination clause in 
every employment contract, where the work of a man and a woman has been given an ‘equal 
value’ per Section 65(1). This reproduces the text of Article 2(1) of the Convention No. 100 
‘Equal Remuneration’ 1951, which states that:
‘Each Member shall, by means appropriate to the methods in operation for 
determining rates of remuneration, promote and, in so far as is consistent with such 
methods, ensure the application to all workers of the principle of equal remuneration 
for men and women workers for work of equal value’.
The Government’s White Papers provide a rich mine of state practice toward the applicability 
of ILO standards in the UK, together with instances where great emphasis has been placed 
around compliance (amounting to a degree of opinio juris). Indeed, it was the UK 
Government that placed before the ILO Governing Body in 1926 a resolution to enact a 
system of supervision that survives in much the same form today.®  ^At this point, it is 
appropriate to deal with the events post-dating some of the more notable standards to 
demonstrate a degree of willingness to be bound by ILO norms.
The Radiation Protection Convention (1960) which provided for progressive compliance was 
met with an enthusiastic welcome in the Government’s White Paper on ratification in 1962, 
which stated that ‘intended that future measures shall comply with the Convention and that its 
progressive application will thus be secured’.®® Later on, the Employment Policy Convention 
(1964) requiring ‘the declaration and pursuit of a policy of full, productive and freely chosen 
employment’ received an equally gracious demonstration of state practice in the White Paper 
which declared ‘the maintenance of full, productive and freely chosen employment has been
Through a combination o f Treaty obligation (Articles 5 and 10 EC), publieation of secondary legislation and 
use o f enforcement to compel prompt and accurate implementation per, Artieles 226-8 EC. See for example 
Equal Pay Act 1970 (now absorbed into Equality Act 2010).
Committee o f Experts, Committee o f the Conference and Committee on Freedom of Association.
^^Cmnd. 1608 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1962), Publishing the Ionising Radiations (Sealed Sources) 
Regulations 1961.
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a fundamental objective of national policy in the United Kingdom for many years, and the 
Government therefore propose to ratify this Convention’/®
The ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (1948) 
was ratified by the UK in 1949. In the White Paper, the Government announced that the Taw 
and practice in the UK was in accordance with the principles set out in the Convention. Effect 
is given to the Convention by common law, legislation and practice’.^ * Coupled with this 
effective demonstration of state practice, the Government evidenced a consideration of its 
binding obligation later that year upon a complaint by banks regarding dominance by 
company based associations. The Committee of Experts recommended the commencement of 
an ‘impartial, full and prompt’ inquiry; the Government duly complied and appointed Lord 
Cameron to the task. Cameron recommended improvements to the banking industry.^^ The 
Government responded by commissioning a working party of London’s clearing banks and 
company-based staff associations. Eventually, agreement was reached in 1968 to set up 
national negotiation machinery. This is a neat example of opinio juris, through the 
Government putting in place real changes on the back of ILO recommendations.
Perhaps a starker example is to be found surrounding the implementation of the Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention (1957). Much was made by the UK representatives of the 
protections afforded under the Magna Carta (1215) and indeed most protections against 
forced labour were to be found at common law. The Committee of Experts was not satisfied, 
however, pointing to the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1884, which laid down 
penal sanctions for ill-discipline amongst (merchant) seamen. In a further demonstration of 
opinio juris, the Government instituted investigations through the Court of Inquiry chaired by 
Lord Pearson, who concluded that the Act should be amended, especially the provisions that 
were the subject of the Committee’s remarks. The Act was duly amended.
It is notable that the UK has traditionally relied on the advancement of labour legislation 
through the collective agreement, typified by Lord Wedderbum’s statement that ‘most 
workers want nothing more of the law than it should leave them alone’.^ ® The UK has always.
Cmnd. 2790 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1965).
Cmnd. 7956 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1949).
Cmnd. 2202: Lord Cameron, Report o f  the Inquiry by the Honourable Lord Cameron, D.S.C. Q.C. into the 
Complaint by the National Union o f  Bank Employees (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1963).
Wedderbum, K.W., The Worker and the Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965) p.9.
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therefore, been something of an awkward partner in the ILO, notwithstanding its clear 
acceptance of its importance through state practice and its coercive power through acts 
demonstrating an opinio juris.
The second issue thrown up by the GCHQ litigation was whether international labour 
norms are of the necessary character to amount to international customary rules. Whilst it 
is true, the labour law does not feature prominently amongst the peremptory norms of the 
international community, there is nothing to prevent a rule of international labour law 
becoming a rule of customary international law, if that rule is evidenced by the uniform 
and consistent practice of states acting out of legal obligation. The question for the court is 
simply whether a standard can be said to be a ‘general practice accepted as law’; there is no 
separate character test. Similarly, it might be argued that in the field of labour law, unlike 
other areas of international law, there is little to link state practice beyond the ILO and its 
conventions. It may well be said, therefore, that without the rights set out in the 
conventions, new parallel rules of customary law would not form, as state practice would 
not be consistent, nor have any reason to be. As discussed in the hypothesis there is nothing 
to prevent a treaty being the seed of a customary principle, recording it or crystallising an 
emerging customary rule. As Lord Bingham confirmed in the House of Lords in 
R(European Roma Rights) v Prague Immigration Officer:
‘The existence of [a] convention is no obstacle in principle to the development of 
an ancillary or supplementary body of law, more generous that [that] convention in 
its application ... ’
This gives strength to the perfectly sensible argument that a treaty provision may provide a 
framework around which customary norms may develop which, as Novitz explained would 
remain irrespective of the host treaty provision because of ‘their implicit status within the 
international community’.
"^*See: Re North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic o f  Germany v Denmark) [1969] ICJ Rep 3; West Rand 
Central Gold Mining Company Ltd  v The King [1905] 2 KB 391; Trendex Trading Corporation v Central Bank 
o f  Nigeria [1977] QC 529; Cia Naviera Vascongado v SS Cristina (The Christina) [1938] AC 485; R v Jones 
(Margaret) [2005] QB 259.
% 0 0 5 ]2 A C  1 atp.35H .
Novitz, T., Tntemational Promises and Domestic Pragmatism: to what extent will the Employment Relations 
Act 1999 implement international labour standards relating to freedom o f association’ (2000) 63 Modern Law  
Review 379 at p.379.
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In any event, many of the standards of the ILO presented via its conventions, concern 
matters already recognised as customary by the ICJ. The prohibition of race discrimination 
promulgated by the ILO at Cl 11 (which shall be examined later in this thesis) for example, 
was accepted as customary by the ICJ in South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa) 
(Liberia v South Africa) (SecondPhase):
‘We consider that the norm of non-discrimination or non-separation on the basis of 
race has become a rule of customary international law’^^
The principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of race is arguably, therefore, already a 
norm of customary law codified within the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965.
Once a general practice is accepted as law, a customary norm is dynamic in its application 
due to its incorporation into the common law of England and Wales. It is enforced by 
private citizens bringing actions in the domestic courts against employers, inviting the 
court to have recourse to a customary rule as a source of law. This bottom-up, citizen first 
approach to rights’ delivery is far stronger than relying upon the state to implement the 
articles of a convention. In that sense, it is akin to the statutory provisions of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, which enables litigation of ECHR rights in the domestic courts.
The technical assistance (in the form of seminaries) provided by the International Labour 
Office in Turin to national juridical systems works to create a uniform application of ILO 
conventions and indeed is borne out of that intention. This comes against a context of 
judge led (rather than state led) reform,^^ which, of itself, is supportive of the customary
Opinion of Judge Tanaka [1966] ICJ Rep 6 at p.293 cited with approval by Lady Hale in R(European Roma 
Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer, Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55 at [102].
See also incorporation o f the principle o f non-discrimination in: International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) (1966); 
Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) (1965); Convention on the Elimination o f All 
Forms o f Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) (1979); Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (“CRPWD”) (2006).
See: Trendex [1977] QB 529, CA; Kuwait Airways Corp. v Iraqi Airways Corp. [2002] 2 AC 883, HL.
Report of the Committee o f Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 47^  ^ Session, 
Report III (pt.IV) (Geneva, ILO 1963) p. 11.
See for example: The Commonwealth Secretariat’s mission to convene high level colloquia for high level 
judges pursuant to the Bangalore Principles (1988) which set out the growing trend o f domestic courts to engage
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nature of technical standards because of the universality of application that is being 
promoted via centralised training. Furthermore, the influence of transnational corporations 
(‘TCNs’) is acutely felt, as indeed Hepple predicted, by their funding of international 
training sessions.
The CEACR of the ILO promotes universality of application, via its (near unique) level of 
enquiry of relevant domestic court judgments. In its 2002 Observation to Australia, for 
example, the CEACR observed the High Court’s decision on equal remuneration was ‘in 
accordance with the Convention [C l00 on ‘Equal Remuneration’]’. Conversely, in its 2003 
Observation to Costa Rica, the Committee noted a Supreme Court ruling which narrowed 
the ability to collectively bargain was in conflict with C98 ‘Collective Bargaining’. Again 
in its 1997 Observation to Croatia, the Committee criticised the recent Supreme Court 
decision which permitted the intervention of public authorities in collective bargaining, as 
a violation of Article 4 of C98. With respects to Cl 11 ‘Discrimination’ the Committee, in 
its 2002 Observation, analysed the 1989 decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court 
which held the ban on head-scarves as being constitutional, noting that ‘the current broad 
prohibition for students and civil servants from wearing head coverings may lead to 
situations incompatible with the principle of equality as envisaged by the Convention 
[Cl 11]’. The Committee also routinely follows-up on the effect of its Observations, for 
example, in its 2002 Observation to Ethiopia, noted the Supreme Court had released a 
union leader, whose detention, had, in a previous Observation, been of grave concern to the 
Committee. This jurisprudence and, importantly, the evidence of state compliance in 
response to Committee Observations, is strong proof of the uniform and consistent 
application.
Amongst ILO member states, the level of monist application of ILO conventions by 
domestic courts is striking. For example. Article 11(2) Constitution of the Philippines
(sometimes unratified) international instruments as tools for interpreting domestic legislation. Further, the UN 
(specifically the Offices o f the Human Rights Commissioner) runs training human rights standards (adopting 
and issuing a training manual ‘Human Rights Lawyers in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human 
Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers’ (2003)). Further, UNICEF run training for judges on the 
application o f the Convention on the Rights o f the Child.
See: International Council on Human Rights, Local Perspectives: Foreign aid to the justice sector, (June, 
2000).
Hepple, B., Labour Law and Global Trade (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005).
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directs ‘general principles of international law’ are part of the domestic law and the 
Philippine Supreme Court in International School Alliance o f Educators v International 
School^^ held the ILO principle of non-discrimination (and arguably a rather more 
substantive vision) of equality was a general principle of the law of Philippines. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has subsequently held a rule (we might reasonably 
suppose a customary one) of equal rank to legislation, on application of lex posterior. In 
the US ratified treaties (and customary norms^^) have the rank of Federal law, in that their 
provisions override state law, but can be overridden by subsequent Federal law. In Europe, 
the principle also abides. In German basic law. Article 25 directs that ‘the general rules of 
international form part of the Federal law’. Article 25 is also apt to cover customary law.^^ 
Similarly, the Estonian Constitution provides that ‘generally recognised principle and rules 
of international law are an inseparable of the Estonian legal system’. In some instances, the 
treaty provisions are afforded higher status and, therefore, even within the consent based 
system of treaty law there is growing support for a supranational mechanism. In Costa 
Rica, for example, the Constitution at Article 7 provides that international treaty provisions 
are of a higher status than national law and conflicts must be resolved accordingly.
It is clear, in any event, that the ILO Conventions are already in active use by domestic 
courts to fill a lacuna in national law. For example, in AMSA v Migilo (1990) the Tribunal 
of First Instance of Milano based its judgment exclusively on Article 7 of ILO C l32 on 
Annual Holidays with Pay. Similarly, in Carmen Sachelaridi Knutson v Cooperativa 
Santisimo Redentor Limitada (2000) the Paraguayan Labour Court of Appeals relied on 
c m  to hold sexual harassment akin to sex discrimination. Again in Dugain v Air 
Madagascar (2003) the Madagascan Supreme Court granted certiorari on the grounds the 
inferior courts had failed to have regard to Cl 11.
In many instances, the rules of international law are a mandatory reference point to 
domestic statutory construction, which translates in practice, as a reference to ILO 
conventions in the field of labour or equality law. Article 39 of the South African 
Constitution, for example, requires reference to international law when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights. In Hoffmann v South African Airlines (2000) the Constitutional Court relied on
^ G R N o. 128845 (2000).
Secretary o f  Justice v Hon. Ralph C. Lantion and Marl B. Jimenez G.R. No. 139465 (2000).
See: Rodriquez v Drummond Company Inc. 256 F Supp 1250 (ND Ala 2003). Judgment 14, April 2003. 
Seidl-Hohenfeldren, I., Volkerrecht (Cologne: Heymaims Verlag KG, 1997) p.43.
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c m .  Further, in that case. Justice Ngcobo (with whom the other justices agreed) set out 
the Constitution (when interpreted by reference to C l l l )  not only sought to eliminate 
discrimination, but also the effects thereof:
‘The need to eliminate unfair discrimination does not only arise from Chapter 2 of 
our Constitution. It also arises out of international obligation’.
Reference to the ILO conventions (even non-binding ones) has now become common in 
South Africa when the courts are called upon to interpret the provisions of the Employment 
Equity Act 1998, especially with respect of claimants living with H IV /A ID S.This is in 
accordance with the express statutory provision at Section 3(d) of the Act which provides 
that:
‘[the provisions of this Act] must be interpreted in compliance with the 
international law obligations of the Republic, in particular those contained in the 
International Labour Organisation Convention (N o.Ill) concerning Discrimination 
in Respect of Employment and Occupation.’
The practice of explicit reference to ILO instruments as a global source of labour law is 
becoming more widespread, supporting a customary thesis set out herein. In UST Faculty 
Union et ah v Dir Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonia et al. (1999) the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines relied on ILO C87 to find a fundamental right to self-organisation. Similarly, in 
Kyo Gas (2002) on the basis of powerful submission of claimant counsel, the Tokyo 
District Court used the logic of C l00 to inform its interpretation of Section 4 Labour 
Standards Act. The jurisprudence was followed by the Okayama District Court in 
Uchiyama Kogyo (2001).
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the pragmatic benefits of the thesis when compared 
to the enforcement models advanced. The demonstration that certain labour norms are 
customary in nature brings with it many virtues. Perhaps most importantly, it presents the 
single most effective and enduring mechanism of delivering rights to individual workers.
Hoffmann v South African Airlines, Case GOT 17/00, (Judgment, 28 September 2000) at [51].
See for example: PFG Building Glass (PTY) Ltd  v Chemical Engineering Pulp Paper Wood and Allied  
Workers Union Case No. J90/03; Joy Mining Machinerya Division o f  Harnischfeger (South Africa) (PTY) L td  v 
National Union o f  Metal Workers o f  South Africa Case No. J158/02; The State v Makewanyane, 1995 (3) SA 
391 (CC) at [33] (under interim Constitution in 1993).
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Chapter Four
Testing the Thesis against the Methodology
‘ The vessel in which milk is proffered 
...be one all seekers can use
Introduction
This Chapter examines the treaty provision in question. We shall test the thesis, that rule 
against non-discrimination in work contained within the ILO Treaty C l l l  is customary in 
nature, by applying the methodology set out in Chapter One.
The Treaty Provision
C l l l  was resolved at the 42"^ Session of the Conference and was adopted on 25 June 
1958. The Convention drafts the classes of prohibited discrimination in wide terms at 
Article l(l)(a) to cover any ‘distinction, exclusion or preference’ made on the basis of 
‘race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin’. The 
effect of which must be to ‘nullify or impair equality of opportunity or treatment’ and so 
as to give the maximum possible scope to cover ‘employment or occupation’. This neatly 
mirrors the trend of ILO Conventions to extend protection to the broadest category of 
those engaged in economic activity. It also renders no minimal temporal considerations of 
engagement with an employer as a precondition to the engagement of C l l l ’s protective 
Articles.
C l l l  is alive to the varying forms of discrimination. In particular, it notes that prima 
facie ‘neutral situations’ can give rise to harmfiil effects. In which regard, it acts as a 
companion to the prohibition on direct discrimination to cover any ‘distinction exclusion 
or preference’ which has the ability to ‘impair equality of opportunity or treatment’. This 
formal and substantive dynamic, characterises much of UK domestic equality legislation, 
which is directly applicable in labour relations. The Committee of Experts on the
* This excerpt from the judgment of Burger CJ in the US Supreme Court in Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 
424 (1971) p.431 is the birth o f indirect discrimination and a vision o f substantive equality.
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Application of Conventions and Recommendations has placed the test for discrimination 
as outcome-focused,^ in their words:
‘Cl 11: covers all discrimination without referring to the intention of an author of 
a discriminatory act or even without there needing to be an identifiable author, as 
in the case of indirect discrimination or occupational segregation based on sex’/
The pursuit of equal treatment was not created for the first time in C l l l .  Indeed, the post­
war international human rights instruments reflect this ambition. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), for example, sets out, at Article 1 (in distinctly 
aspirational language, as opposed to that of legal enforceability) the general hope that all 
nations will agree that:
‘[a] 11 human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood’
It goes on, at Article 2, to create a specific injunction against any distinction in the 
application of the Declaration’s ‘rights’, specifically with regard to a set of (non- 
exhaustive) characteristics.- This underlines the universalism of rights detailed in the 
Preamble. The rights are also not dependent on the ‘possessor’ being a member of a given 
polity or free society, but rather are inherent within that individual inalienably and in 
perpetuity. The inclusion of economic and social rights, however, within the 
Declaration’s scope, is possibly reflective of the aspiration of the Canadian drafter. 
Professor John Peters Humphrey, to entice the world around to the Canadian social 
welfare model, rather than an attempt to create any binding force of law. This, doubtless 
well motivated inclusion, has opened the document up to accusations of being drafted 
around a western industrialised hegemony, which in turn has given fresh life to the 
cultural relativist movement. The post-war human rights instmments have plainly 
influenced the model of anti-discrimination adopted by the ILO and indeed the grounds of 
protected class (race, colour, etc.) were deliberately incorporated into the Convention
 ^See: Manuela, T., ‘Diserimination and Equality at Work: A review o f the concepts’ (2003) 142(4) In t’l Lab 
Rev. 401, at 402.
^(Geneva: ILO, 1998) p.22, para.26. Note also a rejection o f motive as a defence to ‘direct’ discrimination in 
UK domestic equality law (but not indirectly discriminatory p er se), see, for example, the decision o f  the 
Supreme Court in R(E) vJFS  [2009] UKSC 15, (discussed below).
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during its drafting. Furthermore, the Governing Body of the ILO expressed the view that 
‘the documents submitted to the Conference should deal with discrimination on all the 
grounds listed in Article 2 (1 / of the Universal Declaration’. ^
The ILO also re-examined its own purpose in the mid 20^  ^ Century and, in 1944, 
reaffirmed its core beliefs in the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944). Chief amongst which 
was that all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex have the right to pursue both 
their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of fi*eedom and 
dignity, of economic security and of equal opportunity.^ From the point of view of 
universality with a view to creating a customary norm it is of note that the Committee of 
Experts has held that it is essential that Governments give their attention to all the 
grounds of discrimination envisaged in the Convention. ^
The normative aim of equality of opportunity
It is against this general fi-amework that C l l l  sets out to secure the twin normative aim of 
‘equality of opportunity and treatment’. It is therefore, important to examine the notion of 
equality in ILO Treaty C l l l  against the literature and order it into a typology. Harlow 
and Rawlings’, in their categorisation of laws in general,^ conceive laws fitting into one 
of the following broad types by reference to their policy aims:
4 General Survey (1988) Report 111 Part,4B para.31.
 ^being: race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.
 ^Discrimination in the Field o f  Employment and Occupation, (ILC, 40* Session) (1957) Report V ll(l) , question 
7, pp.l and 30.
 ^Appendix 1: (ILO: 1944, 26* Session). For a further discussion o f the Declaration, see Chapter 2, The 
unavoidable nexus ofpeace and social justice as Astraea Redux, in ‘Historical Background’ .
 ^General Survey (1963) para.22.
 ^ See: the ‘lights thesis’ in: Harlow and Rawlings, Law and Administration in Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
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^  (3) Green light equality -  equality of outcome.
â
to
a. (2) Amber light equality -  equality of opportunity.
I
i  ( 1 ) Red light equality -  equality under the law.
To put some flesh on the bones: red light equality can be seen as the passive punitive 
model of law, whereby equality is delivered through universal subjugation beneath 
(mainly criminal) laws that simply punish mal-compliance. Red light equality has no 
social agenda or normative aim (e.g. laws prohibiting corruption of bodily integrity). 
Amber light equality is a typically communitarian v iew ,m ix ing  certain rights with 
responsibilities. It notes difficulties with the way society’s institutions are arranged, but 
seeks to affect a transformative agenda by removing barriers to equal opportunity (these 
are best typified by the UK’s 1970s race and sex discrimination statutes now streamlined 
in the Equality Act 2010). Green light equality resolves to adjust (perceived) inequity by 
deploying variations on a Rawlsean ‘difference principle’ to affect social change. Of the 
three, green light equality is the most variable, ranging from the positive obligations upon 
employers arising out of UK disability anti-discrimination legislation, to the Marxist 
vision at the extreme. Somewhere between Amber and Green light equality is quite 
possibly room for notions of positive discrimination or affirmative action programmes. It 
should be borne in mind that, as Hare observed, the state is the ‘natural collector, 
calibrator and redistributor of life’s inequalities’.^  ^It naturally follows that the level of 
state intervention increases exponentially as one travels down the categories (a higher 
level of intervention is required for green light projects than red). The drafting of the 
Universal Declaration, which reflects a higher end integration conception of human 
rights, is to be contrasted with the largely conservative drafting of the Convention.
For a wider explanation o f the communitarian theory, see: Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice 
(Harvard, 1982).
See: Rawls, I., A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1972).
Hare, R., M., ‘A Theory of Justice by Rawls: a Critical Study’ (1973) 23 The Philosophical Quarterly 144.
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McCrudden developed several typologies of discrimination, which, in a sense, parallel the 
varying visions of equality from red to green light above. In 2002, based largely on the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, McCrudden developed the following classifications/^
(1) Equality as procedural justice -  pure formalised equality(akin  to red light 
equality above).
(2) Equality as social justice -  a broadly substantive mode/^ (akin to amber/green 
hybrid light equality above).
(3) Equality as diversity -  an acknowledgement of difference, promoting 
involvement though a ‘transformative agenda’ (akin to weak/moderate green light 
equality).
Before tackling McCrudden’s 2006 theory of discrimination, we must pause to examine 
these three interpretations and their impact on our interpretation of C l l l .  By ignoring 
entirely the libertarian concepts of red light equality, McCrudden would appear to 
concede to a fundamental distrust in non-state actors delivering any form of equality. He 
chooses rather to begin with the procedural or formalised vision of equality, mixed with 
an ambition to affect social change, summed up well by Fredman:
‘... as competitors in a race, the goal pursed by procedural justice is to equalise 
the competitors’ starting points
This is not, however, as Fredman characterises it, pure procedural justice. Any attempt to 
deliver equality of opportunity clearly opens the door of the Ralwsean difference 
principle, or at the least, a degree of state intervention with a view to affect social change 
and is exposed to the libertarian critique as a consequence. This view, is in effect, 
supported by Hepple who saw it as:
‘... depriving two individuals of a particular benefit as well as by conferring the 
benefit on both’.^ ^
McCrudden, C., Equality at Work: Legal Approaches in the European Community (2002). This was a 
background paper prepared for Time fo r  Equality at Work (ILO, Geneva, 2003).
Which we can take to mean focusing on an inequality of process rather than outcome.
Which we can take to mean focusing an inequality of outcome arising from a (possibly) neutral provision. 
Fredman, S., A critical review o f  the concept o f  equality in UK anti-discrimination law  (Cambridge: Centre 
for Public Law Working Paper (No.3), 1999).
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The procedural equality envisaged by McCrudden has, however, in his own words, been 
criticised for failing to rectify some of the institutional inequalities that abide/^ It would 
be unfair, therefore, to level the full weight of the libertarian critique at a theory that 
failed to meet the Rawlsean vision even partially. This view can, however, be compared 
to the formalised Article l(l)(a) of the Convention, in that it prohibits overt 
discrimination on the protected grounds.
The ‘equality as social justice’ model next advanced by McCrudden and has two distinct 
strands: (i) indirect discrimination (akin to amber light equality) and (ii) affirmative 
action programmes (akin to an amber/green light hybrid). This flaunts a garish agenda of 
social change with its usual phalanx of assumptions, epitomised by Dupper as promoting 
‘highly desirable forms of social c h a n g e I t  carries with it a few trunks worth of 
normative baggage, which are not in receipt of public endorsement nor even objectively 
proven as desirable. Furthermore, the critique of affirmative action as a concept in 
employment is well documented,^^ but now has legislative support in the UK by ss.l58- 
159 Equality Act 2010. This lens of the theory goes further than Article l(l)(b), which 
seeks to prevent the erection of barriers to equality of opportunity, rather than placing an 
explicit duty on the state to remove them by referring only to a ‘distinction, exclusion or 
preference’. Article 2 requires Member States to pursue a national policy designed to 
‘promote equality of opportunity’ with a view to eliminating discrimination; it is not 
however, specific and whilst drafted in the language of a duty, makes no further provision 
for the scope of the ‘national policy’. Furthermore, although Article 5(2) of the 
Convention does, after some requirements, provide for limited scope to enact ‘protection
Hepple, B., ‘Equality and empowerment for decent work’ (2001) 140(1) In t’l Lab. Rev. 5-18.
See: McCrudden, C., ‘Regulating discrimination: Advice to a legislator on problems regarding the 
enforcement o f anti-discrimination law and strategies to overcome them’ in Loenen, T and Rodrigues, P., eds. 
Non-discrimination law: Comparative perspectives (The Hague: KLl, 1999) pp.295-314.
Dupper, O., ‘In defence o f affirmative action in South Africa’ (2004) South Africa Law Journal.
See in general: Blanpain, R., ‘Equality of treatment in employment law’ in, Zweigert, K., (ed.) International 
Encyclopedia o f  Comparative Law  (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990); Edwards, J., Positivie discrimination, 
social justice and social police: Moral scrutiny o f  a policy practice (London: Tavistock, 1987); Loury, G., 
Social exclusion and ethnic groups: The challenge to economics (1999) paper delivered at Washington DC, 28- 
30 April, World Bank; Calves, G., ‘Les politiques de discrimination positive’ (1999) 822 Problems Politiques et 
Sociaux. For a US critique see most prominently: Epstein, R., ‘Protect us. Lord, from Title Vll: A Response to 
Gelback, Klick, and Wexler’ (2009) 3 University o f  Chicago Law Review.
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or assistance’ measures, it is submitted that this is likely to be aimed at subsidies rather 
than statistical engineering, such as English classes for non-native speakers in the labour 
market, part funded by the Government.
McCrudden’s final vision of equality, equality as diversity, draws on the dichotomous 
Feminist jurisprudence between emphasis on ‘sameness’ and celebrating differences; but 
has distinct high communitarian, low-end Rawlsean overtones. This notion of anti- 
discrimination via recognition is akin to the emphasis placed on the ‘personhood’ rather 
than the ‘disability’ of people with disabilities in recent social policy. Policy seen through 
this lens could easily sanction affirmative action programmes (celebrating the individual 
contributions of a given group), travelling further down the path to redistribution of life’s 
inequalities through a fundamental shake-up of society’s institutions. Celebrating 
difference can easily be seen less charitably, however, as encouraging division, which is 
inevitably counterproductive to anti-discrimination ambitions. The Convention, on the 
other hand, focuses on the lexicon of universalism. It sweeps all human beings together 
and mandates a form of the Rawlsean veil of ignorance,^^ where society is made ignorant 
to each-others’ race, creed or sex. This ignorance of certain differences nullifies any 
notion of the McCrudden ‘equality as diversity’ thesis finding an easy home amongst ILO 
instruments as the Convention is drafted to ignore rather than celebrate difference.
In 2006, McCrudden and Kountouros perfected the raw visions of equality, into a 
typology of discrimination. Firstly, equality is conceived as ‘rational’, with no normative 
baggage. As McCrudden put it, addressing inequality is of no ‘greater moral or legal 
significance than if the government decided to allocate houses only to those with red 
hair’.^  ^This vision of equality is clearly not what the ILO intended in the Convention, 
particularly by referring explicitly to the Universal Declaration and emphasising human 
beings’ personhood, both in the Preamble. There is an evidential normative dynamic at 
play, which coupled with the social context of the drafting, mirrors a post-war rush to 
codify individual rights.
21 Rawls, J., A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1972).
McCrudden, C., and Kountouros, H., Human Rights and European Equality Law  (Oxford: University o f  
Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2006) Working Paper No. 8/2006. p.2. (Henceforth 
the ‘2006 Paper’).
136
Next, McCrudden floats a notion of equality as protecting ‘prized public goods’ for 
distribution to all without distinction. This, distinctly Utilitarian vision assumes its flawed 
mantle, that the ‘public good’ is a singular, universal concept envisaged by all. The 
invitation of such a subjective noun in equality law is riddled with historical caution, for 
all extremist regimes have deployed the public good as a shield from criticism for 
depriving minority rights and even the modem UK Coalition Government brands itself as 
‘moving forward in the national interest’. If one forgives the normatively-loaded 
conception of ‘good’, however, the type is broadly sound: as a uniting society around a 
common set of goals (freedom from discrimination, for example). One could have 
referred to the protection of ‘public commodity’ as financially neutral concepts that are 
liable for discrimination (things said or done, for example). The Convention echoes the 
broad thmst of the ‘prized public goods’ argument; however it draws no distinction 
between the public and the private realm. The English employment relationship is a 
pointedly private one, as explained by the speeches of Viscount Kilmuir L.C. and Lord 
Keith in the House of Lords in Vine v National Dock Labour Board?^ McCmdden 
defended his thesis by referring to the operation of Article 14 of the ECHR, which as a 
conjunctive to the Convention’s other articles ensures their operation without 
discrimination. Simply, McCmdden envisaged the freedoms and access to public 
services, secured in the substantive articles of the ECHR, are ‘public prized goods’ and 
Article 14 ECHR is the guarantee to equal access. This public only vision, however, 
overlooks Section 3(1) Human Rights Act 1998, which prescribes a new form of statutory 
interpretation thus:
‘(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
rights’
Section 94(1) Employment Rights Act 1996 guaranteeing the right of employees not to be 
unfairly dismissed must be read in line with Article 6 ECHR, for example, guaranteeing a 
fair trial (by Section 3(1) HRA). The protection of ‘goods’ (public and private) is 
therefore a compatible thesis with the provisions of the Convention.
23 The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (London, 2010) p.7.
[1957] AC 488, at pp.500 and 507.
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McCrudden then moves to characterise discrimination as a status harm flowing from the 
possession (or perceived^^ possession) of a given characteristic. For McCrudden, this type 
of discrimination is the opposite side of the ‘prized public goods’ argument. He explained 
that the status harm argument:
‘...is less concerned with the importance of good being allocated and more 
concerned with the use of actual or imputed identity in a wide range of 
situations’.^ ^
In essence, this category is concerned with outcome flowing from a given set of 
protective criteria (race, sex, sexual orientation, etc.) and in so doing is focused to a far 
greater degree on substantive over formal equality. It mirrors Article 1(1 )(b) of C l l l  and 
the ‘indirect discrimination’ provisions in domestic legislation.
In his final vision of equality, McCrudden stopped short of the Rawlsean ‘difference 
principle’, but instead advanced the ‘positive obligation’ class of equality. Although 
McCrudden conceived this category as ‘equality of opportunity’, it clearly has the 
potential to slide into delivering ‘equality of outcome’ and in so doing, he has ended at 
the same point as he did in 2003 as a high end Communitarian -  low end Rawlsean. There 
is a potential nod of support for this view at Article 2 of C l l l ,  whereby contracting 
parties undertake to:
‘... declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote ... equality of 
opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation . . . ’
It is however, calculated to ‘[eliminate] any discrimination in respect thereof not to 
pursue a broader aim of delivering equality Mindful of the need for customary norms to 
demonstrate a broad consensus, it is perhaps unwise to pin the bar of equality too high.
The possession o f a given characteristic is not a prerequisite for a number o f discrimination claims, see for 
example, English v Thomas Sanderson Blinds Ltd  [2008] EWCA Civ. 1421 as authority that a claim under 
Regulation 5 o f the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003.
McCrudden, 2006 Working Paper, p.3.
Although note Section 149 Equality Act 2010.
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for as McCrudden himself admitted ‘Community law on equality is probably the most 
advanced of any jurisdiction in the world’
The liberal vision of equality, that likes must be treated alike, permeates UK domestic 
legislation/^ Fredman, however, through four overlapping conceptions of equality, 
demonstrates how European Community jurisprudence could construe Directives'^ and 
Treaty^^ provisions in such a way to give effect to substantive equality.
Fredman began with an outcome focused ‘equality of results’, which at tdrst blush, 
appears a modem implementation of the Rawlsean difference principle. It is rather, a 
sonnet in support of indirect discrimination as conceived in US civil rights law.^  ^It is, so 
Fredman argued, a limp concept, so long as its restitution is damaged, permitting the 
offending ‘provision, criterion or practice’ to continue. The Northern Irish example is 
held up as instmctive, as it incorporates a well deployed affirmative action or positive 
discrimination prov ision .T h is approach, secures a ‘fairer’ distribution of jobs. In 
England and Wales, few statutory provisions exist as a parallel, with the notable 
exception of the (now repealed) Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002, 
which permitted ‘all women’ shortlists in the selection of parliamentary candidates. 
Now, Section 104(2) Equality Act 2010 permits the selection of candidates based on any 
of the protected characteristics. The English courts, however, have been resistant to 
measures to promote equality via affirmative action see: Jepson andDyas Elliot v Labour 
Party}^
2006 Working Paper, p.9 see also: Kravaritou, Y., ‘Equality between men and women (Article 23)’ in 
Bercusson, B., (eds.) European Labour Law and the EU Charter o f  Fundamental Rights (Brussels: ETUI, 2002) 
pp.39-43.
Part II Chapter 2 Section 13 Equality Act 2010 ‘less favourable treatment’ (Formerly: Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, Race Relations Act 1976).
Fredman, S., ‘A Critical Review of tbe Concept of Equality in UK Anti-Discrimination Law’ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Centre for Public Law and Judge Institute of Management Studies: 1999).
Notably: Council Directive 2000/43/EC on Equal Treatment (OJ [2000] L I80/22).
Article 141 EC.
See: Title VII, Civil Rights Act 1964 (subsequently found in UK law: see Equality Act 2010. Formerly: Race 
Relations Act 1976, and Sex Discrimination Act 1975; and now extends to all protected characteristics.
Fair Employment Act 1989.
The measure could now be achieved via Section 104(2) Equality Act 2010.
[1996] IRLR 1996.
139
Fredman’s second vision is the common refrain of the centre-left: ‘equality of 
opportunity’. It is argued, with some validity, that this is the approach of the and 
Fredman is keen to paint the Communitarian ideal thus:
‘... using the graphic metaphor of competitors in a race, [this approach] asserts 
that true equality cannot be achieved if individuals begin the race from different 
starting points. An equal opportunities approach therefore aims to equalize the 
starting points ... ’ ^^
This inevitably exposes the theory to the liberal critique. Essentially it questions whether 
some are ‘handicapped’ to advance others in the pursuit of a nebulous equilibrium, 
notably Cavanagh, who perceived an inevitable conflict between ‘equality of opportunity’ 
and business efficacy.^^ Still, however, Fredman observed that this conception of ‘not 
putting barriers up’ fails to guarantee more women taking up posts without the 
introduction of special measures (such as affirmative action programmes).
The final two theories are akin to one another. Penultimately, Fredman saw the delivery 
of substantive equality through an auxiliary to substantive rights, such as the operation of 
Article 14 ECHR. In continuation, the final vision saw a ‘broad value driven approach’ 
advanced. This approach demands a critical analysis of a given measure to ensure (in the 
words of the Article 157(4) TFEU) ‘full equality in practice’. This could be achieved 
either singularly or with a codicil similar to Article 14 ECHR to a domestic clause (such 
as rights to healthcare, education, social security, etc.) to ensure non-discrimination in the 
operation of that clause.
In addition to distinctions, exclusions or preferences made ‘on the basis’ of a series of 
protected grounds at Article 1(1 )(a), which the UK legal system styles ‘direct’ 
discrimination. Article 1(1 )(b) deals with facially neutral situations, which have the effect
Notably at D. 76/207/EC Art. 2(4), See also: C.450/93 Kalanke v Frieie und Hansestadt Bremen [1995] 
ECTI-3051 para.23.
Fredman, S., ‘A Critical Review o f the Concept o f Equality in UK Anti-Discrimination Law’ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Centre for Public Law and Judge Institute of Management Studies: 1999).
Cavanagh, M., Against Equality o f  Opportunity (Oxford: OUP, 2003). See also: Epstein, R., ‘Protect us. Lord, 
from Title VII: A Response to Gelback, Klick, and Wexler’ (2009) 3 University o f  Chicago Law Review cf. 
Greenberger, S., ‘A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the Civil Rights Act 1991’ (2003) 73(2) 
Oregon Law Review 253.
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of ‘nullifying or impairing’ equality of opportunity or treatment which the UK legal 
system styles ‘indirect discrimination’. This concept has a rich jurisprudential heritage in 
Western legal theory and deserves some contemplation.
Article l(l)(b) of the Convention reads as follows:
‘ 1. For the purpose of this Convention the term discrimination includes-
(a) ...
(b) such other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality o f opportunity or treatment in employment or 
occupation as may be determined by the Member concerned after consultation 
with representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, where such exist, 
and with other appropriate bodies’ [emphasis added].
The notion of a legislative provision aimed at tackling the disparate effects of a facially 
natural measure, is arguably something of a hybrid between an individual focused tort and 
group-based positive discrimination."^® The concept sits uncomfortably with a liberal classical 
theory, in that it justifies the state’s interference in private (industrial) relations on normative 
foundations of what should not to be the case, rather than on the two foundations of ‘harm 
prevention’ and ‘distributive justice’.
The delivery of non-discrimination rights has been often characterised as a binary, individual 
and group model."^  ^Brest set out the prevailing individualistic model thus:
‘The individual justice model rests on the “anti-discrimination principle”, which 
disfavours classification and other decisions and practices that depend on the race (or 
ethnic origin) of the parties affected’.
Morris, A. J., ‘On the Normative Foundations o f Indirect Discrimination Law: Understanding the Competing 
Models o f Discrimination Law as Aristotelian Forms o f Justice’ (1995) 2 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 199, 
p.199.
Gardner, A., ‘Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination’ (1989) 9 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 1, pp.1-3.
See most prominently: Fallon and Weiler F irefighters v Stotts: Conflicting models o f Racial Justice’ (1984) 
Sup. Ct. Rev., 1.
Brest, ‘In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle’ (1976) 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, p.l
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The individual model seeks to avoid the prevention of talented people’s entry to the labour 
market (or their access to goods and services or to education) on a set of arbitrary grounds 
over which they have no control/"^ It is of note that the direct discrimination model endured 
as the dominant feature of Western domestic human rights statutes until the 1970s/^ For 
many theorists, however, the model failed to take account of ‘social reality’/® Therefore, a 
form of anti-discrimination legislation emerged, centred on group rights, which identified 
groups that are socially disadvantaged and sought to advance their interests/^ The group 
model is itself dichotomous: the first limb values on the legal force necessary to prevent the 
individual discrimination, and the second and the stronger limb, sees groups as independent 
entities, entitled to a group remedy/^ The group model is surely, at least in part, a reaction 
against the significant critique of law’s neutrality and its failure to apply its power to correct 
societal injustice/^
This is reflected in the UK direct discrimination jurisprudence: see the approach o f Lord Nicholls o f  
Birkenhead Shamoon v Chief Constable o f  the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11 and Nagaraian v 
London Regimental Transport [2000] 1 AC 501.
Until 1971 in the US with the decision of the Supreme Court in Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 424 (1971) 
which influenced in 1975 the UK introduction offhe Sex Discrimination Act o f the same year.
See: Fliss, ‘Groups and the Equal Protection Clause’, (1976) 5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 107, p.l08; see 
also: McCrudden, C., ‘Institutional Discrimination’ (1982) 2 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 303, pp. 317-347; 
Fredman, S., ‘Legitimising Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review o f the 
Supreme Court Doctrine’ (1979) 62 Minnesota Law Review 1049, pp. 1052-1057; Burke-Marshall, ‘A Comment 
on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a “Nation o f Minorities’” (1984) 93 Yale L. J. 1006.
Fliss, ‘Groups and the Equal Protection Clause’, (1976) 5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 107, pp.147-151.
See, for example, the new power of Employment Tribunals to make a recommendation as to the treatment o f  
‘any other person’ as well as the Claimant at s.l23(3)(b) Equality Act 2010. As to group rights generally see: 
Morris, A. J., ‘On the Normative Foundations o f Indirect Discrimination Law: Understanding the Competing 
Models o f Discrimination Law as Aristotelian Forms o f Justice’ (1995) 2 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 199, 
p.203; but see also Fallon and Weiler Fire-fighters v Stotts: Conflicting models o f Racial Justice’ (1984) Sup. 
Ct. Rev., 1, p.22; Fliss, ‘Groups and the Equal Protection Clause’, (1976) 5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 107, 
pp.147-156.
See detailed discussion in ‘Extrinsic Literature Review’ in Ch.l. See the critique of the law in general: Ralws. 
J., A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1972); Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, 1974); Jabbari, 
D, ‘From Criticism to Construction in Modem Critical Legal Theory’ (1992) 12 OJLS 507-542, 509; Unger 
‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561; Treubner, G., ‘Substantive and 
Reflective Elements in Modem Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239. See for Feminist critique: Ree, J., 
‘Metaphor and Metaphysics: The End of Philosophy and Derrida’ (1984) 38 Radical Philosophy 21; Derrida, J.,
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An alternative model is the Aristotelian corrective and distributive thesis. The former is the 
doctrine of compensating injured parties for a given wrongful act or as McCrudden sees it 
‘agent relative’. Distributive justice allocates the common stock and assigns the related costs 
according to a general distributive scheme founded on criteria that apply to all persons®® and 
is the basis of McCrudden’s conception of equal access to ‘public prized goods’. The two 
principles do not interrelate particularly well with each other, nor indeed with a classical 
liberal theory of justice. As Morris observed, ‘legally earning high profits upsets an existing 
distributive scheme but has no corrective implications’ or that the:
‘... law recognizes a right to relief on corrective grounds when an impoverished thief 
steals fi*om a wealthy person. This is so even though the thief may, on account of 
poverty, have a distributive claim against the entire community, including the wealthy 
victim’, or that the ‘courts do not vet plaintiffs to determine whether they already 
have their allotted share of societal advantages’.®^
It is, however, accepted that the indirect discrimination model reflects a distributive rather 
than a corrective model of justice.®^
The UK statutory conception of indirect discrimination has its roots in US law. The decision 
of the US Supreme Court in Griggs v Duke Power Co®® is the benchmark interpretation of the 
Title VII provisions of the US Civil Rights Act 1964. The practice of Duke Power to only 
engage those with a high school education in the Operations, Maintenance or Laboratory 
Departments was held to give a ‘built in headwind’ to white males in North Carolina, 34% of 
whom had completed High School compared to only 12% of their black male counterparts. 
The Court reasoned, that just as in the fable, the fox and the stork entertain each other to 
dinner with crockery the other could not use, Duke Power had inadvertently erected a barrier
in The Return o f  Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, ed. Q. Skinner (Cambridge: CUP, 1985); See on Marxist 
critique: Horwitz, M.J., ‘The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?’ (1977) 86 Yale Law J. 561.
Aristotle, The Nichmachean Ethics (London: Penguin, 1953).
Morris, A. J., ‘On the Normative Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law: Understanding the Competing 
Models o f Discrimination Law as Aristotelian Forms o f Justice’ (1995) 2 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 199, 
pp.206, 207, 213.
See: Gardner, A., ‘Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination’ (1989) 9 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 1, pp.3-5, 
8-11; McCrudden, C., Smith, D., Brown, C., ‘Racial Justice at Work: the Enforcement o f the Race Relations Act 
\916' { \9 9 \)  Employment 2)2.
401 US 424(1971).
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which was insurmountable to more black men then white men. Just as Congress has 
demanded that ‘the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use’, so Duke 
Power must proffer promotion on a level playing field. As Chief Justice Burger put it:
‘Practices, procedures or tests, neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of 
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status quo of prior 
discriminatory practices ... ’
In seeking a ratio of Griggs, Forshaw and Pilgerstorfer argued it is three fold. First, there 
must be a rule or condition at play that creates a winning and a losing group; second, the 
separation must place those with a protected characteristic in the losing group at a particular 
disadvantage; and finally, the difference is not necessary.®®
Reconciling the twin treaty aims of equality of opportunity and social justice
Whilst Article 2 ILO Treaty C l l l  seeks to secure the aim of ‘equality of opportunity and 
treatment’, it is adopted against the Preamble to the ILO Constitution, which provides that:
... universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social 
justice’.®®
As such, each of the instruments adopted by the ILO, are framed against a promotion of 
social ‘justice’. The question, thrown up by ILO Convention C l l l ,  therefore, is whether the 
aim of equality can be reconciled with the aim of justice. To do so, relies upon eliding the 
two concepts to mean that justice equates to fairness.
‘Justice as fairness’ is the central plank of the Rawlsian theory of justice.®^ It is dependant 
first, on one’s belief in the power of the state; second, on one’s visions of liberty and 
equality; and finally, the fairness of difference principle (and its component parts). It is 
perhaps a random example to deploy Rawls as the subject of this analysis, but as Nozick
^^401 US 424(1971)atp.430.
Forshaw and Pilgerstorfer ‘Direct and Indirect Discrimination: Is There Something in between’ (2008) 37(4) 
Industrial Law Journal 347, p.349.
Constitution o f the International Labour Organization, 1919.
Expounded in Rawls. J., A Theory o f  Justice (OUP, 1972).
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describes his theory as ‘the benchmark, where all others must subscribe or state their reasons 
why not’,®^ it appears logical.
It is the central pillar of Rawls’ theory that the state is the ‘natural collector, calibrator and 
redistributor of life’s inequities’.®^ His central theory, based on the primacy of liberty and the 
equality of all has drawn scorn from the fundamentalist libertarians. Nozick, stated that any 
theory advancing the ‘big state’ or anything more than ‘night watchman’®® be grotesque. His 
vision of a small state based on property rights and minimal interference is the best solution 
and obviously conflicts with Rawls’ vision. Lukes, however, was quick to point to the 
inadequacy of Nozick’s critique to account for primarily society, and secondly, the existence 
of a social contract.®  ^It is perhaps this middle turf, of ‘equality of opportunity’, where Rawls’ 
finds his greatest difficulty. Sandel’s spirited critique of what he terms ‘Rawls’ theory of 
conscription’®^ reflects the academic mainstream, and points to assumptions about society, 
negating the fundamental aspiration o f ‘justice as fairness’.
Hart pointed to the superficial mismatch between Rawls’ first (the primacy of individual 
liberty) and second principle (a redistributive equality).®® Based on this account, an affront to 
one’s liberty in the name of equality (however well intentioned) would arguably be ‘unfair’. 
As with many theories, this is as dependant on matters definitional as it is on matters 
substantive. Dworkin pointed to liberty 1/2 and equality 1/2; they being abstract (1) and 
expanded (2).®"^  It is clear that basic abstract liberty (characterised by Nozick and Hayek’s®® 
market-based liberty) is offended by the equality of material well-being purported by Rawls. 
As Postema observed, there is a ‘third-way’ liberty/equality paradigm missed by Dworkin, 
that being community liberty and equality of opportunity®®. This communitarian based thesis.
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, 1974).
59 Hare, R. M. ‘A Theory o f Justice by Rawls: a Critical Study’ 23 (1973) The Philosophical Quarterly 144.
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, 1974), pp.53.
See: Lukes, Steven in Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1977).
Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Harvard, 1982).
See: Hart, H.L.A., ‘Between Utility and Rights’ in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983).
^  Outlined most specifically in: ‘What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty’ (1981) 73 low aL . Rev. 1; see 
also Peerenboom, R., ‘Human Rights and the Rule of Law What’s the Relationship at US and International 
Law?’ (2005) (spring) Georgetown Journal o f  International Law.
See: Hayek, F.A., The Road to Serfdom (London, Routledge and Regan Paul, 1976).
^  Postema, ‘Liberty in Equality’s Empire’ (1987-1988) 73 low aL. Rev. 55.
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offered by Sandel, bases individuals as ‘common goods that make up society’®^. This may 
reflect the Utilitarian aspiration to work in the name of a ‘collective good’, this, Dworkin 
argued may be reconciled with liberty, as ‘the collective good and personal liberty may not 
always be working apart’.®^ This third way, equality/liberty paradigm, is not that envisaged 
by Rawls; however, and any middle reconciliation would still leave socio-institutional 
inequities that would need to be changed. Perhaps the best way to envisage the three views of 
equality that have emerged is through Harlow and Rawlings’ lights thesis.®  ^A basic equality 
under the law, favouring the ‘rugged individualism’ of Tocqueville,^® would be characterised 
as a red light theory. The equality of opportunity, characterised by removing barriers (or 
rather passively not putting them up) reflected by affirmative action programmes, can be seen 
as an amber light area. The equality of material well-being (or as some communitarian critics 
may term, equality of outcome) characterised by Marx’s famous citation ‘fi*om each 
according to their ability and to each according to their need’,^  ^may be seen as a green light, 
corrective, re-educational theory. It is this last vision with which we are concerned. It poses 
an obvious clash with Dworkin’s liberty 1, Postema’s ‘middle theory’ and academic 
mainstream. It does, however, find reconciliation with the thoughts of those behind the veil of 
ignorance, in the original position (out of whose minds the difference theory arises) and it is 
this that requires a fundamental assessment.
The difference theory demands a fundamental sharing of talents, to correct society’s 
‘economic inequities’; based on Rawls’ reasoning it is those ‘economic inequities’ that 
prevent ‘economic mobility’ and thus institutional unfairness. Sandel (a lead communitarian) 
viewed this as a ‘conscription of others’ talents to benefit the worst o ff whilst Nozick 
viewed it akin to having a ‘collective organ bank’.^ ® It is an area of societal interference that 
few (democratic) governments have feared to tread, the inevitable question as to whether one 
draws the line at a policy which actively hinders others to allow some to ‘catch up’ be
Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Harvard, 1982) 70-72, 80.
Dworkin, R., ‘A Matter o f Principle’ (1985) lowaL. Rev. 181-204.
Harlow and Rawlings, Law and Administration in Europe (OUP, 2003).
Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 30 (The Henry Reeve Text as revised by Francis Bowen, 
Vintage Books, 1945). Also see views expounded by Theodore Roosevelt and President Herbert Hoover 
expounded in Degregorio, W. A. The Complete Book O f U.S. Presidents (Wings Books, 1991) pp.470.
Marx, K. The Communist Manifesto (1848).
’^Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Harvard, 1982) 70-72, 80.
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, 1974).
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allowed, is considered by Dworkin. He out rightly rejects any kind of ‘tampering with the 
sanctity of the person’, la y in g  to rest Nozick’s fears of ‘collective organ banks’. Postema, 
whilst agreeing with the sense of this argument, saw it as unsupported and apparently ad hoc; 
a mere normative imposed barrier of ‘what should not be’.^ ®
Rawls’ (marginally) less controversial supposition was adjustment in the rights of property. 
Whilst not siding with Horowitz and Merrit’s argument of ‘property as a means of social 
control’^ ® suggesting it might be ‘free at the point of use’,^  ^he does ponder its worth. Connin 
immediately saw this as an ‘unholy endorsement of estate taxation’.N o z ic k  (in less rhetoric 
tone) argued that people would end with talents they ‘merely have yet do not deserve’.^ ® 
Sandel concluded that all these are the product of people in the original position and therefore 
‘inherently individualistic’.^ ® As it is clear the people in the original position (‘POP’) POP 
(despite an ultimate failure of an experiment at the University of Texas to recreate such) is 
fiction, and solely out of Rawls’ mind, they are mere assumptions of what people might 
create. As Hare observed ‘assumptions are not egalitarian’^^  and thus the entire veil of 
ignorance exercise is defeated. Baker, viewed this as ‘playing Nozick against Rawls’ with a 
‘predictable outcome
The people in the original position described by their creator as ‘agents of choice separate 
from all ends commitments and capacitates’ ®^ have come in for communitarian criticism. 
Sandel observed that they are first not constituted by community and second not able to 
reflect. Baker noted that this is consistent with the Rawlsian theory to place them above
Dworkin, R., Tn Defence of Equality’ (1983) 1 Soc. Phil. Pol. 24, 39.
Postema, G. ‘Liberty In Equality’s Empire’ (1987 -  1988) 73 Iowa. L. Rev. 55, 94.
See: Merritt, A, ‘The Nature and Function of Law: A Criticism o f E.P. Thompson’s “Whigs and Hunters’” 
(1980) 7 British Journal o f  Law and Society 194; Horwitz, M.J., ‘The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human 
Good?’ (1977) 86 7a/e Law J. 561.
Theory o f  Justice (OUP, 1972).
Connin, L ‘On DiQuattro, “Rawls and Left Criticism” (1985) 1 Political Theory 13. In response to: 
DiQuattro, A ‘Rawls and Left Criticism’ (1983) 11 Political Theory 1.
Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, 1974), pp.225-226.
Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Harvard, 1982) pp.77.
Hare, R. M. ‘A Theory of Justice by Rawls: a Critical Study’ 23 (1973) The Philosophical Quarterly 144, 
146.
Baker, E.C., ‘Sandel on Rawls’ (1985) 133 University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review 4, 895, 908.
A Theory o f  Justice (OUP, 1972).
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identity to ensure they are free agents. If that is the case, Sandel argued they are ‘thin 
denuded images of personhood’.B a k e r  saw this as Rawls merely making a ‘hypothetical 
point’.F in a lly , Sandel pointed to the lack of knowledge of ‘pre-institutional orders’ ®^ will 
negate their ability to effectively produce a new society. Baker responded somewhat weakly 
by asserting that this is obvious and that without a knowledge of property ownership, for 
example, one could not condone theft.^^
The veil of ignorance itself motivates those behind it to act out of ‘rational self-interest’, in 
case they are at the bottom of the pile. Dworkin questioned this, citing the gambling person^^ 
and Wanzer was highly critical citing that ‘individualism is a bad sociology
The notion of ‘justice as fairness’ on the Rawlsian model clearly has marked gaps and fails to 
take sufficient account of the individual; but provides a convincing model of societal mindset 
at least.
It is therefore clear that the pure principles of equality cannot be equated to the pure notion of 
justice. However, the ILO Constitution establishes its aim to promote ‘social’ justice, in 
which, some measures have to be taken, which conceivably offended the pure principle of 
equality. The ILO Treaty C l l l ,  for example, conceives of affirmative action programmes. 
These may well promote the aim of social justice, but fails to secure the principle of equality 
of treatment.
Drawing these strands together. ILO Treaty C l l l ,  establishes at Article 2, the principle of 
equality of opportunity and treatment in work. It does so however, with the aim of 
‘eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof. This is a classically communitarian 
model. When conceived as such, the principle of justice in the ILO Constitution can be 
reconciled with equality in the ILO Treaty C l l l .
Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Harvard, 1982) pp. 20, 55-58.
Baker, E.C., ‘Sandel on Rawls’ (1985) 133 University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review 4, 895, 899.
Sandel, M., Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Harvard, 1982).
Baker, E.C., ‘Sandel on Rawls’ (1985) 133 University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review 4, 895.
Dworkin R., ‘In Defence o f Equality’ (1983) 1 Soc. Phil. Pol. 24, 39.
Wanzer, S, ‘The Physician’s Responsibility Towards Hopelessly 111 Patients -  A Second Look’ (1989) New  
England Journal o f  Medicine 320, 844-849; Badzek, C.A. and Cline, H.S., ‘Inappropriate Use o f Dialysis for 
some Elderly Patients; Nephrology Nurses Preconceptions and Concerns’ (2000) Nephrology & Nursing 
Journal (Oct).
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Applying the Methodology
The Methodology to test this thesis is set out in Chapter One. It sets-out six questions:
1. It the treaty provision fundamentally norm creating?
2. Has there been very widespread and representative participation?
3. Has the practice of those states been extensive and virtually uniform?
4. Has there been parallel practice of non-party states?
5. Has that practice been motivated by a legal obligation to practice in such a way?
6. Has any state registered an early and persistent objection to the rule?
Q1. Fundamentally norm creating
The relevant rule is contained at Article 2 of the Treaty and provides that:
‘Each Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to declare and pursue 
a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national conditions 
and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and 
occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof’
To be fundamentally norm creating, this thesis hypothesised that such a provision must be 
clear. It is plain that Article 2 is clear in its meaning and obligation. Further, it should be 
drafted in terms of a legal obligation. It is submitted that the terms of Article 2 are plainly 
mandatory and framed in such terms.
It is of course trite that the general principle of non-discrimination is contained within a 
multitude of international instruments, which enjoy very widespread participation amongst 
the community of nations. This context goes to both demonstrating the fundamentally norm 
creating character of the provision in the ILO treaty, but also the general attitude of states 
toward the principle.
149
Article 1(3) Charter of the United Nations^® provides that amongst the purposes of the United 
Nations is:
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights for fundamental freedoms 
for all without discrimination as to race, sex, language or religion’
Article 2 to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights^^ provides that:
‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property birth or other status’.
Article 7 goes on to state that:
‘All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in 
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.’
Article 2(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights^^ provides:
‘Each state party ... undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised ... without distinction 
of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.
Article 2(2) provides that in relation to such rights:
‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law ... the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on 
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.
(San Francisco, 26 June 1945; TS 67 (1946); Cmd. 7015).90
(Paris, 10 December 1948; TS 67 (1946); Cmd. 7662). 
(New York, 16 December 1966; TS 6 (1977) Cmd. 6702).
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The same general principle is restated many times in other instruments.^^ Which when 
considering the notion of discrimination on the grounds of ‘race’, the ICJ held in the South 
West Africa Case^ "^  that:
'...w e  consider that the norm of non-discrimination or non-separation on the basis of 
race has become a rule of customary international law ..
On a similar vein, the ICJ held later in Barcelona Traction^^ that obligations erga omnes 
included:
‘ ... the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, 
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination’^^
The UK House of Lords concluded that the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
race was a rule of customary international law in R(European Roma Rights Centre) v 
Secretary o f State for the Home Departments^
It would therefore seem that the prohibition of non-discrimination in work; as set-out in 
ILO Treaty G i l l  at Article 2, is capable of being norm creating.
Q2. Very widespread and representative participation in the ILO Treaty C111
At the time of writing G i l l  has received 169 ratifications. Those ratifications together with 
the following digest of national legislation demonstrate a very widespread and 
representative participation in the Treaty.
Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York, 16 December 1966); Charter of 
Fundamental Rights o f the European Union (18 December 2000).
Ethiopia v South Africa (SecondPhase) [1966] ICJ Rep. 6.
Ibid. atp.293.
Belgium v Spain (secondphase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3.
Ibid. atpara.33-34.
[2004] UKHL55 per Lady Hale at [98].
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Afghanistan'
Albania^ ®®
Algeria^®^
99
Angola102
103Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina^
Armenia^
Australia^
Austria^
Draft Labour Code (2007), ss 3, 8, 9(1), (2), 59(4), 62, 93,120,125,124,126. The following provisions were 
adopted at the Afghanistan Compact (London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 January -  1 February): Articles 
91-104, Chapter VI, Draft Labour Code (2006).
Law on Equal Gender Society 2004, Employment Promotion Act 1995, and. Law o f Education and 
Professional Training 2002.
Labour Code, 1990; General o f Service o f the Public Service, s.27; Penal Code s.341; Executive Decree 
No.07-123 (24, April 2007) ss.l5 , 29; Executive Decree No. 97-473 (8, December 1997); Executive Decree No. 
97-474 (8, December 1997).
General Labour Act 2/00 (11, February 2000) s. 1(3), 3, 20(2)(b), 268.
Antigua and Barbuda Labour Code, Articles: 14(3), B7(3)(a), s.C4(l) et al. ; Civil Service Act 1984; Civil 
Service Regulations 1993; see also the Constitution o f Antigua and Barbuda s. 14.
’ '^^Act No. 32592 (3, August 1998); Contracts o f Employment Act, s. 173; Legislative Decree No.326/56; 
Decree No. 11370/37; Decree No. 91395/36; Decree No. 24145/47; Decree No. 254/98; Decree No. 57/99; 
Decree No. 66/99; Framework Act 1999 (No. 25164); Decree No. 1086/06 (approving ‘Towards a National 
Anti-Discrimination Plan); see also General Collective Labour Agreement 2006 (especially s. 125 directly 
imputing the text of Article 1 of the Convention); Ministry o f Labour Employment and Social Security 
(Decision No. 5) (5, January 2007) (creating the Advisory Office on Violence in the Workplace (n.b. including 
sexual as ‘violence’)). See forthcoming Bills regulating internship schemes (Acts Nos 25.013 and 25.165).
Constitution o f Armenia Article, 14(1); Labour Code, s.3(l), (3),(5), 86, 114, 141(3), 117, 172, 173, 221, 
222, 223, 258; Criminal Code s.156; see also, the Law on Employment and Social Protection in Case o f  
Unemployment s .11, 16; Decision No. 646-N (28, December 2007); Law on Civil Service, s .11.
Racial Discrimination Act 1975; Disability Discrimination Act 1992; Age Discrimination (Amendment) Act 
2006; Work Relations Act (Work Choices Act); Affirmative Action Act; Guide to Preventing Racial 
Discrimination and Racial Harassment in the Workplace (Commissioner for Equal Opportunity, Western 
Australia); Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Victoria).
’°^Act No. 833/1992 Equality of Treatment Act 1979 (as amended); Federal Act No. 100/1993 Equality of 
Treatment of Men and Women in the Federal Service; Federal Act concerning Reduction in Disadvantages for 
Women (No. 837/1992); Labour Market Service Act (No. 314/1994); Federal Act concerning equal rights in the
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Azerbaijan^
Bahamas^^^
Bahrain^
Bangladesh^
Barbados^
Belarus^
Belgium^
Belize^
Benin^^^
Bolivia^
Bosnia and Herzegovina^ 
Botswana^
Brazil^^®
Bulgaria121
public service sector (100/1993); Act amending the Act Concerning legal Trainees (109/2000); Constitution o f  
Austria.
Labour Code 1999; Equality o f Opportunity and Treatment Act 1992; Presidential Decree on the 
Implementation of Women’s Policy (6, March 2000); Law o f the Republic o f Azerbaijan on Guarantees o f  
Gender Equality 2006.
Constitution, Article 26; Employment Act 2001 ss.6-7; Early Childhood Care Act 2004;
Constitution o f Bahrain, Article 18; Labour Code, s.llO  etseq; Legislative Decree, to accede to Convention 
on Elimination of All Forms o f Discrimination Against Women 2002; Prime Ministerial Edict, Family 
Allowances Scheme (12/1979). See also: Labour Code 2010 (Draft).
Constitution of the People’s Republic o f Bangladesh; Labour Act 2006, Part II; National Policy on 
HIV/AIDS, (November, 2006).
Constitution o f Barbados 1966, Chapter 3; Prevention of Apartheid in Sports Act 1990 (no. 11).
Constitution o f the Republic o f Belarus 1994, (equal right to vote).
Labour Code 1971 (as amended 2009); Protection from Violence and Moral Sexual Harassment 2002; 
Discrimination Act 2003.
Constitution of Belize 1981; Protection Against Sexual Harassment Act 1996; Trade Union and Employers’ 
Organisations (Registration, Recognition, and Status) Act 2000, s.9(3).
Labour Code; General Statute o f Permanent State Employees; Constitution, Art.3.
117
118
Constitution (2009); General Labour Act 1990; Public Service Regulations (pursuant to Act No. 1178/1990). 
Constitution o f Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995.
Constitution, s. 15; Employment Act; Public Service Act 2000.
Constitution; Penal Code S.216-1A; Decree No. 6122/2007; Act No. 382-B/91.
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Burkina-Faso^^^
Burundi
Cambodia^ "^^
Cameroon^ ^^
Canada^
Cape Verde^^^
Central African Republic 
Chadi29 
(:hile'3o 
China^^^
Columbia^
128
Constitution, Article 6 ; Labour Code 2004; Labour Code 1986; Labour Standards Regulations 1987 ; Civil 
Service Act 1999 ; Public Education Act ; Protection against Unemployment and Protection o f Employment 
Act; Council Minister’s Decree No. 183 (5, September 1994) ‘Mother Tongue in State Schools’.
Constitution 1991; Labour Code.
Constitution; Labour Code 1993; Portant protection juridique des personnes infectées par le virus de 
l'immunodéficience humaine et des personnes atteintes du syndrome de l'immunodéficience acquise (12 May, 
2005).
Labour Code.
Labour Code; Penal Code; Civil Status Registration Ordinance; Civil Code.
Canada Labour Code; Canadian Employment Equality Act; Charter o f Rights and Freedoms; Constitutional 
Act 1982, Parts I and II; Canadian Human Rights (Amendment) Act 1996, Ch. 14; Equal Wages Guidelines 
1986; Employment Equality Act; Human Rights Code; Human Rights Act 2002. Ontarians with Disabilities 
Act; Quebec Charter o f Human Rights and Freedoms.
Legislative Decree No. 83.81.
Labour Code 2009 (Act. 09.004).
Constitution o f Chad; Labour Code.
^°L&w on Gender Equality ss.13-14; Labour Code; Penal Code; Act 1984-12-12; Act 2001-12-04; Decision 
No. 267/2005/QD -TTg (31 October 2005) ‘Vocational Training for Ethnic Minorities’; Decision No. 
134/2004/QD -  TTg (20 July 2004) ‘Ethnic Minority Households -  Land and Water’; Ordinance No. 
21/2004/PL-UBTVQHll. See also: 2010 ILO awareness programme o f the Ministry o f Labour, Invalids, and 
Social Affairs.
Additional Articles o f the Constitution o f the People’s Republic of China: Article 9; Labour Act 1994, 
Chapter II.
Equal Opportunities Act 2003 (No. 823); Act No. 1257 (4, December 2008); Amending Act No. 1257; Penal 
Code section 210A. See also: National Development Plans on Female Job Creation; Presidential Office for 
Equal Rights for Women.
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- Comoros^
- Congo (Democratic Republic
- Costa Rica^^^
Cote dTvoire^^^
- Croatia^
-  Cuba^ ^^
-  Cypms^ ^^
- Czech Republic '^^^
-  Denmark^ "^ ^
-  Djibouti^ '^ ^
-  Dominica^ "^ ^
- Dominican Republic^ "^ "^
- Ecuador^
Policy formation stage only, see: National Policy on Gender Equity and Equality (PNEEG) (June, 2008); 
Organization o f Employers of Comoros (OPACO). No legislative protection, however, since ratification in 
2005.
No specific legislative prohibition or definition concerning discrimination.
Act No. 7801 (30, April 1998) (Establishing National Women’s Institute); Penal Code; Decree No. 27894-S; 
Act No. 7142 (on gender equality); Act No. 7476 (on sexual harassment); Act No. 2694 (prohibiting 
discrimination in employment).
There is a continued lack o f specific legislative prohibition on discriminatory practices.
Constitution o f Croatia; Labour Act 2003, (specifically s.2); Equality o f the Sexes Act 2003 (especially s. 13).
Resolution No. 8/2005, ss.1-2; Decree Law No. 175/1997; Penal Code; Decree Law No. 176/1997; Act No. 
83/1997; Decree Law No. 234 ‘on workers’ maternity’; Resolution No. 8/2005.
Single consolidated equality legislation: Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation Law 
(No.58(l)/2004) (transposing European Community secondary legislation concerning equal treatment: Directive 
2000/78/EC and Directive 2000/43/EC).
Single equal treatment obligation under: Labour Code 262/2006 (see. S .16(1)); Anti-discrimination Act 
(forthcoming).
Act No. 388/2000 (as amended by) Act No. 396/2002; Act No. 835/2001; Act No. 775/2001. See also: role 
of Danish Equal Opportunities Board in enforcement.
Labour Code; Act No. 174/2007; Family Code.
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Model Laws on Equal Opportunity and Treatment in Employment and 
Occupation (to be adopted); State Security Act 1984.
Labour Code 1992.
Constitution 2008 (especially Article 11(2): grounds of prohibited discrimination, and Article 47(5) on 
disability discrimination); Executive Decree No. 1733 (Official Bulletin, 601, 29 May 2009).
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- Egypt'""
- El Salvador'"^
- Equatorial Guinea'"^
- Eritrea'"^
- Estonia'^''
Ethiopia'^'
Finland'^^
France'^"
Gabon'
Gambia'^"
Georgia'
Germany'
Labour Code No. 12 o f 2003.
Legislative Decree No. 1030.
Fundamental Law o f Equatorial New Guinea No.2 o f 4 Jan. 1990.
''^^Constitution o f Eritrea, Article 14; Labour Proclamation o f Eritrea (No.l 18/2001): n.b. Pursuant to Article 
24, ILO Conventidù, the Governing Body o f the ILO approved a Tri-Partite Committee to investigate alleged 
non-compliance with Convention 111 in the 282"  ^Session (November 2001).
Constitution o f the Republic o f Estonia 1992; Gender Equality Act 2004; Law No. 315 on Equal Treatment 
(11, December 2008).
Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, s.l4(l)(f); Federal Civil Service Proclamation No. 262/2002.
Constitution o f Fiji, Article 38, 39, 44, 44(3); Industrial Relations Act 2004, Sections 6, 79; Education 
(Establishment and Registration o f Schools) Regulations 1996; Social Justice Act 2002-3; Human Rights 
Commission Act, Section 21; Industrial Relations Act. See also: Women’s Plan o f Action 1999-2008.
Act on Equality between Men and Women (232/2005); Non-discrimination Act 2004; Equality Act. Finland 
is a Member State o f the European Union and is, therefore, obliged to implement such secondary legislation as 
duly passed concerning discrimination. In Article 226EC proceedings the ECJ held Finland not to have 
implemented the provisions o f the Equal Treatment Directive (Council Directive 2000/43/EC) to Aland 
Province (see Case -  327/04). See also: Action Plan for Gender Equality 2004-2007.
'^"'Constitution of the French Republic (1958), Preamble: "... based on the common ideal o f Liberté, égalité, 
fraternité’'’'. Labour Code, L. 122-45; Act No. 83-634, Section 6 (as amended by Section 11, Act No 2001-1066); 
Act No 2001-397; Act No 2001-1066, Section 9.
Civil Code; Labour Code 1990. See also: National Policy to Promote Equality 2003-2008.
Constitution, Article 33(4); Labour Act;
Employment Act, Section 5(d); Labour Code, 17(2).
General Equal Treatment Act 2006.
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Ghana'
Greece'""
Grenada'"'
Guatemala'"^
Guinea-Bissau'"^
Guinea'""
Guyana'"^
Haiti'""
Honduras'"^
Hungary'"^
Iceland'""
India'^"
Indonesia'^'
Iran, Islamic Republic of'^^
Iraq'^^
•174
159
Ireland, Republic of
Labour Code 2003; Education Act 2008;
Equal Treatment Act No. 3488/2006.
Employment Act, Section 26.
Labour Code 1993; Civil Code, Section 111;
Constitution; General Labour Act; Uniform Labour Act o f the Organisation for the Harmonisation o f  
Business Law in Africa (CHADA).
Order of 5, March 1987, Section 20. No further information received.
No legislative information provided. See however: Guyana National Action Plan for Women, 2000-2004.
No legislative information provided.
Labour Code; Penal Code; Decree No. 4-2000; Social Security Act. See also: Gender Equality and Equality 
Plan II, 2008-2015.
Constitution (1949); Labour Code.
Act on the Equal Status and Equal Rights for Women and Men 2004; Parental Leave Act 2004.
Caste Disabilities Removal Act 1850; Hindu Succession Act 1956; Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe 
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989; Protection o f Civil Rights Act 1955; Unorganised Sector Workers Security 
Act 2008; Employment o f Male Scavengers and Construction o f Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act 1993.
Manpower Act (No. 13 o f 2003), Sections 5,6,32; Human Rights Act 1999; Act No 21/1999 (Implementing 
Cl 11). See also: Equal Employment Opportunity Guidelines (8, December 2005).
Constitution o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran, Article 23.
Constitution o f Iraq, Article 16; Labour Code (2010).
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Israel'^^
Italy'^"
Jamaica177
Jordan'
Kazakhstan
.180
179
Kenya 
Kiribati'^'
Korea, Republic of'^^
Kuwait'
Kyrgyzstan'^"
•185Lao, Peoples Republic of 
Latvia'^"
Lebanon'
Lesotho
Liberia'^"
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya'""
174 Employment Equality Act,
Equal Rights for Women Act 1951; Employment (Equal Opportunities) Act.
Legislative Decree No. 145 (5, May 2005) (updating Italian law with EC Council Directive 2002/73/EC); 
Legislative Decree No. 215; Legislative Decree No. 196/2000; Act No. 53 (8, March 2003); Legislative Decree 
No. 145/2005.
Constitution o f Jamaica, Section 24 et seq. See also: Commission on Gender and Social Equality (2002). 
Penal Code; Labour Code.
Labour Code (Adopted: 15, May 2007), ss.4-7.
Constitution o f Kenya; Employment Bill (both in draft).
Constitution o f Kiribati, Ch.II; Employment (Amendment) Act 2008 (Act No. 2/2008), Part IV.
Constitution o f the Republic o f Korea (17 July 1948), Ch.II; Labour Standards Act (Law No. 50309), Ch.I; 
Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief Act 1999; Age Discrimination Act 2008; Act No 8075/2006 on 
Employee Status.
Constitution, Article 29.
No report received since 1996.
No legislative provision.
Labour Code 2002, Section 7,27, 32, 33.
Labour Law 2010.
188
189
Labour Code; Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act 2006; Race Relations Act 2004. 
Decree o f 1982.
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Lithuania'"'
Luxembourg'"^
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'"^ 
Madagascar'""
Malawi'"^
Mali'""
Malta'"^
Mauritania'"^
Mauritius'""
Mexico^""
Moldova, Republic o f" '
Mongolia^"^
Montenegro^"^
Morocco^""
Mozambique205
190 No legislative provision.
Labour Code; Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men 2007. See also: National Anti- 
discrimination Programme 2006-08.
Penal Code, Section 454; Labour Code 2005; Act o f 26 May 2000 ‘Sexual Harassment’; Act o f 8, December 
1981 (see also bills transposing: Council Directives 2000/78/EC) and 2000/43/EC).
Labour Relations Law; Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men.
Labour Code; Act No. 2005-040.
Employment Act 1999 (No.6 2000); Republic o f Malawi (Constitutional) Act 1994 (No.20 1994); 
Employment o f Women, Young Persons, and Children (No.22 o f 1939).
Decret no 92-073/P-CTSP portent promulgation de la Constitution, Titre I .
Equal Treatment in Employment Regulations 2004; Equal Treatment o f Order 2007. See also National 
Commission for the Promotion o f Equality (NCPE).
No legislative information available.
Employment Rights Act 2008 (notably Section 4); Employment Relations Act 2008; Equal Opportunities 
Act.
Constitution, Article 1; Federal Labour Act. See also. National Programme for Equality o f Opportunity and 
Non-Discrimination.
Labour Code.
Labour Code 1999; Employment Protection Act.
Constitution; Labour Law No. 49/08; Law on Gender Equality 46/07. See also Action Plan on Achieving 
Gender Equality.
Constitution; Labour Code;
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Namibia^""
Nepaf"^
Netherlands^"^
New Zealand^"" 
Nicaragua^'"
Niger^"
Nigeria^'^
Norway^'^
Pakistan^'"
Panama^
Papua New Guinea^'" 
Paraguay^
Peru^'^ 
Philippines 
Poland^^"
219
205 Lack o f legislative progress.
Labour Act N o.l 1/2007; Affirmative Act (Employment) Act 1998.
Constitution o f the Kingdom of Nepal (1990), notably Section 12.
Act No. 119 of 21 February 2004; Equal Treatment Act; Equal Treatment of (Handicapped and Chronically 
111 People) Act; Equal Treatment in Employment (Age Discrimination) Act; Equal Treatment (Men and 
Women) Act.
Race Relations Act 1971; Equal Pay Act 1972; Employment Contracts Act 1991 (No.22 o f 1991).
Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Nicaragua de 1987.
Labour Code 1996; Ordinance No. 96-039.
Constitution o f the Federal Republic o f Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree 1999 (No.24 o f 1999).
Act (No. 62 o f 2005) Respecting Working Environment, Working Hours and Employment Protection etc 
(Working Environment Act) Ch. 13.
Constitution o f Pakistan.
Constitucion politica de le Republica de Panama de 1972 ; Decreto del Gambinete 252 por el cual se aprueba 
el Cogido de Trabajo 1972.
Constitution, Article 45, 55; Industrial Relations Act 2003; Employment Act; Gender Order No.20; Police 
Act, Section 20(1).
Labour Code; Penal Code s.l33.
Act No. 28983 o f 2007, Law of Equal Opportunity for Men and Women.
Labour Code; Republic Act 12 May 1989 No.6275.
160
PortugaP'
QataP"
Romania^^^
Russian Federation^^"
Rwanda^^^
Saint Kitts and Nevis^^"
Saint Lucia^^^
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines^^^ 
Samoa^^"
San Marino^^"
Sao Tome and Principe^^'
Saudi Arabia^^^
Senegaf^^
Serbia^^"
Constitution o f the Republic o f Poland (No.483, 2 April 1997), Ch.I; Regulation o f Council Ministers 25 
June 2002 (on race, ethnic origin, religion or belief, age and sexual orientation); Ordinance o f the Council 
Ministers 22, April 2008 (equal treatment).
Labour Code 2003; Act No. 35/2004; Second National Plan for Equality (2003-06); Decision No. 198/2003 
Council Ministers.
Provisional Constitution o f Qatar [1970-04-02]; Act No. 17 o f 1995 to regulate the release from service to 
Qatari women employed by the Ministry o f Education.
Constitution de la Roumanie de 1991; Act No. 202/2002.
Constitution, Article 19; Labour Code.
Act No. 13/2009, 27 May 2008, Section 12; Act No 59/2008, 10 September 2008.
Constitution, Section 15; Protection of Employment Act, Section 11(d).
Labour Code; Equality of Opportunity and Treatment in Employment and Occupation Act 2000.
Constitution Order 1979, Article 13(3). Member o f CARICOM and therefore should have integrated the 
Model Laws on Equal Opportunity and Treatment in Employment and Occupation.
Constitution o f the Independent States of Western Samoa 1962, Part II.
Law No. 40 o f 1981 (on equal opportunity between men and women in respect o f employment and 
occupation); Law No. 141 o f 1990 (on rights o f disables people); Law No. 59 of 8 July 1974 (declaration o f  
rights o f citizens).
Decree No. 69/95 (31, December 1995); Decree No. 28/92 (10, September 1992); Ordinance o f 27 May 
1996.
Royal Order No. A/90, o f 1 March 1992, to promulgate the Constitution.
No legislative provision recorded: See observation of CEACR 2004.
Act on Prohibition o f Discrimination (Official Gazette No. 22/09) April 2009; Labour Code, ss. 18-33.
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Seychelles^^^ 
Sierra Leone^^" 
Slovakia^ ^^  
Slovenia^ ^^
240
Somalia^^" 
South Africa 
Spain^"'
Sri Lanka^"^ 
Sudan^"^ 
Swaziland^"" 
Sweden^"^
Switzerland^""
Constitution of Seychelles (Third Republic) (Promulgation) Notice, 1993 (SI No. 38 of 1993); -Employment 
(Amendment) Act 2006 (Act No.4 o f 2006).
Constitution. No further information, see observation o f CEACR 2010.
^^^Anti-discrimination Act 2004 (as amended by Act No. 85/2008); Act No. 461/2003 on Retirement. See also 
Action Plan for the Prevention o f all forms o f Discrimination, Racism and Xenophobia 2006-08.
Employment Relations Act (as amended) 2007; Penal Code 2008; Roma Community Act 2007; Vocational 
Rehabilitation and Employment o f Disabled Persons Act. See also: Disability Action Plan 2007-13.
No report received. See observations o f the CEACR 1994 and 1999.
Constitution o f the Republic o f South Africa (Act No. 108 o f 1996); Labour Relations Act 1995 (No. 66 o f  
1995); Employment Equality Act 1998; Prevention o f Unfair Discrimination Act 2000 (No. 4 o f 2000); Equality 
Act 2000.
Constitucion Espanola de 1978; Royal Decree No. 1600/2004 o f 2 July 2004; Declaration for Social 
Dialogue, concluded on 8 July 2004 by the Government and the social partners; Inter-federal agreement on 
collective bargaining, 2005 (ANC 2005), concluded on 4 March 2005 and extended on 26 January 2005; 
Agreement o f the Council o f Ministers to adopt measures to promote equality between women and men (Order 
No. PRE/525/2005) o f 7 March. See also Plan for Gender Equality in the General State Administration o f 4 
March 2005, containing affirmative action measures. Spain is also a member of the EU, therefore, must adopt 
and integrate the relevant legislation thereof; also National Programme for Reform 2005.
Constitution o f 1978 o f the Democratic Socialist Republic o f Sri Lanka; Prevention o f Social Disabilities Act 
(No. 21 o f 1957); Women’s’ Charter.
Interim Constitution o f the Republic of Sudan 2005; Labour Code o f the Republic of Sudan 1997; Southern 
Sudan Draft Labour Act.
244 The Constitution o f the Kingdom of Swaziland Act, 2005 (No. 0001 o f 2005).
Instrument o f Government (1974: 152); Equal Opportunities Act (No. 433 o f 1991); Discrimination Act 
2009; Working Environment Law; Ethnic Discrimination Law. Also a member o f EU.
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Syrian Arab Republic^"^ 
Tajikistan^"^
Tanzania, United Republic of"" 
Togo"""
Trinidad and Tobago""' 
Tunisia"""
Turkey""^
Turkmenistan"""
Uganda"""
Ukraine"""
United Arab Emirates""^
United Kingdom""^
Uruguay"""
^"'^Constitution Federale du 18 Avril 1999; Civil Code; Equal Opportunities Act; Ordonnance du 10 décembre 
2004 concernât la commission de conciliation selon la loi sur l’egalitie, 2005.
Insufficient information provided: see CEACR observation 2008.
Constitution o f the Republic o f Tajikistan (6, November 1994); Act No. 1, March 2005 State Guarantees for 
the Equality o f Men and Women and Equal Opportunities for their Realisatidn (Text No. 129); Labour Code.
Constitution o f the United Republic o f Tanzania, Part II; Employment and Labour Relations Act 2004 (No. 6 
o f 2004), Part II; Employment Act (No. 11 of 2005); Employment and Labour Relations (Code o f Good 
Practice) Rules, 2007.
Constitution de la IVe Republique (31, December 2002); Labour Code 2006 ; (Draft) Family Code.
Constitution o f the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2000; Equal Opportunity Act (No. 69 o f 2000).
Constitution de la Republique Tunisienne du 1” juin 1959 ; Labour Code ; Penal Code ; Act No. 2006/58 ; 
Act No. 93-10 o f 17 February 1993.
Act No 2709 Constitution o f the Republic o f Turkey (7, November 1982) (as amended by Act No. 25469); 
Labour Act No. 4857 (22, May 2003); Act No. 5840 (25, February 2009).
Constitution o f Turkmenistan; Act No. 154 ‘State Guarantees for Equal Rights Women’.
Constitution o f Uganda (1995); Employment Act; Persons with Disabilities Act.
Constitution o f Ukraine (20, April 1978) (as amended, 21 September 1994) Part II; Act No. 2866-IV (8, 
September 2005).
United Arab Emirates Constitution, 1971, Part Three.
Equality Act 2010 (in-force from October 2010) consolidating: Equal Pay Act 1970, Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, Race Relations Act 1976, Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (as amended). Employment Equality 
(Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, 
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. The UK is also a member o f the EU. See ‘Comparative Study’ 
below for a more detailed discuss of UK equality law compared with the Convention.
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Uzbekistan"""
Vanuatu""'
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of"""
Viet Nam 
Yemen"""
263
265Zambia 
Zimbabwe"""
Of the 169 members who have ratified the Convention, 159 have made serious attempts to 
implement its provisions at national law. It is clear, therefore, that there has been a very high 
level of representation, which by virtue of the varied location and character of the states, can 
also be said to be representative.
Q3. Extensive and virtually uniform practice
We must now consider whether that high level of ratification has resulted in a virtually 
uniform practice. Each part of the treaty is examined, to develop a thorough understanding 
of the relevant state practice.
Scope
The Preamble to the Convention is drafted in wide terms to cover the field of ‘employment 
and occupation’. The term has been widely embraced and, subject to a few lingering
Constitution; Act No. 18104 o f March 2007, Equal Treatment; Fines Code, approved by Executive Decree 
No. 186/04 o f 8 June 2004; Act No. 17677, o f 29 July 2003.
Constitution; Labour Code; Criminal Code.
Constitution o f the Republic of Vanuatu, 1980.
Constitucion de la République de Venezuela ; Organic Labour Act.
Constitution o f the Socialist Republic o f Vietnam; Labour Code o f the Socialist Republic o f Vietnam; Law 
on Gender Equality 2006; Penal Code, s. 121.
Constitution o f the Republic of Yemen (1992), Part II; Labour Law No. 14 o f 1978; Labour Code (Act No.5 
of 1995).
Constitution of Zambia Act 1973, No.27, (as amended by Act N o.l o f 1991); Citizens Economic 
Empowerment Act 2006 (No. 9 of 2006).
Constitution o f Zimbabwe Amendment (No.l7) 2005; Labour Relations Act 1984, Part II; Prevention o f  
Discrimination Act 1998 (No. 19 of 1988 Cap.8-16).
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exceptions for public service,""^ a norm can be readily construed around the Convention’s 
scope. The Committee is, however, keen to recall the provisions of Article 1(3), which 
extend the Convention’s scope to vocational training and access to employment and has 
drawn this to the attention of non-complaint states.""^
Most ratifying states have implemented the Convention’s protected characteristics across 
the entirety of their territory, on vessels and on-board aircraft flying their flag or registered 
in that country. Some, however, restrict protection to only their own citizens."^"
Article 1(1) (a) and (b) Species o f Discrimination
The Convention recognises that discrimination arises as an indirect, as well as a direct 
barrier to equality of opportunity. This, therefore, strips the operative sections of any 
requirement of intention, focusing rather on the outcome demanding and the enquiry as to 
whether any distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing 
equality of opportunity. With the exception of Afghanistan (2009), Gambia (2009) and 
Uganda (2010), the dichotomous model of discrimination has been universally recognised.
Most states incorporate the Convention by drawing up protected characteristics and 
holding unlawful discrimination to fall where distinction is made upon those grounds.""' 
Some, however, go further and hold any differentiation to the detriment of a person without 
just cause to be discriminatory and thus unlawful.""" Similarly, in other states, legislation 
prohibits ‘all discrimination’ or ‘any form’ without specifying the actual grounds, leaving 
that to the courts as a matter of public policy to create.""" This follows McCrudden’s first 
ground, conceiving non-discrimination as merely rational behaviour and, therefore, to be 
encouraged by the law. Many states have incorporated, verbatim, the definition of
See CEACR Observations: Egypt (2006) public sector employees’ governed by a different Labour Code, 
Latvia (2005) political opinion not a protected ground in civil service, and, Trinidad and Tobago (2007) public 
service regulations contain potentially sex discriminatory provisions.
See, CEACR Observations: Armenia (2008), Central African Republic (2010), Chile (2010), Croatia (2004), 
Ethiopia (2010), Philippines (2008), Uganda (2010), Viet Nam (2010).
General Survey (1988) Report III part 4B para. 19.
Angola (General Labour Act No 6 1981 s. 1(3)); Hungary (Labour Code s. 18(3)).
General Survey (1988) Report III part 4B, para.23.
See for example: Austria (s.2 Equal Treatment Act 1979).
See for example: Argentina (s. 172 Decree No 390, 13 May 1976).
165
discrimination set-out in the Convention. At its lowest, there is the state practice to 
evidence a customary norm of discrimination, meaning any exclusion of certain persons 
because they belong to a group that is defined by intrinsic characteristics. At its highest, 
there is practice of member states legislating for a general principle of equal treatment 
and/or equality of opportunity """or defined as a breach of equal treatment on certain 
grounds. """
Article 1(1) (a) Prescribed Grounds
In varying forms, either via legislation, public policy, practical programmes or 
administration, states have implemented the bulk of the prohibited grounds at Article 
l(l)(a). There are, however, individual exemptions: race, """ colour, ""^
sex,"""religion,"^"political opinion,"^'national extraction"^" and social origin."^"
274 See for example: Equatorial Guinea (s.20(3) Fundamental Act) and Rwanda (s.25 Labour Code).
See for example: Japan (s.l Act No 113,16 June 1972).
See for example: Cape Verde (Art.22 Constitution); Guinea-Bissau (s. 155(2) Labour Code 1986); 
Luxembourg (s.2(l) Act o f 8 December 1981); Madagascar (Art. 12 Constitution); Nicaragua (Art.27 
Constitution 1986).
See CEACR Observations: Chad (2002), Dominican Republic (2009), Guatemala (2010), Paraguay (2010), 
Qatar (2002), Togo (2010), Tunisia (2010), Zimbabwe (2005).
See CEACR Observations: Chad (2002), Belgium (2009), Dominican Republic (2009), Guatemala (2010), 
Kazakhstan (2010), Moldova (2010), Paraguay (2010), Qatar (2002), Togo (2010),Tunisia (2010), United Arab 
Emirates (2005), Uzbekistan (2007), Viet Nam (2010).
See CEACR Observations: Guatemala (2010), Jamaica (2002), Lesotho (2010), Philippines (2002).
See CEACR Observations: Angola (2009), Pakistan (2010), Qatar (2002), Viet Nam (2010).
See CEACR Observations: Albania (2007), Austria (2009), Canada (2007), Chile (2010), Cuba (2006), 
Djibouti (2010), Eretria (2004), Ghana (2010), Haiti (2006), Latvia (2005), Lithuania (2010), Mauritius (2009), 
Slovenia (2010), Sweden (2010), Turkey (2010), United Arab Emirates (2005), United Kingdom (2006), 
Uzbekistan (2007), Venezuela (2010), Viet Nam (2010), Yemen (2010), Zimbabwe (2005).
See CEACR Observations: Albania (2007), Antigua and Barbuda (2009), Chile (2010), Dominican Republic
(2009), Eretria (2009), Ethiopia (2010), Gabon (2008), Haiti (2006), Latvia (2005), Nicaragua (2010), Paraguay
(2010), Qatar (2002), Romania (2010), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2010), Togo (2010), Tunisia (2010), 
Viet Nam (2010), Yemen (2010).
See CEACR Observations: Antigua and Barbuda (2009), Austria (2009), Canada (2007) (although note 
‘income’ discrimination prohibited, narrower ground that ‘social origin’), Ethiopia (2010), Malta (2010), 
Norway (2005), Paraguay (2010), Romania (2010), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2010), Sweden (2010), 
Syrian Arab Republic (2008), United Kingdom (2006), Yemen (2010).
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As the Committee observed, it is the refrain of some of the less enthusiastic states that 
either there exists no discrimination in their state, or that their body of law is not 
discriminatory in its effect or application."^" This is contrary to the spirit of the Convention 
and is an argument rarely advanced in recent years. A few lingering statutory provisions 
remain, which are, however, discriminatory, most notably the surprising assertion in the 
Irish Constitution that a women’s place is at home:
‘The Family -Article 41
2(2) The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be 
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in 
the home’."^ "
Article l(l)(b) Any other distinction
Article l(l)(b) is the living part of the prohibition. As the Committee of Experts observed 
‘...national equality policy must be adjusted to newly emerging forms of discrimination for 
which solutions must be found’. W h i l s t  the Article is, by its nature, likely to provide a 
basis for a range of measures, the Committee of Experts have frequently held sexual 
harassment to fall within sex discrimination,"^" highlighted the importance of protection for 
those living with a disability and AlDs. Indeed, where states have already
General Report o f  the Committee o f  Experts on the Application o f  Conventions and Recommendations 
(Geneva; ILO, 2009), para. 106.
Constitution o f Ireland: Bunreacht Na heireann; Enacted by the People, T' July 1937. Drawn-out by the 
Committee o f Experts in its 2010 Observation.
General Report o f  the Committee o f  Experts on the Application o f  Conventions and Recommendations 
(Geneva: ILO, 2009) para. 107.
See CEACR Observations: Algeria (2008), Angola (2009), Armenia (2008), Bahrain (2010), Barbados 
(2005), Brazil (2004), Bulgaria (2010), Cambodia (1999), Chile (2010), Djibouti (2010), Dominica (2006), 
Ecuador (2010), Egypt (2006), El Salvador (2004), Gabon (2008), Georgia (2006), Ghana (2010),Grenada
(2008), Guinea-Bissau (2005), Haiti (2006), India (2010), Iran (2006), Iraq (2010), Israel (2009), Jamaica 
(2002), Jordan (2009), Macedonia (2010), Malawi (2001), Malta (2010), Mauritius (2009), Mexico (2002), 
Moldova (2010), Morocco (1998), Mozambique (2007), Netherlands (2008), Pakistan (2010), Papua New  
Guinea (2007), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2010), Saudi Arabia (2009), Togo (2010) limited sexual 
harassment measures, Uganda (2010) sexual harassment doesn’t cover co-workers. United Arab Emirates 
(2005) no definition o f sexual harassment, Viet Nam (2010).
See CEACR Observations: Afghanistan (2009), Korea (2009), Ghana (2010).
See CEACR Observations: Central African Republic (2010), Dominican Republic (2009), Paraguay (2010).
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implemented provisions, the Committee is concerned where there is a high level of 
dismissed claims, as in the case of Costa Rica (2010), that the measure is not enforced. The 
Committee of Experts have confirmed nothing in the Convention is designed to limit the 
emergence of new grounds, because the purpose of the Convention (and its sister 
instruments) is to protect human beings from discrimination. The formation of new 
customary grounds of protection in addition to those set out in the Convention is not 
therefore fettered by its provisions.
With respect to sexual harassment, many states are beginning to provide employment 
specific protection. Many, however, rely on provisions of their criminal code, which, the 
Committee of Experts argue is not wholly adequate because there is often is a higher 
burden for claimants. Furthermore, low-level hostile conduct, which has the potential to be 
equally as destructive to a relationship, to mutual trust and confidence, is frequently 
ignored.""' That said, some states do prescribe types of behaviour that amount to 
discrimination""" and others legislate more generally to cover discrimination whatever the 
form it takes. """
Article l(l)(b) has the potential to catch all forms of discrimination which have the effect 
of ‘nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity’. However, as this is a study of the 
customary effect of the Convention as interpreted by the Committee of Experts, it is 
asserted that to speculate on other forms of discrimination, not expressly highlighted by the 
Committee, would be to stray beyond custom.
Articles 2 and 3 — Promotion o f Equality o f Opportunity
The Committee brands Cl 11 as ‘forward-looking’""" and the positive equality duty, 
throughout Article 2 and 3, is doubtless a key part of that assessment. For most states.
General Survey 1963, para.32. See also: General Survey (1988) Report III part 4B, para. 17.
General Report o f  the Committee o f  Experts on the Application o f  Conventions and Recommendations 
(Geneva: ILO, 2002) and (Geneva: ILO, 2009) para.l 11.
United States (Title VII Civil Rights Act 1964); Ireland (s.3 Employment Equality Act 1977); Sweden (s.4 
Act of 17 December 1979).
Australia (s.5 Sex Discrimination Act 1984).
General Report o f the Committee o f  Experts on the Application o f Conventions and Recommendations 
(Geneva: ILO, 2009) para. 105.
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equality law is, as the law of the ‘bad man’,""" a passive concept where mal-compliance is 
punished. This Article extends the obligation on states to a positive duty to promote 
‘equality of opportunity’. This has been surprisingly well received, subject to notable 
exemptions""" and is therefore of technically falling within the customary part of the 
Convention. It is hard, however, to conceive of a potential claimant with the necessary 
standing to bring a claim for a state’s failure to draw up a national policy to promote 
equality.
Article 4 —Actprejudicial to the State
This has been widely accepted as standard practice, that all persons suspected of a 
prejudicial activity be allowed an appeal to a competent body against the sanction handed 
down at first instance. The Committee of Experts have, however, implicitly created an 
obligation that the sanction (whether at first instance or upheld at appeal) must be 
‘proportionate’, raising concern in the instance of the Central African Republic (2010) and 
in Chile (2010) with respects to Section 36 of the Penal Code which prohibits such persons 
holding any job.
Article 5 — Positive Action
Positive action, sometimes referred to as positive discrimination, is a term used to describe 
measures which are facially discriminatory, but are employed to promote representation in 
a given job where a given protected class have been traditionally underrepresented, such as 
all women shortlists to promote more women MPs. Article 5 can be construed as the 
enforcement companion to the equality duty of Article 3 and 4. It may be construed in 
either a narrow sense (providing extra training for non-native speakers, for example) or a
O f the sort conceived by Holmes, O.W., ‘The Path o f the Law’ (1897) Harvard Law Review  166.
See CEARC Observations: Antigua and Barbuda (2009), Armenia (2008), Benin (2000), Bosnia 
Herzegovina (2000), Cape Verde (2001), Chad (2002), Dominican Republic (2009), Equatorial New Guinea
(2005), Gabon (2008) , Gambia (2009), Ghana (2010), Grenada (2009), Guinea-Bissau (2009), Iceland (2006), 
Iran (2006), Iraq (2010), Ireland (2010), Israel (2009), Jamaica (2002), Jordan (3009), Kazakhstan (2010), 
Lesotho (2010), Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (2010), Mauritania (1993), Mauritius (2009), Moldova (2010), 
Mongolia (2002), Morocco (1998), Norway (2005), Pakistan (2010), Panama (2010), Papua New Guinea
(2009), Peru (2010), Portugal (2006), Qatar (2002), Romania (2010), Rwanda (2010), Saint Kitts and Nevis
(2010), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2010), San Marino (2009), Seychelles (2006), Syrian Arab Republic 
(2008), Trinidad and Tobago (2007), United Arab Emirates (2005), Uzbekistan (2007), Yemen (2010).
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wider sense (setting quotas to compensate for under-represented minorities) (both 
discussed below). The Committee of Experts have taken to highlighting the plight of 
indigenous people and alerting states to the discretionary provisions of Article 5. The 
Committee has, for example, highlighted the disproportionately low representation in the 
workforce of a number of sections of society and recommended positive action to assist: 
Afro-Columbians in Columbia (2010), all minorities in Croatia (2004), the Roma people in 
the Czech Republic (2009), women in Ecuador (2010) and Egypt (2006), indigenous 
workers in El Salvador (2004), the Roma and Sami people in Finland (2006) and Romania 
(2010), tribal persons in Mexico (2002), the Kurds and Bedouins in Syrian Arab Republic 
(2008), and the Berber population in Tunisia (2010).
As Article 5 is discretionary, it is hard to conceive a customary rule growing around it. In 
that sense. Article 5 is only customary in as much as it is the necessary solution to cure a 
failure to promote equality of opportunity by Article 3-4 (which do have customary 
potential).
It is clear that the majority of states prohibit discrimination on the full range of the 
Convention’s protected grounds. Indeed, many states have gone further and adopted new 
protected classes. The level of implementation is sufficiently uniform, to pass this 
requirement to create a customary rule.
Q4. The practice and opinio juris of non-party states
In order to determine whether the treaty rule has passed into customary international law 
we must examine the practice of non-parties to the treaty. The following states are not 
parties to the treaty:
• Brunei Darussalam
• Japan
• Malaysia
• Marshall Islands
• Myanmar
• Oman
• Palau
• Singapore
• Suriname
• Thailand
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• Timor-Leste
• Tuvalu
• United States
We will now turn to consider whether these states have, by their practice, adopted a 
parallel rule prohibiting discrimination in work to the ILO Treaty Cl 11. Furthermore and 
crucially, we shall consider whether, if they have done so, they have done so out of a sense 
of legal obligation to do so.
Pursuant to the Methodology, the practice of states has been examined by referencing the 
digest of state practice complied by the ILO in its Annual Report 2008."""
Brunei Darussalam 
State Practice
There are no specific laws which deal with non-discrimination in work, nor is there a 
constitutional provision for general non-discrimination. The only exception is in the field of 
trade unions, where section 19.2 of the Trade Union Act (CAP 128) prohibits discrimination 
based on union affiliation and provides for sanction in case of contravention.
There being no relevant practice towards the rule in the treaty, it is not necessary to go on to 
consider the State’s opinio juris.
Japan
State Practice
The 1947 Constitution provides at Article 14(1) that:
‘... all people are equal under the law and in political, economic or social relations. 
There shall be no discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, social status or 
family origin .... Discriminatory measures in contravention of the constitutional 
provisions in laws and/or regulations are prohibited, and in fact, no such laws or 
regulations and/or administrative measures exist.’
297 Country Baselines: Annual Report on Convention C l 11 (Geneva, 2008).
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The Constitution specifically guarantees free choice to individuals for any job by Article 22. 
Articles 3 and 4 of the Labour Standards Act of 1947 declared the principle of equal 
treatment applied to labour contracts as follows:
‘Article 3. An employer shall not engage in discriminatory treatment with respect to 
wages, working hours or other working conditions by reason of the nationality, creed 
or social status of any worker.’
‘Article 4. An employer shall not engage in discriminatory treatment of a woman as 
compared with a man with respect to wages by reason of the worker being a woman.’
Furthermore, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law was revised in June 1997 and 
entered into force in April 1999. Major revisions include: (i) prohibiting discrimination 
against women workers; (ii) introducing a monitoring and control system for enterprises; 
(iii) improving a mediation system at the workplace; (iv) abolishing restrictions on 
overtime and holiday work, and night work to women workers; (v) assisting employers in 
addressing various issues, including sexual harassment at workplaces.""^
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law (Law No.l 13 of 1972) was revised in 2006 with a 
view to promoting further equal opportunity and treatment between men and women in 
employment. In order to promote equal opportunity between men and women, the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare submitted, at its 164- session, a revised bill of Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law and related laws, which included provisions, such as 
prohibition of discrimination against both men and women, and prohibition of indirect 
discrimination. The bill was approved in June 2006. The Government further stated that with 
regards to the structure of the provision prohibiting indirect discrimination, the bill stipulates 
that the ministerial ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare should specify 3 
kinds of cases and that these would be considered illegal when there are no legitimate 
reasons. Additionally, in July 2006, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare started a
The Constitution o f Japan and Mariners Law (Law No. 100 o f 1947) (sections 14 and 22); Labor Standards 
Law (Law No.49 o f 1947), sections 3, 4, and 119; Mariners Law (Law 100 of 1947) section 6; National Public 
Service Law (Law 120 of 1947), sections 27 and 109; Employment Security Law (Law 141 o f 1947), sections 2, 
3 and 22; Mariners Employment Security Law (Law 130 o f 1948), sections 2 and 4; Local Public Service Law 
(Law 261 o f 1950), sections 13 and 60; Equal Employment Opportunity Law (Law 113 of 1972), section 1.
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discussion on a policy concerning part-time work in the Equal Employment Subcommittee of 
the Labour Policy Council, consisting of intellectuals, representatives of employers and 
employees. It is scheduled to compile a final conclusion at the end of this year. The Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare intends to take appropriate action based on the conclusion.
As such, we can conclude that Japan has demonstrated the necessary practice towards 
implementing the rule against non-discrimination in work. The question now, is to determine 
whether they have done so out of a sense of legal obligation.
Opinio Juris
The above practice was motivated by two aims. First, a desire to match ‘international 
standards’;""" and second, in anticipation of ratifying ILO Treaty G i l l  at some future 
point."''''
Furthermore, in 2005, Japan requested the technical assistance of the ILO to ensure its laws 
were in compliance with ILO Treaty G i l l .  Further, technical assistance was requested to 
inform a national seminar on the realization of the aims of the 1998 Declaration, in particular 
equality of treatment in work, which would lead to a national action plan to combat 
discrimination. The ILO granted this request and undertook in its 2008 Observation to Japan 
to assist with the labour law review process.
These acts of state practice are all enshrined in primary legislation. Accordingly, they cannot 
be seen as acts of mere courtesy outside the legal sphere. They are not done with any 
reservation and are not ambiguous in their intention. Indeed, much recent legislation has been 
with the express aim of complying with ILO Treaty G i l l ,  even though as a non-party it has 
no obligation to do so. Rather, Japan takes the view that as a member of the international 
community and member of the ILO, it has an obligation to align its laws with the aims of 
those national instruments.
Specifically the ILO’s standards on discrimination set out under the Declaration o f Philadelphia (1944), see 
speech of Ryoko Sakuraba, Kobe University, 2007 ‘Employment Discrimination Law in Japan: Human Rights 
or Employment Policy?’.
See Public Communication o f Government of Japan to ILO, 2008.
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Accordingly, the legislative practice of Japan can be inferred as being, in opinio juris of the 
state, as part of international legal obligations.
Malaysia 
State Practice
In 2001, the Malaysian Parliament approved a constitutional amendment outlawing sexual 
discrimination. The 1957 Malaysian Federal Constitution, amended in 1963, clearly prohibits 
inclusion in any law provisions that would appear discriminatory in respect of employment 
and occupation. Article 8 of this text defines non-discrimination as:
‘no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race and descent, 
place of birth or gender except as expressly authorised by the Constitution’.
This indicates that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of 
the law. The Federal Constitution, Article 136, also states that all persons, whatever race, in 
the same grade in the service of the Federation shall, subject to the terms and conditions of 
their employment, be treated impartially:
‘Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination 
against citizens on the grounds only of religion, race, descent or place of birth, in any 
law, or in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in 
the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of 
property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation 
or employment.’
More recently, Malaysia passed the Persons with Disabilities Act 2008. It is the first anti- 
discrimination law in Malaysia.
It would appear the Malaysia has therefore demonstrated the necessary state practice to 
recognize a rule against discrimination in work. The question now, is to determine whether 
they have done so out of a sense of legal obligation.
174
Opinio Juris
These acts of state practice are all enshrined in primary legislation. Accordingly, they cannot 
be seen as acts of mere courtesy outside the legal sphere. They are not done with any 
reservation and are not ambiguous in their intention to create a legal rule. Whilst Malaysia 
has not expressed any intention to ratify ILO Convention Cl 11 at a future point, its practice 
is in such a context as to demonstrate an intention to create binding legal rules.
Marshall Islands 
State Practice
The Marshall Islands’ Constitution (1979) Article II s. 12, provides that all persons are equal 
under the law and by s. 12(2) no law shall be made which discriminates. There are, however, 
no laws which deal with discrimination in work. There is therefore, no need to examine 
opinio juris.
Myanmar 
State Practice
Myanmar does not have any constitutional or specific laws which outlaw discrimination in 
work. In failing to demonstrate the necessary practice, it is not necessary to go on to consider 
this state’s opinio juris.
Oman
State Practice
Article 17 of the Basic Law stipulates:
‘All citizens are equal before the law, and they are equal in public rights and duties. 
There shall be no discrimination between them on the grounds of gender, origin, 
colour, language, religion, sect, domicile or social status.’
Articles 18, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 of the said law include the same concept 
about discrimination in relation to other general areas, such as the freedom to associate and 
access the courts.
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These are general provisions and do not encompass ‘work’ specifically. As such, they are not 
relevant practice.
Palau
State Practice
Article IV of the Constitution provides that:
‘Section 5: Every person shall be equal under the law and shall be entitled to equal 
protection. The government shall take no action to discriminate against any person on 
the basis of sex, race, place of origin, language, religion or belief, social status or clan 
affiliation except for the preferential treatment of citizens, for the protection of 
minors, elderly, indigent, physically or mentally handicapped, and other similar 
groups, and in matters concerning intestate succession and domestic relations. No 
person shall be treated unfairly in legislative or executive investigations.’
Palau, however, does not have any labour specific provisions. It therefore has failed to 
demonstrate the necessary state practice.
Singapore 
State Practice
The 1965 Constitution has amended article 12(1) which provides that ‘all persons are equal 
before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law’. In 2005, the Tripartite 
Comiuittee on Employability of Older Workers was established to review, among other 
issues, discrimination against older workers in employment and to strengthen existing 
measures, codes and guidelines, such as the Code of Responsible Employment Practices and 
the Guidelines on Non-Discriminatory Job Advertisements. This Tripartite Committee is also 
implementing a broad strategy to shape positive perceptions of employers, employees and 
customers on the employability of older workers.
Whilst there are some legal provisions which may be deployed by a worker suffering 
discrimination, there are no specific anti-discrimination laws in work. As such, the state has 
failed to demonstrate the necessary practice.
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Suriname 
State Practice
By Article 8, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution of Suriname, discrimination on grounds of 
birth, sex, race, language, religion, education, political beliefs, economic position or any 
other status is prohibited. The Constitution (Article 27, Paragraph 1(c)) also provides for the 
right to work by guaranteeing equal opportunity in the choice of profession and type of work, 
and forbidding that access to any function or profession be prevented on grounds of sex. 
Moreover, Article 28 of the Constitution guarantees to all employees, irrespective of age, sex, 
race, nationality, religion or political opinion, the right to:
- Remuneration for their work corresponding to quantity, type, quality and experience 
on the basis of equal pay for equal work;
- The performance of their task under humane conditions;
- Safe and healthy working conditions; and
- Sufficient rest and recreation.
These are specific anti-discrimination in work provisions of the kind envisaged by the ILO 
Convention. As such, the state has demonstrated the necessary practice and it will now be 
necessary to go on to consider whether it has enacted these out of a sense of legal obligation.
Opinio Juris
The Government has signalled its intention to ratify ILO Treaty 0111^°^ and in 2008, the 
Government initiated a review of its laws on ‘job classification’ and ‘minimum wages’ to 
harmonise national legislation with the provisions of the ILO Treaty Cl 11.^^  ^Accordingly, in 
2005, the Government requested the technical assistance of the ILO to harmonise legislation 
in the following areas: (1) developing policies regarding equal remuneration; (2) developing 
labour market policies that promote equality of opportunity; and (3) assessment in 
collaboration with the ILO regarding the difficulties identified and their implications for 
realising the principle and the right of equality of opportunity and treatment as set out in the 
Treaty. In 2008, the Government requested the technical assistance of the ILO to provide
Public Communication to the ILO, 2001 and 2003. 
Public Communication to the ILO, 2008.
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assistance on the drafting of legislation concerning on the treatment of women in the 
workplace.
The above acts of state practice are all enshrined in primary legislation. Accordingly, they 
cannot be seen as acts of mere courtesy outside the legal sphere. They are not done with any 
reservation and are not ambiguous in their intention. Indeed, much recent legislation has been 
with the express aim of complying with ILO Treaty Cl 11, even though as a non-party it has 
no obligation to do so.
Accordingly, the legislative practice of Suriname can be inferred as being, in opinio juris 
of the state, as part of international legal obligations.
Thailand 
State Practice
The 1997 Constitution (Article 30) provides that all persons are equal before the law and 
shall enjoy equal protection under the law, irrespective of their sex. Article 80 of the 
Constitution states that the State shall protect and develop children and youth, promote 
gender equality, and sustain families and communities. The Government is in the process of 
drafting the Bill of Promoting Equal Opportunity, to eliminate discrimination against women. 
The Bill aims to protect not only women, but also all target groups specified in the 
Constitutional Law of Thailand B.E.2540 (1997), who suffer from inequality of opportunity 
at work, education, training and access to public facilities or services. Moreover, it defines 
the word ‘discrimination’ and sets up a procedure of legal complaint, an authority of 
concerned agencies and discrimination remedy fund. As a result, active discrimination 
against women and other target groups will be eliminated and they will have equal 
opportunity to obtain the necessary development and live with human dignity. At the 
moment, the Draft Bill is undergoing the legislative procedure.
The state has demonstrated a level of practice toward a prohibition against discrimination in 
work. It is, however, limited to a draft bill which is confined to sex discrimination. As such, 
the level of practice is insufficient.
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Timor-Leste 
State Practice
The Labour Code (Regulation No.2002/5), section 2, prohibits discrimination in employment 
and occupation. Section 9 of the same text prohibits unequal treatment in remuneration. 
Under section 2 of the Labour Code, discrimination means ‘any distinction, exclusion or 
preference based on race, colour, national extraction, sex, sexual orientation, maternity, 
family responsibility, religion, political opinion, social origin, health status including 
HlV/AlDS, disability, language or age which directly or indirectly nullifies or hinders 
equality of opportunity or treatment in access to training, access to jobs, and terms and 
conditions of employment’, but does not include specific requirements based on the inherent 
nature of the particular job.
The wording of the Labour Code is a verbatim copy of the provisions of the ILO Treaty 
Cl 11. As such, the state has demonstrated very clear practice. It is now necessary to identify 
whether the state has done so out of a sense of legal obligation.
Opinio Juris
In 2008, the Government signalled its intention to ratify ILO Treaty Cl 11 at some future 
point.^^  ^In the meantime, it has made legislative changes to its domestic legislation, as part 
of its membership of the ILO and the international community generally. Accordingly, in 
2006, the Government requested the technical assistance of the ILO to harmonise its domestic 
laws and mechanisms with the ILO Treaty Cl 11 in the following areas: (1) Capacity building 
of responsible government institutions; (2) strengthening capacity of employers’ 
organizations; (3) strengthening capacity of workers’ organisations; (4) legal reform (labour 
law and other relevant legislation); (5) strengthening data collection and capacity for 
statistical analysis; (6) awareness raising, legal literacy and advocacy; (7) assessment in 
collaboration with the ILO of the difficulties identified and their implications for realising the 
PR; (8) developing labour market policies that promote equality of opportunity; (9) training 
of other officials (police, judiciary, social workers, teachers); (10) developing policies 
regarding equal remuneration; (11) establishing or strengthening specialised institutional 
machinery; (12) co-operation between institutions (e.g. various ministries and relevant
Public Communication to the ILO, 2008.
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commissions); and (13) sharing of experiences across countries/regions.In 2007, the 
Government requested the technical assistance of the ILO to train its state officials in 
delivering the principle of equality of opportunity and treatment and in 2008 the 
Government asked the ILO to review all its legislative changes to assess their compliance 
with the ILO Treaty Cl 11.3°*
The above acts of state practice are all enshrined in primary legislation. Accordingly, they 
cannot be seen as acts of mere courtesy outside the legal sphere. They are not done with any 
reservation and are not ambiguous in their intention. Indeed, much recent legislation has been 
with the express aim of complying with ILO Treaty G i l l ,  even though as a non-party it has 
no obligation to do so.
Accordingly, the legislative practice of Timor-Leste can be inferred as being, in opinio 
juris of the state, as part of international legal obligations.
Tuvalu 
State Practice
By s. 11(1) the enjoyment of core rights is to be enjoyed without discrimination and, further 
by s.27(l) of the Constitution discrimination is prohibited on the following grounds:
‘...discrimination refers to the treatment of different people in different ways 
wholly or mainly because of their different-
(a) races; or
(b) places of origin; or
(c) political opinions; or
(d) colours; or
(e) religious beliefs or lack of religious beliefs’
By s.27(2) no-one shall be ‘treated in a discriminatory manner’. The scope of these 
provisions applies as follows:
Public Communication to the ILO, 2006. 
Public Communication to the ILO, 2007. 
Public Communication to the ILO, 2008.
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‘12. Application of Part II
(1) Each provision of this Part applies, as far as may be-
(a) between individuals as well as between governmental 
bodies and individuals; and
(b) to and in relation to corporations and associations (other 
than governmental bodies) in the same way as it applies to and 
in relation to individuals, except where, or to the extent that, 
the context requires otherwise.’
The scope of these provisions appears apt to cover employment. As such, Tuvalu has 
demonstrated the necessary state practice. We must now go on to consider whether the state 
has implemented these provisions out of a sense of legal obligation.
Opinio Juris
Tuvalu became a member of the ILO in 2008. It is actively aligning its labour laws to comply 
with the fundamental standards of the ILO, including the non-discrimination prmciple 
established in ILO Treaty Cl II with a view to ratifying them at some future point. Indeed, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Labour in 2008 requested the ILO assist its review of 
its labour law to bring them in line with international labour standards. It is of note that the 
Labour Department is part of the Office of the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister for 
Labour. As such, these public requests and statements provide very high quality opinio juris.
The above acts of state practice are all enshrined in primary legislation. Accordingly, they 
cannot be seen as acts of mere courtesy outside the legal sphere. They are not done with any 
reservation and are not ambiguous in their intention. Indeed, much recent legislation has been 
with the express aim of complying with ILO Treaty Cl 11, even though as a non-party it has 
no obligation to do so.
Accordingly, the legislative practice of Tuvalu can be inferred as being, in opinio juris of 
the state, as part of international legal obligations.
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United States 
State Practice
The U.S. Constitution recognises the principle and right of non-discrimination in the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause precludes any state from denying its 
citizens ‘the equal protection of the laws’. The United States has a clear national policy 
supporting the elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation, expressed in the 
U.S. Constitution, numerous federal and state laws, regulations and Executive Orders.^^^ The 
general principle of this national policy is reflected in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Further, Executive Order 11478 states that ‘it is the policy of the Government of the 
United States to provide equal opportunity in Federal employment for all person’ and 
requires that all executive agencies ‘establish and maintain an affirmative program of equal 
employment opportunity for all civilian employees and applicants for employment in 
accordance with the equal opportunity policy’.
The United States has clearly demonstrated the necessary state practice to prohibit 
discrimination in employment. It does so in similar terms to the ILO Treaty Cl 11 of which it 
is not a party. The question is whether it has done so out of a sense of legal obligation.
Opinio Juris
The US practice for anti-discrimination in work was not, in inception, motivated out of a 
belief that it was an international obligation to do so or out of an intention to create such a 
legal obligation. Rather it was a key policy of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in 
order to accommodate the civil rights movement and promote civil cohesion for, essentially, 
domestic, social and economic reasons. The practice of the US, whilst on a similar model of 
ILO Treaty Cl 11, does not evidence the necessary opinio juris to count toward the creation 
of a customary rule.
Principally see: (i) the Civil Rights Act of 1991; (ii) the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978; (iii) the Women's 
Educational Equity Act of 2001; (iv) Executive Order 11478; (v) Executive Order 11590; (vi) the Classification 
Act; (vii) the Wagner-Peyser Act; (viii) the Workforce Investment Act; (ix) the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and 
Technical Education Act; (x) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; and (xi) the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).
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The ILO Treaty Cl II was submitted to the Senate in 1998 for consent to ratification; 
however, the legislator declined and the Government is not actively considering ratifying 
c m .  This does point away from inferring the practice of the United States in the field of 
non-discrimination has been motivated out of a sense of legal obligation to do so. As such, its 
practice does not count toward the creation of a customary rule.
Q5. Persistent objection
No states have registered a prompt or persistent objection to the rule prohibiting 
discrimination in work.
Conclusion on customary status
Drawing this large digest of raw evidence together, we can draw a number of conclusions. 
First, the non-discrimination in work rule at Article 2 ILO Treaty Cl 11 provides that:
‘Each Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to declare and pursue 
a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national conditions 
and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and 
occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof.’
The provision is norm creating in that a general non-discrimination rule has already created 
a general rule of law. Second, there has been very widespread participation in the Treaty, 
evidenced by the high level of ratification. Additionally, that participation is also 
representative in that the ratifying states are geographically, socially and culturally 
representative. Third, the practice of those ratifying states has been extensive, in that the 
vast majority have exercised practice, which goes beyond the requirements of the Treaty. 
The practice of parties to the Treaty has been virtually uniform, that is to say, it follows the 
model at Article 2 of the Treaty. Fourth, the practice of non-parties to the Treaty has been 
virtually uniform in the implementation of the core principle at Article 2. Fifth, no state has 
registered a prompt objection to the emergence of a customary rule parallel to Article 2 of 
the Treaty. Sixth, the practice of those non-party states has been motivated out of a sense of 
legal obligation and intention to do so arising out of their place in the international 
community and membership of the ILO generally.
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As such, it can be said that the practice and opinio juris of the majority of states evidences 
a rule of customary international law prohibiting discrimination in work, parallel to the 
treaty provision at Article 2 ILO Treaty Cl 11. Such a rule is therefore enforceable against 
all states, including non-parties. Further, the rule is enforceable irrespective and 
independent of the Treaty provision and as such, will remain enforceable against a state 
regardless of whether it has denounced ILO Treaty GUI.  Finally, as a rule of customary 
international law, it is a source of the English common law. The rule against discrimination 
in work, therefore, could amount to a cause of action in the UK courts.
The UK is currently a party to ILO Treaty G i l l  and as such, is bound to implement its 
provisions. However, at any time the UK could choose to denounce that Treaty and cease 
to be bound by its provisions. Given the conclusion that the rule against discrimination in 
work is a rule of customary international law, we shall go on to consider the harmony with 
the English domestic law with the rule.
Comparative Study: Domestic Law of the United Kingdom and 0111
Discrimination law in the United Kingdom has a mongrel heritage. There is no single 
unifying national factor^ ®  ^that pulls the prohibited grounds together in neat cohesion, rather a 
rag-tag mix of European Gommunity legislation,^®  ^US jurisprudence, Gouncil of Europe
Although there is now a single unifying statute, in the Equality Act 2010, the principle provisions o f which 
came into force on 1 October 2010. The Act followed a review commissioned by the Government in February 
2005 to examine the discrimination law framework. In June 2007 DCLG published a consultation paper titled 
‘A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain’. This was followed by 
command papers ‘Framework for a Fairer Future -  the Equality Bill’ (Cm 7431) and ‘The Equality Bill -  
Government Response to Consultation’ (Cm 7454). In January 2009 the Government published the ‘New  
Opportunities’ White Paper (Cm 7533) and the Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on the 24 April 
2009 and received Royal Assent during the wash-up prior to Parliament’s dissolution on 8 April 2010.
Adopted under previous incarnations o f Part 2 ‘Non -Discrimination’ (specifically Arts. 2,3,8,13,18,19 
TFEU) and Title X ‘Social Policy’ TFEU (See: Article 157 TFEU covering equal pay, formerly Article 119 
EC). Prominent measures adopted are: Council Directive 76/207/EEC (amended by 2002/72/EC). Adopted 
under Article 13, Treaty o f Amsterdam: ‘Equal Treatment’ Council Directive Recast as 2006/54/EC (Formerly 
2000/43/EC); ‘Framework’ Council Directive 2000/78/EC; Council Directive ‘Implementing the Principle of  
Equal Treatment between Men and Women in the Access to and Supply o f Goods and Services’ 2004/113/EC;
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emanations and international obligations form the basis of a rather muddled system. There is 
no single codified constitutional document providing a source of anti-discrimination 
measures/^® nor has there been any particular shared national experience, out of which might 
have emerged a unified approach to discrimination.^^^
The common law has certainly not provided any public policy argument or general principle 
against discrimination, even its most egregious forms. The historical position, which abided 
until the late twentieth Century, is epitomised by Lord Davey:
‘...employers are entitled to refuse [to employ] for the most mistaken, capricious, 
malicious or morally reprehensible motives that can be imagined, but the workman 
has no right of action against him’.^ ^^
The notion of equality has been viewed as irrelevant at best, and a wicked waste of 
ratepayers’ money at worst.^^^ The introduction of a ‘colour bar’, for example, was seen by 
the Court of Appeal as a legitimate policy that the employers were entitled to take ‘in their 
own business i n t e r e s t s I n d e e d  following the first versions of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 the common law’s position was clear:
‘[S]ex discrimination is not of itself unlawful. It is unlawful only in the circumstances 
proscribed by [legislation]
Society’s prevailing ambivalence to discrimination was evident, as Virginia Wolf observed:
‘The most transient visitor to this planet could not fail to be aware that England is 
under the rule of a patriarchy. Nobody in their senses could fail to detect the
European Parliament and Council Directive ‘On the Implementation o f the Principle o f Equal Opportunities and 
Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Matters o f Employment and Occupation’ 2006/54/EC.
Although note the Equality Act 2010, the principle parts o f which came into force on 1 October 2010, brings 
together the discrimination statutes, secondary legislation and statutory codes of practice.
As, for example, is the case in South African removal o f apartheid or the Civil War and ensuing Civil Rights 
Movement in the United States.
Allen V Flood [1898] AC 1, HL, p. 172.
The principle o f equal pay was a principle misguided ‘by some eccentric principles o f socialistic 
philanthropy, or be a feminist ambition to secure the equality of the sexes in the matter o f wages in the world o f  
labour’ Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578, HL, p.599.
Scala Ballroom v Ratclijfe [1958] 3 All ER, 220, p.221.
Bernstien V Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Department o f  Employment [1988] 3 CMLR445, para.41.
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dominance of the professor. His was the power and the money and the influence. He 
was the proprietor of the paper and its editor and sub-editor. He was the Foreign 
Secretary and the Judge. He was the cricketer; he owned the racehorses and the 
yachts. He was the director of the company that pays two hundred per cent to its 
shareholders. He left millions to charities and colleges that were ruled by himself. He 
suspended the film actress in mid-air. He will decide if the hair on the meat axe is 
human, it is he who will acquit or convict the murderer, and hang him, or let him go 
free.’^ '^
And so the position would have endured, had it not been for actions on the international 
stage, as Pannick observed of the influence of international standards on the early^^^UK 
discrimination statutes:
‘There is no doubt, that by reason of its international obligations and agreements, the 
UK was obliged to take such action to give effect to their provisions
Whilst Title VH of the US Civil Rights Act 1964 is the antecedent model of English and 
European discrimination measures, the post-war flurry to protect individual rights^^^ wrought 
growing pressure on the UK legislator to enact anti-discrimination measures. Parliament, 
therefore, via different routes, and for varying reasons, enacted a series of statutory torts and 
statutorily implied terms.
The first major piece of legislation is the Equal Pay Act 1970, which has now been replaced 
by Part 3, Chapter 3 Equality Act 2010. The notion of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has its early 
origins in a resolution of the 1888 Trade Union Congress; however, the provisions of Article 
2 of c m  (and C l00 on Equal Remuneration) are the foundations of the English vision.^^® 
Indeed, Section 5, Equal Pay Act 1970 (and now Section 66(1) Equality Act 2010) 
reproduces the sex equality aim of Article 2(1) of C l00 and implies a non-discrimination 
clause into contracts. Closely aligned to the 1970 Act, was the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
(its main provisions now also transposed into the Equality Act 2010). Whilst seeking to
Wolf, V., A Room o f  One’s Own (Oxford: GUP, 1929 ) p.43 referring to the plight o f women, but it could 
very well have applied to people from a different race or with a disability under a majority yoke.
Race Relations Acts 1965, 1968, 1976; Equal Pay Act 1970; Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
Pannick, D., Sex Discrimination Law (Oxford: OUP, 1985) p.l3.
Detailed in the Introduction to this Chapter and in Chapter \ : Historical Background.
See: Equal Pay (London: House of Commons Library, 10, December 1969) Ref. 69/24, paragraph. 21
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achieve similar aims to the Equal Pay Act 1970, the 1975 Act heavily influenced by US law 
(notably by Griggs) had a far wider scope stretching to creating statutory torts of 
discrimination far beyond the employment relationship. Whilst originally race discrimination 
was prohibited by the Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968, the Race Relations Act 1976 
opens up the definition of ‘race’, beyond mere ‘colour’, which endures at Section 9 Equality 
Act 2010. It is important to note that the Convention does not include disability, sexual 
orientation or part-time work as explicit prohibited grounds of discrimination^^^ and the 
relevant UK provisions shall not, therefore, be explored.
Whilst the influence of US Civil Rights legislation, much of which now stands encrusted with 
case law (itself now largely codified) is acutely felt in UK discrimination law, it is plain there 
are important distinctions. For example, there are no minimum service requirements or 
maximum recoverable damages for discrimination in employment under the UK anti- 
discrimination statutes; whereas the US Title VII Civil Rights Act is only engaged if it 
concerns ‘interstate commerce’ or an undertaking of ‘more than fifteen workers’.
Age
Whilst ‘age’ is not an explicit ground of prohibited discrimination, it should be noted that 
there have been significant efforts to prevent age related discrimination by the ILO. Indeed, 
as early as 1938, the International Labour Office drew up a report concerning age 
discrimination for submission at the 85^  ^Session that year and again the following year, at the 
86* Session. The plight of the over-35s was specifically highlighted at the Symposium on 
Equality of Opportunity in Employment, in Panama in October 1973. There are those who 
would see ‘age’ as a natural candidate for an Article l(l)(b) prohibition.^^^
These can be found in other conventions which do not form part o f this study: notably, Cl 59 Convention on 
Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment of Disabled Persons (1983); C175 Part-time Work Convention 
(1994). The Equality Act 2010, the primary provisions of which came into force on 1 October 2010 streamlines 
the UK discrimination provisions. Formerly, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995; Part-time Workers 
(Prevention o f Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000/1551; Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003/1661, respectively implement other grounds o f discrimination in UK domestic law. It should 
be noted however, the Committee of Experts has encouraged the use o f Article 1(1 )(b) to catch non-specified 
discrimination, such as disability: see CEACK Individual Direct Request to Ghana, (2010), para.6.
See, for example. International Labour Office official: Boglietti, G., ‘Discrimination against older Workers 
and the Promotion o f Equal Opportunity’ (1974) 110 Int’l. Lab. Rev. 351, 352.
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As is common in discrimination law, the US provides the first legislative protection in this 
field. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967) prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of age, with a purpose ‘to promote employment of older persons based on their 
ability rather than age’ and to ‘help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems 
arising from the impact of age on employment’.^ ^^  ^A point of interest for this study into 
customary law is the decision in Mahoney v RFE/RE, Inc?^^ holding the 1967 Act to protect 
US citizens working in other countries, thus creating norms of conduct, which applied across 
other jurisdictions.
On 5 May 1971, Edward Milne MP (Lab. Blythe) made his first of several attempts to 
introduce the ‘Age Level of Employment Bill’ as a private members’ bill, prohibiting age 
discrimination against workers over 45. In his speech introducing the Bill, he observed that:
‘There are many thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, who find 
themselves jobless because of discrimination’.
It would be over thirty years later, that a partial victory for Milne and others arrived in the 
form of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1031) outlawing less 
favourable treatment on the grounds of ‘age’, but controversially introduced a default 
retirement age of 65, which has now been repealed and the default retirement age removed by 
the coming into force of the Employment Equality (Repeal of Default Retirement Age 
Provisions) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1069).
Sexual harassment
Again this is not an explicit ground of prohibited conduct, as it is in UK law,^^^ the 
Committee of Experts has been consistent in its reports that sexual harassment is
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (December, 15 1967), 
codified as Ch. 14 Title 29, United States Code, 29 USC §621.
For a detailed analysis and commentary on the history o f US age discrimination law, see: Macnicol, J., Age 
Discrimination: An Historical and Contemporary Analysis (Cambridge: CUP, 2006) pp.234-272.
(DC Cir. 1994) 47 F3d 447,449.
Hansard: House o f Commons Debs. 5s, vol. 816, 5 May 1971, cols. 1377-8.
Section 4A Sex Discrimination Act 1975, inserted by Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) 
Regulations 2005/2467, Reg.5.
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discrimination on the grounds of sex for the purposes of Article l.^^  ^Whilst UK law, at 
Section 26(1) Equality Act 2010, now provides for a single express statutory prohibition on 
harassment, the courts have historically attempted to construe such a prohibition from the 
wording of the original Sex Discrimination Act 1975/^^
Scope
Building on a post-war principle of equal treatment of the i n d i v i d u a l ^ ^ ®  and on a thesis that 
lasting peace and social justice are premised on decent work for all,^ ^  ^the Convention draws 
the classes of prohibited grounds widely. Article 1(a) expressly prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of ‘race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin’.
Since 1976, race, colour, and national or ethnic origin have all been defined as ‘racial 
grounds’ by Section 3(1) Race Relations Act 1976. From 2 December 2003, however, 
religion and belief have been added as prohibited grounds.^^^ Now all Article l(l)(a) grounds 
(save for political opinion and social origin) are protected by Section 4 Equality Act 2010.
Until recently, the UK Government, in successive submissions to the Committee of Experts 
had to concede that there is no specific legislative prohibition to discrimination on the 
grounds o f ‘political opinion’ or ‘social origin’.
In terms of the latter. Section 1 Equality Act 2010, which was not brought into force by the 
Coalition Government, provided that ‘public authorities’ must have ‘due regard’ to exercise 
their functions in such a way that is designed to ‘reduce the inequalities of outcome which 
result from socio-economic disadvantage’. The section, even if in force, is hardly earth 
shattering in its scope. It only applies to certain bodies when carrying out their public
See, for example, Observations/Direct Requests o f the CEACR: Armenia 08; Bahrain 10; Barbados 05; 
Brazil 04; Bulgaria 10; Cambodia 99; Chile 10; Costa Rica 10; Djibouti 10; Dominica 06; Ecuador 10; Egypt 
06; El Salvador 04; Gabon 08; Georgia 06; Ghana 10; Grenada 08; Guinea-Bissau 09; Haiti 06; India 10; Iran 
06; Israel 09; Jordan 09.
See, for example: Morrison J in British Telecommunications p ic  v Williams [1997] IRLR 668, EAT; Porcelli 
V Strathclyde Regional Council [1986] ICR 564, Ct. o f Sess.
See, for example: Universal Declaration o f Human Rights 1948, European Convention o f Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950.
Preamble to the ILO Constitution, 1919; recently reaffirmed in the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a 
Fair Globalisation (2008).
By Regulation 3(1) Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1660).
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functions (not likely employment) and even then the obligation would be to have ‘due 
regard’. Also, the ‘class duty’ excludes from its scope those subject to immigration control by 
Section 1(6). This ‘pernicious and spiteful exemption’ would limit the force of this dormant 
section. During the preparatory work of the Convention ‘social origin’ was envisaged less 
as a ground of discrimination (notwithstanding that is how it is expressed on the face of the 
Convention), but rather as a social mobility clause^ "^^  in similar terms to the Section 1 
Equality Act model. The Committee of Experts does point out that explicit legislative 
protection on the grounds of ‘social origin’ is rare.
Political opinion has traditionally only been an actionable ground of discrimination in 
Northern Ireland. By Section 16(2) Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 ‘political 
opinion’ is an explicit prohibited ground of discrimination. It has also been hinted, albeit in 
obiter, that ‘belief within the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 
(SI 2003/1660) is broad enough to incorporate ‘political p h i l o s o p h y Indeed, in the recent 
R ed fea rn ^àQcïsion, ‘racial grounds’ can come awfully close to ‘political opinion’. Mr 
Redfeam, a BNP member was dismissed from his job as a bus driver of largely Asian 
passengers, on health and safety grounds. His argument that he was, in reality, dismissed by 
reason of his membership of a party which fielded candidates on an anti-Islamic platform and 
was therefore dismissed by virtue of the racial views held by his party. This argument was 
not successful before the Court of Appeal. Mummery LJ dismissed the appeal, but on rather 
technical policy considerations thus:
‘It [the Race Relations Act 1976] does not apply so as to make the employer, who is 
not pursuing a policy of race discrimination, or who is pursuing a policy of anti-race 
discrimination, liable for race d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ’ .
On appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, however, Mr Redfeam was successful. 
The Court held, by a majority, that the one year qualifying period before an employee could
Monaghan, K., ‘The Equality Bill: a sheep in w o lfs  clothing or something more?’ (2009) European Human 
Rights Law Review 512, at 531.
General Survey (1988) Report III Part4B para.54.
General Survey (1988) Report III Part4B para.56.
See Burton J in Grainger Pic v Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4.
Redfeam  v Serco Ltd (t/a West Yorkshire Transport Service) [2006] EWCA Civ 659.
Redfeam  [2006] EWCA Civ 659, para.45.
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bring a claim for unfair dismissal, barred Mr Redfeam from successfully challenging his 
dismissal on grounds, of essentially, his political opinion. The Govemment responded by 
amending s. 108 Employment Rights Act 1996 3^ ®^ to include ‘political opinion’ as a ground of 
unfair dismissal, which can now be brought into an Employment Tribunal from the first day 
in employment, thus:
‘(4) Subsection (1) does not apply if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal 
reason) for the dismissal is, or relates to, the employee's political opinions or 
affiliation’.
Prior to the decision of the ECtHR being handed down, the Court of Appeal re-considered 
Redfeam (where political opinion coincides with race) in English v Thomas Sanderson 
Blinds^^^ and raised doubt as to the applicability of its ratio. 3"*^ From the perspective of 
compliance with Cl 11, the Committee of Experts has held that the protection of political 
opinion is wide and not limited to beliefs within ‘established political principles’. 3^^^ 
Specifically, it found that:
‘the protection afforded by the Convention is not limited to differences of opinion 
within the framework of established principles. Therefore, even if certain doctrines 
are aimed at fundamental changes in the institutions of the State, this does not 
constitute a reason for considering their propagation beyond the protection of the 
Convention, in the absence of the use of advocacy of violent methods to bring about 
that result’.3"^"^
The Committee found on an alternative occasion that:
Redfeam  v United Kingdom [2013] IRLR 51 ECHR. (App. no 47335/06) Raising complaints under Articles 
9, 10, 11, 13 and, 14 ECHR.
340 By S. 13 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.
[2008] EWCA Civ 1421.
Laws LJ [21] and Sedley LJ [41].
General Survey (1988) Report III Part4b, para.57.
Report o f the Committee o f Experts (Geneva, ILO 1986) p.284.
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... measures taken against a person by reference to the aims for an organisation or 
party to which he belongs imply that he must not associate himself with those aims, 
and accordingly they restrict his freedom to manifest his opinions
The fact that Mr Redfeam’s views and those of the BNP, with whom he associated as a 
member, ran contrary to the public policy enacted in the Race Relations Act 1976 is 
immaterial to whether his dismissal breached his rights under the Convention and the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal is, therefore, at odds with the UK’s Convention obligations.
Again whilst ‘social origin’ enjoys no specific protection, less favourable treatment or 
harassment of an employee who is a member of an ethnic group, meeting Lord Fraser’s 
definition,3'^* would be caught by the Act. As it was in Dutton^^^ where the Court of Appeal 
held Romany travellers to fall within the meaning of ‘racial group’. Here, a much stereotyped 
and maligned community would have a cause of action against ill-treatment on the grounds of 
perceived (ethnic) ‘social origins’.
As the Committee of Experts frequently observe, termination of employment on a prohibited 
ground runs contrary to Article 1(a) of the Convention. As is the case with both ‘social 
origin’ and ‘political opinion’, neither is a ‘potentially fair’ reason for dismissal, per Section 
98 Employment Rights Act 1996. A (qualifying) dismissal on these grounds, therefore, would 
be an unfair dismissal, and entitle the (former) employee to a declaration to that effect and 
restitution pursuant to Section 94. Furthermore, a ‘valid reason’ is the ‘c o r n e r s t o n e of 
C l58 Termination of Employment Convention (1981) ratified by over 34 members, 11 of 
which are members of the European Union. "^^^
Finally, the United Kingdom is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and by Section 3 Human Rights Act 1998, primary legislation is 
to give effect to Convention rights. Article 14 of which reads as follows:
ILO Official Bulletin, Vol. LXX, 1987, Series B, Supplement 1, para.515.
Mandla V Dowell Lee [1983] AC 548, HL. pp. 560-563.
Commission fo r  Racial Equality v Dutton [1989] QB 783, CA.
Report of the CEACR 2007/78"' Session.
Whilst it is conceded the UK is not a signatory o f C l58 Termination o f Employment Convention (1981) the 
provisions of the Convention are, on a regional customary vortex thesis, binding on the UK. For the Author’s 
conclusions as to custom see: the Ts this standard customary?’ section in Chapter 4, p.23.
192
‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth, or other status’ [emphasis added].
Whilst it is elementary that Article 14 of the Convention is only engaged via one or more of 
the substantive rights, it certainly demonstrates a regional (European) commitment to the 
scope of anti-discrimination protection envisaged by the Convention. Indeed, in any event. 
Article 8 ‘Right to Respect Private and Family Life’, certainly could encompass the personal 
employment relationship. Indeed, the ECtHR has recently adopted an integrationalist 
approach to the Convention in Sidabras & Dziautas v Lithuania?^^ In Sidabras, the Court 
accepted the wide ranging restrictions imposed by the State on the Claimants via their 
employment contract as KGB officers engaged and further infringed Article 8 ECHR thus:
‘[their employment contract] affected [their] ability to develop relationships with the 
outside world to a very significant degree, and has created serious difficulties for them 
as regards the possibility to earn their living, with obvious repercussions on their 
enjoyment of their private life’^^ ^
Indeed, the Committee of Experts noted and endorsed the judgment in its 2007 Individual 
Observation to Lithuania concerning the Convention. The Committee made direct reference 
to the later decision in Gasparavicius v Lithuanic?^^ where interference with public sector 
employment does indeed engage Article 8 ECHR. Lord Walker, however, held that the 
interference with private life must be high, prior to Article 8’s engagement M v  Secretary o f  
State fo r  Work and Pensions. In RfWright) v Secretary o f State fo r  Health^^^ Stanley- 
Bumton J held the legislative scheme for listing care workers unfit to work with children was 
incompatible with Article 8 (and indeed 6) ECHR:
... is suspicion of misconduct serious enough to indicate that a person constitutes a 
risk to vulnerable persons. That is calculated to interfere with his personal
(2004) 42 EHRR 104.
(2004) 42 EHRR 104 at [48].
(Application no. 74345/01) (Judgment 7, July 2005).
[2006] EWHC 2886 (Admin)
[2006] EWHC 2886 (Admin).
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relationships with colleagues and the vulnerable persons with whom he has worked, 
and with others.’
The judge was cautious, however, to exclude termination of employment ‘in general’ from 
the scope of the Convention, balancing the wide ambit afforded by the ECtHR and the narrow 
interpretation delivered by the Court of Appeal in R(Countryside Alliance) v Attorney 
General
The effectiveness of UK anti-discrimination legislation, however, might well be questioned 
by Labour Force survey statistics. In 2004/5 men, on average, earned £480.40/wk compared 
to their female colleagues, who on average, took home £293.80/wk;3^^ and in 2007, only 
10.4% directors of FTSE 100 companies were f e m a l e . I n  2006, only 30% of local 
councillors were female, and of those, only 0.5% were non-white.^^^ In 2004, white males 
earned £176 more than their Indian/Pakistani colleagues;^*® and in 2005 Citizenship Survey, 
13.5% of black male employees reported they had been discriminated against in recruitment 
or promotion, compared with only 0.5% of white males.^*^
In conclusion, the scope of UK anti-discrimination law is broadly in line with the 
Convention. Whilst political opinion and social origin remain excluded from the list of 
protected characteristics, the courts have construed the legislation widely and purposefully to 
provide the widest possible protection. The scope UK law would require comparatively 
limited amendment to comply with the Convention.
2006] EWHC 2886 (Admin) at [65].
[2006] EWCA Civ 817.
Labour Force Survey (2004/5); Li, Y., Devine, F., and Heath, A., Equality Group Inequalities in Education, 
Employment and Earnings: A research review and analysis o f  trends over time (London: Equalities and Human 
Rights Commission, 2008). Table 3a, p.89.
Sex and Power 2007 EOC (2007e).
National Census o f Loeal Authority Couneillors in England (2006); Walby, S., Armstrong, J., and 
Humphreys. L., Review o f  Equality Statistics (London: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2008) Section 
8 ‘Participation, Influence and Voiee’ p.97.
Labour Foree Survey (2004/5); Li, Y., Devine, F., and Heath, A., Equality Group Inequalities in Education, 
Employment and Earnings: A research review and analysis o f  trends over time (London: Equalities and Human 
Rights Commission, 2008). Table 3a, p.89.
National Census o f Local Authority Councillors in England (2006); Walby, S., Armstrong, J., and 
Humphreys. L., Review o f  Equality Statistics (London: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2008) Seetion 
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Species o f Discrimination
The Convention, by Articles 1(a) and (b) recognises the now entrenched dichotomy of direct 
and indirect discrimination. The latter owes its existence to the decision of the US Supreme 
Court in Griggs v Duke Power^^^ which, serendipitously, coincided with the visit to the US 
by the then Home Secretary (the late Roy Jenkins) and his special advisor, Antony Lester.^*  ^
On their return, Jenkins proposed a late amendment to the Sex Discrimination Bill in 
committee stage. The new Clause l(l)(b) (later on receipt of Royal Assent, Section l(l)(b)) 
introduced the novel concept and was still rather hazy in the minds of the Govemment 
sponsors, as Conservative opposition member, Ian Gilmour MP explained:
‘... we do not know what it means. Secondly, we do not think the Govemment knows 
what it means; and, thirdly, if we did know it meant, we do not think that we would 
like it, but we cannot be sure’.3*"^
Indeed, as Connolly3*^ observed, the idea was not mentioned in the White Paper and so Mr 
Gilmour’s words may hold a modicum of tmth. Judicial minds also remain somewhat 
perplexed as to its true application and whether it is a defined class of discrimination at all 
(see the case study at the end of this Chapter, for a fiirther discussion).
The former, direct discrimination is a simple re-statement of the Aristotelian principle that 
like ought to be treated alike. The wording of the Article, is sufficient to encompass some3** 
forms of sexual harassment, indeed it is a perennial occupation of the Committee of Experts 
to request of states their measures (often in the criminal law) to combat this particular form of 
unequal treatment.
362 401 u s  465. See ‘Indirect Discrimination’ above.
Now Lord Lester o f Heme Hill, QC.
HC Standing Committee B (22, April 1975), col.36.
Connolly, M., Discrimination Law  T* ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2006), pp.132-133.
Although note the decision o f the House of Lords in Macdonald v Advocate General fo r  Scotland [2003] 
UKHL 34 where a policy of the RAF to humiliate and interrogate homosexuals was held not to amount to sexual 
harassment for the treatment was equally bad to male and female homosexuals.
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367The Griggs distinction
It is a settled principle of discrimination law that a complaint only arises on the creation 
(intentionally or otherwise) of two classes; one of which is treated differently to the other 
except in cases of harassment, pregnancy and disability where no comparator is required. In 
English legislation there is a separation of treatments. For claims alleging direct sex or race 
discrimination, the test is ‘less favourable treatment’, compared with the Convention 
definition of ‘any distinction, exclusion or preference ... which has the effect of nullifying or 
impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation’. Both terms rely 
on less favourable treatment; a claim where men and women were treated badly, but equally 
so, would present no complaint under the Act or the Convention.^*^ It is here, that many 
uniform policies avoid being held to be unlawful, as an employer may require that no make­
up may be worn, but so long as the policy applied equally to men as to women, the measure 
is not discriminatory. As Connolly observed, that approach is first, somewhat at odds with 
broader discrimination jurisprudence and second, is unreasonably generous to employers.^^®
For claims alleging indirect sex or race discrimination, there must be a distinction of classes 
again, where one has more of a challenge complying with a given provision, criterion or 
practice, than the other. The Convention applies the same standard in ss.(a) as ss.(b) and now 
section 19 Equality Act 2010.
Genuine Occupational Requirements
Article 1(2) reads as follows:
‘Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the 
inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination’
This ‘genuine occupational requirement’ or "bone fide occupational qualification’ in the 
United States,^^  ^ is a normally prohibited attribute that employers are entitled to consider in
367 ( 1 9 7 1 ) 4 0 1  u s  465. See ‘Indirect Discrimination’ above.
Macdonald v Advocate General fo r  Scotland [2003] UKHL 34. Ibid.
Smith V Safeway [1996] ICR 868, CA.
Connolly, M., Discrimination Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) pp.87-88.
See, for example: United States Code Title 29 (Labour), Chapter 14, §263(f)(l). See also the origin o f the 
principle in Canadian law: Bhinder v CN [1985] 2 SCR 561, Supreme Court o f Canada. This is also provided for
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recruitment and retention of employees. Successive amendments, as the consequence of 
amended European Community legislation, however, have heavily restricted the scope of this 
power, as was the case in Ahmed v Amnesty International}'^^ In Ahmed, a Sudanese employee 
applied for a secondment to the Sudan, but was refused because of concerns about her safety 
as a direct result of her ethnic origin. The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the 
Employment Tribunal’s finding that Ahmed had suffered direct racial discrimination, in spite 
of the citation of a genuine occupational requirement by Amnesty. The case is, however, far 
from clear. The EAT agonised over Amnesty’s ‘intolerable’ position between non­
discrimination and its obligation to maintain the occupational health and safety of its 
employees. As Connolly observed, the EAT dealt extensively with the legality provisions at 
(now repealed) Section 41 RRA, which in any event, did not apply to cases that fell within 
the scope of the Race Directive 2000/43/EC, yet failed to deal with the subjective element of 
direct discriminat ion.The lack of clarity renders the new ‘occupational requirement’ 
provisions at Schedule 9 Equality Act 2010 ripe for extensive litigation.
The manner in which UK law has developed in this regard is very similar to the trust of 
Article 1(2). Indeed, the Convention permits ‘exclusions’ whereas the UK law only deals 
with positive preferences as Ahmed demonstrates, and therefore offers greater protection.
Promotion o f equal opportunity
Article 2 imposes a specific obligation on member states to ‘declare and pursue a national 
policy designed to promote ... equality of opportunity and treatment’. In the United 
Kingdom, by Section 3 Equality Act 2006, the Equality and Human Rights Commission is 
charged to promote broad equality of opportunity objectives. The Commission has powers to 
inter alia, provide information and advice,3 "^^  publish codes of practice,^^^ hold inquires,^^* 
conduct investigations,3^^ issue an unlawful act notice^^^ and institute legal proceedings.^^^
in the European Community via the Equal Treatment Directive Recast 2006/54/EC (formerly 76/207/EEC) 
Art.2(6).
[2009] ICR 1450, EAT.
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Connolly, M., ‘Ahmed v Amnesty International’ (2009) Emp. L.B. 94(Dec), 4-7 at p.4. 
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Section 14. 
Section 16. 
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197
Additionally, public authorities, when discharging their public functions, have a duty to have 
regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other 
conduct prohibited under this act^ ^® to advance equality between persons who share a 
protected characteristic and persons who do not^^  ^and to foster good relations between 
persons who share a protected characteristic and those who do not/^^ Further, public 
authorities are required to having regard to the need to secure a number of statutory 
objectives toward persons living with a disability. Pursuant to its statutory duty to promote 
equality of opportunity and treatment, the Equality and Human Rights Commission publishes 
guidance under each of the Acts on its website^ "^  ^and a consolidated guide to undertaking 
‘equality impact assessments’, both of which are merely guidance but a failure to follow its 
provisions will require explanation.
The public sector equality duty also applies to public bodies when engaging employees and 
managing their workforce. In particular, the duty translates into requiring a thorough analysis 
and continual review of employment policies and practices, maintaining a picture of the 
protected characteristics shared by the workforce, monitoring any gender pay gap, success 
rates for job applications, take-up of training opportunities, promotion success rates, return to 
work after maternity leave, etc.^^  ^The Equality and Human Rights Commission will assess 
the performance of public bodies in complying with the duty under Section 31 Equality Act 
2006. If the Commission believes a public body to be in breach of its obligations, it may enter 
into formal agreements pursuant to Section 23 of the 2006 Act to require future planning. 
Finally, if compliance is still not forthcoming, the Commission may apply for a judicially 
review of the public body’s omission.
378 Section 21.
Sections 24-25.
Section 149(l)(a) Equality Act 2010.
Section 149(l)(b) Equality Act 2010.
Section 149(l)(c) Equality Act 2010.
mvw.eqaulitvliumanrights.com
Section 49A Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
The Essential Guide to the Public Sector Equality Duty (London, EHRC, 2011) pp. 16-18.
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Since their enactment, the equality duties have received significant judicial consideration, 
out of which some general principles have emerged.
First, compliance with the duties is a matter of substance not form;^^^ however, a failure to 
mention the duty explicitly shall make it harder for a public authority to demonstrate 
compliance as H.H. Judge Mackie QC held in R(Chavda) v Harrow the duty is to:
... have regard to the listed considerations. These are important duties nonetheless ... 
[in this instant case] there is no evidence that this legal duty and its implication were 
drawn to the attention of the decision-takers who should have been informed not just 
of the [protected group] as an issue but of the particular obligations which the law 
imposes. It was not enough to refer obliquely in the attached summary to “potential 
conflict with the DDA” this would not give a busy councillor any idea of the serious 
duties imposed upon the Council by the Act’^ ^^
Furthermore, as Sedley LJ held in R(Domh) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBO?'^^
‘Members are heavily reliant on officers for advice in taking these decisions. That 
makes it doubly important for officers not simply to tell members what they want to 
hear but to be rigorous in both inquiry and reporting to them.’
The ‘substance not form’ position has, however, grown up around a number of challenges^^^ 
by gypsy and traveller groups to an unfavourable planning appeal decision.^^^ jh e  position is 
somewhat unique in those cases; however, because, expressly to comply with the (now
Public authorities have been under an obligation to promote race equality since 2 April 2001. Which as 
Moses LJ explained in Kaur v Ealing LBC [2008] EWHC 2062 (Admin.) was as a direct result o f the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry Report (Cm 4262-1) at [15]. Disability equality duties followed on 4 December 2006 and sex 
equality on 2 April 2007.
R(Baker) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA 131, Dyson LJ at [35- 
37].
[2007] EWHC 3064 (Admin.).
[2007] EWHC 3064 (Admin.) at [40].
[2009] EWCA 941 (Civ.).
[2009] EWCA 941 (Civ.) at [79].
Notably not via judicial review but via Section 288(l)(b) Town and Country Planning Act 1990 being the 
statutory provision to challenge the Secretary o f State’s decision.
Notably R(Baker) v Secretary o f State fo r  Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 141 and 
R(Isaacs) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Communities and Local Government [2009] EWHC 557 (Admin.).
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repealed) Section 71 race equality duty, the Department for Communities and Local 
Govemment (“DCLG”) issued Circular 01/2006 which was a material consideration. It being 
common ground, the inspectors in each case had followed the Circular’s guidance the Court 
held that, as a matter of substance, the Section 71 RRA duty had been discharged. This is, 
however, a very special set of circumstances and has arguably led to a diluting of the duty. 
The balance was corrected, however, in R(Harris) v Haringey where Pill LJ held:
‘[t]he case is distinguishable from Baker and Isaacs where policies had been adopted 
in a Circular whose very purpose was to address the issues addressed in section 71(1). 
It cannot be said that the policies cited in this case were focused on specific 
considerations raised by section 71. The council policies to which reference has been 
made may be admirable in terms of proposing assistance for ethnic minority 
communities, and it can be assumed that they are, but they do not address specifically 
the requirements imposed upon the council by section 71(1)’
Second, the duty is to ‘have regard’ to securing statutory objects rather than securing 
statutory objectives per se. Yet, whilst the obligation to have regard is a point of law, the 
weight the decision-taker attaches to the duty in the fullness of all the other circumstances of 
the decision, is a matter of individual judgement.
Third, the duty is on-going and non-delegable. It is, however, plain that where a major 
decision is contemplated (such as a significant restmcturing exercise) much of the 
preparatory work shall include early regard to the duties and, in that sense, can be 
delegated. 3^  ^ This will mean that those preparing the background to a major policy 
consideration should be alive to the duty, even if they will not ultimately be making the 
decision to adopt policy. If further work is undertaken after an interim decision is made, that
[2010] EWCA Civ 703.
R(Baker) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 141 at [31] and 
R(Brown) v Secretary o f  State fo r Work and Pensions [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin.) at [81].
R(Baker) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 141 at [31-34] and 
R(Brown) v Secretary o f  State fo r Work and Pensions [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin.) at [82].
R(Brown) v Secretary o f State fo r Work and Pensions [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin.).
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must also be subject to the duty and regard must be had to the effect of amendments to an 
agreed policy position on protected groups.^^^
The Convention makes a distinction between merely avoiding discrimination and actively 
promoting equality of opportunity between protected groups at Article 2. This distinction is 
plainly in evidence in the drafting of the equality duties and was emphasised by Munby J at 
first instance in R(E) v
‘On one level JFS obviously did consider matters of racial discrimination: JFS’s Race 
Equality Policy ... shows that. But is that enough? In my judgment it is not.’
The point was emphasised by Dyson LJ the Court of Appeal in Baker v Secretary o f  State for  
Communities and Local Government‘f ‘^ ^
‘The promotion of equality of opportunities is concerned with issues of substantive 
equality and requires a more penetrating consideration than merely asking whether 
there has been a breach of a principle of non-discrimination. ’
The Courts have adopted a firm stance to the duties and, have rejected any notion of a box
ticking approach, as H.H. Judge Mackie explained in R(Chavda) v Harrow LEG:
-
‘An important reason why the laws of discrimination have moved from derision to 
acceptance to respect over the three decades has been the recognition of the 
importance not only of respecting rights but also of doing so visibly and clearly by 
recording the fact.’
The Convention, at Article 2, is drafted to secure both the elimination of discrimination and 
the promotion of equality of opportunity. The public sector equality duties are, however, 
drafted to merely ‘have regard’ to securing those outcomes, rather than securing them as ends 
in themselves. This, coupled with the limited application of the duties to public bodies, 
renders the UK law not quite within the spirit of the Convention. Indeed, in March 2011, the
R(Williams) v Surrey County Council [2012] EWHC 867 (Admin.) where an interim decision to reduce 
library funding had been subject to an equality impact assessment, but a final decision to delegate the running o f  
those libraries to volunteers had not.
[2008] ELR 445. Later appealed to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court on different issues.
R(Baker) v Secretary o f  State fo r  Communities and Local Government [2008] EWCA Civ 141 at [30].
[2007] EWHC 3064 (Admin.) at [40].
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Coalition Government published proposals"^ ®  ^to restrict the power of the EHRC to solely 
‘core functions’ and remove the requirement on public bodies to engage. These changes, for 
Hepple, represent two important ‘steps back’"^ ^^ from what McCrudden described as a model 
of ‘reflexive regulation’"^ "^^ or what the Cambridge Review called ‘responsive regulation’"^®^ or 
‘enforced self regulation’ and move the UK a step away from the ILO Convention. These 
changes have yet to be introduced, however, and the Commission maintains an active role in 
inspecting and reporting on the progress of public authorities made in discharging their 
equality duty. It is therefore submitted that the UK has adopted a clear national policy to 
promote equality of opportunity and has enacted an appropriate enforcement mechanism to 
secure compliance and is therefore following the provisions of Article 2.
Activities Prejudicial to the Security o f the State
Article 4 exempts measures taken against an individual ‘suspected o f  or ‘engaged in’ 
‘activities prejudicial to the security of the state’, provided they may appeal the decision. The 
courts have traditionally taken a deferential line when it comes to Regnum defende, the 
defence of the realm. Section 192 Equality Act 2010, which replaced Section 52 SDA (and 
all other discrimination exemptions) introduces a requirement of ‘proportionality’ and directs 
that:
‘... [a] person does not contravene this Act only by doing, for the purpose of
safeguarding national security, anything it is proportionate to do for that purpose’.
Historically, a certificate signed by a (usually Home Office) minister of the Crown would 
suffice as a test of ‘national security’. However, the ECJ in Johnston v Chief Constable o f  the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary"^^^ held that the ministerial certificates could no longer be used in 
employment or vocational training cases. The Article does impose a test of reasonable
Building a Fairer Britain: Reform o f the Equality and Human Rights Commission (London: Government 
Equalities Office, 2011).
Hepple, B., ‘Enforcing equality law: two steps forward and two steps backwards for reflexive regulation’
(2011) 40(4) ILJ 315.
McCrudden C, ‘Equality Legislation and Reflexive Regulation: A Response to the Discrimination law 
Review’s Consultative Paper’ (2007) 36 ILJ 255.
Hepple, B., Coussey, M., and Choudhury, T., Equality: A New Framework. Report o f  the Independent 
Review o f  the Enforcement o f  UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) at p.56. 
^°^C-222/84, [1987] QB 129.
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evidence, by the insertion of ‘justifiably’ prior to ‘suspected’ and therefore, the UK’s nod- 
and-a-wink approach to this form of sex discrimination exemption is unlikely to satisfy the 
requirements of the Convention. Section 42(1) Race Relations Act 1976, however, was more 
in-line with the aims of Cl 11 and in a similar tone to the new Section 192 direction provided 
that nothing in the legislation:
‘... shall render unlawful an act done for the purpose of safeguarding national 
security, if the doing of the act was justified hy that purpose’, [emphasis added]
A similar ministerial certificate historically sufficed to render lawful that which would 
otherwise be unlawful in the absence of a ‘national security’ issue. As it was in Tinnelly v 
where Roman Catholic builders were refused public works contracts via a ministerial 
certificate, which provided no substantive reasoning. The ECtHR held that the decision 
violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
in that it failed to allow for a ‘fair and public hearing’. It also, of course, would not have 
enjoyed the protection of Article 4 of Cl 11 in that it did not allow for a ‘right of appeal to a 
competent body established in accordance with national practice’. National practice in the 
United Kingdom is that legal proceedings are indeed ‘fair and public’.
Affirmative Action
The Convention, at Article 5, recognises affirmative action as a controversial element of 
Aristotelian distributive justice, undertaken either by its own measures"^ ®^  or those of its 
ratifying members."^^  ^The ILO drafted the words with care, as the Convention talks of a 
discretion to enact ‘special measures’ to assist those possessing one or more of a set of 
prescribed grounds who ‘require special protection or assistance’. The scope the ILO 
intended this Article to have is not clear. A narrow interpretation could permit fi*ee English 
lessons for employees for whom English is an additional language, reasonable adjustments 
for those with a disability and"^ ®^ flexible working policies (or obligations) for the benefit of
'*°^(1998) 27 EHRR 249.
Article 5(1). 
Article 5(2).
In England and Wales see: Section 20 Equality Act (Formerly: Section 4A, Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 (inserted by Reg.5, Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003/1673).
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employees with family or carer responsibilities/^^ This would present little conflict with 
English law.
On a wider view, however, affirmative action programmes could be drawn-up to give ‘special 
assistance’ to a protected group and not linguistically conflict with the Convention. The 
courts have been decidedly reluctant to construe a general right of affirmative action, 
however laudable the motives. In the run-up to the 1997 General Election, the Labour Party 
had resolved to draw-up all women shortlists of Prospective Parliamentary Candidates. The 
decision was much publicised as a concrete measure to diversify the House of Commons. The 
decision was, however, challenged by two male candidates who had tried, unsuccessfully to 
be adopted as Labour Candidates. The Employment Tribunal held the practice amounted to 
direct sex discrimination. Parliament responded by subsequently enacting the Sex 
Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002, but has been otherwise unwilling to enact 
affirmative action programmes in other areas and has, (until recently) limited the scope in 
Parliamentary elections to gender, whereas Article 5(b) conceivably allows for shortlists 
comprising, for example: all men, all over 65s, all under 30s, all candidates with a disability 
within the meaning of the Act, all single parents, etc. By Section 104 Equality Act 2010, a 
political party may make its selections with a view to promoting the full range of protected 
characteristics and may have single sex shortlists.
Any measures, however, can only enjoy the Article 5 exemption should they follow a 
consultation with employers’ and workers’ organisations. It is of note that by Section 158 
Equality Act 2010 a person may institute positive action measures where they reasonably 
believe persons with one or more of the protected characteristics suffers a disadvantage, but 
has limited effect as to employment which is governed by Section 159. The section permits 
an employer to take into consideration underrepresentation in the workforce of workers with 
a protected characteristic when deciding whom to recruit. The Explanatory Notes, however, 
are keen to stress the provision:
See the decision o f the EAT in: EBR Attridge Law LLP (Formerly Attridge Law LLP) v Coleman C-303/06
[2010] 1 CMLR28.
412 Jepson and Dyas Elliot v Labour Party [1996] IRLR 1996.
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‘will not allow employers to have a policy or practice of automatically treating 
people who share a protected characteristic more favourably than those who do not 
have it in these circumstances, each case must be considered on its merits’.
Conclusions on UK Anti-Discrimination Law and International Labour Norms
As is set out, C l l l  is capable of creating binding fundamental labour norms of equal 
treatment, both as a consequence of its own virtually uniform implementation and of the 
prevailing international post-war legal context. The fundamental mechanics of achieving 
equal treatment at Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention have been aspects of the UK law since 
the 1970s. The scope of the UK’s protection increased in 2010 with the harmonisation of its 
equality statutes, but falls just shy of the full extent of protected characteristics at Article 
l(l)(a) still excluding ‘political opinion’ and ‘social origin’ from protected characteristics.
Recently, the UK Supreme Court was again called upon to determine the nature and scope of 
England’s statutory discrimination torts. The case is illustrative of the modem approach of 
the UK to equal treatment. The Convention prohibits any ‘distinction, exclusion or 
preference’ on the basis of a series of protected grounds at Article l(l)(a) two of which are 
‘race’ and ‘religion’. In the UK, certain schools (which are designated by the Secretary of 
State) are entitled to give preference to applicants who meet a set of religious criteria. The 
question in this case was whether the criteria laid down for ‘Jewishness’ by the Chief Rabbi 
was solely a ‘religious’ requirement or whether it strayed into ‘ethnic origins’, to which the 
School would enjoy no specific statutory exemption. Furthermore, Article l(l)(a) is outcome 
focused, that is to say that a provision may be neutral on its face (or seemingly ‘religious’) 
but would have the effect of ‘nullifying equality of opportunity’ of a protected group and 
those that did not share that characteristic. Therefore, in this case, as an alternative, if the 
Court found the entry requirements to be a ‘religious’ rather than a ‘racial’ test, they must 
nonetheless, go on to examine whether the effect of which would be to result in less 
favourable treatment of the claimant. Unlike the Convention, however, UK discrimination 
law provides for indirect discrimination to be objectively justified, via a demonstration that 
the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
The case teases out a number of contrasts with the wording and spirit of the Convention. 
First, the majority of the Justices in JFS took a wide interpretation of the words ‘on the
Equality Act 2010 Explanatory Notes para. 532.
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grounds o f  looking behind the branding of a ‘religious tesf to examine its substance. The 
Court undertook a similar exercise to that demanded by the Convention by the words ‘on the 
basis o f  at Article l(l)(a). This is to be distinguished from the benign motive defence 
advanced by the school, which was rejected by the majority, holding specifically that the 
motive of the defendant is irrelevant (or is only relevant in less obvious cases to demonstrate 
the reason of the less favourable treatment). Second, the Lords Hope and Walker addressed 
their minds to the proportionality of the admissions policy, having previously found it to be a 
‘religious’ rather than a ‘racial’ requirement and further, that the aim was legitimate. The 
Convention recognises no objective justification defence and is decidedly outcome focused 
(by prohibiting treatment which ‘has the effect of . . . ’). Defences are, however, a matter for 
national implementation and, given the objective justification defence is directed toward 
avoiding discrimination, it cannot be seen as a discriminatory statute in itself (for the 
purposes of Article 3(c)) and to that extent accords with the Convention. Third, a matter not 
cross-appealed from first instance, concerns the promotion of equality of opportunity required 
by Section 71(l)(a) Race Relations Act 1976 (now Section 149 Equality Act 2010) and set- 
out at Article 2 of the Convention. Munby J held the JFS to have failed in discharging its race 
equality duty, which called for the active promotion of equality of opportunity between 
people (students in this case) from different races (as defined by the Act). Finally, the Court 
implicitly allowed discrimination between members of an ethnic group to be actionable; 
which would certainly accord a fair reading of the Convention (and the broader non­
discrimination spirit of the ILO and indeed the UN).
The principles of the Convention have thus become fundamentally entrenched in the law of 
the UK, albeit by primary legislation.
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions
Alston’s challenge, to devise a fresh ‘regime’  ^ to tackle the delivery of international labour 
standards and Novitz’s suggestion that some labour rights have ‘implicit’^  status, have been 
taken up and explored by this thesis. As such, by examining the customary status of labour 
law norms contained within the multilateral treaties of the ILO this enquiry has made a novel 
contribution to the discourse on enforcement of international labour standards. The thesis has 
focused on four key themes.
First, this enquiry has necessarily engaged with the debate on the creation of customary 
international law. In particular, the debate which has followed the I d ’s judgment in North 
Sea^ and later Nicaragua,"^ concerning the emergence of new and parallel rule of customary 
law partly inspired by an identical treaty provision. What is notable about the traditionalist 
discourse, which has ensued, is that it takes issue with the fundamental idea of custom itself. 
The debate which has been advanced around that central proposition is largely a normative 
discussion as to why the I d  was wrong for a number of reasons. As we have seen, however, 
the traditionalist anti-thesis is, in essence, a handful of criticisms of the principle, now four 
decades old, that:
‘The existence of identical rules in international treaty law and customary law has 
been clearly recognised by the court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cdiSQS ... those 
cases turned on the question whether a rule enshrined in a treaty also existed as a 
customary rule, either because the treaty had merely codified the custom, or caused it 
to “crystalize”, or because it had influenced its subsequent adoption. The Court found 
that this identity of content in treaty law and in customary international law did not
* Alston, P., ‘Facing up to the Complexities o f the ILO’S Core Labour Standards Agenda’ (2005) 16 European 
Journal o f  International Law  467, at p.476.
 ^Novitz, T., ‘International Promises and Domestic Pragmatism: To what Extent will the Employment Relations 
Act 1999 Implement International Labour Standards Relating to Freedom o f Association’ (2000) 63 Modern 
Law Review 379, at p.379.
^[1969] ICJ Rep. 3 
Nicaragua v United States (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14.
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exist in the case of the rule invoked ... but did not suggest that such identity was 
debarred as a matter of principle’.^
It is argued that such a principle introduces an unwelcome normative element into the strictly 
consensus model of international law.  ^However, as we have seen, the ICJ has endorsed the 
general principle subject to strict rules.^ Chief amongst those rules is that the rule enjoys very 
widespread and representative participation by states. This demonstrates that the consensus 
model of international law remains and, coupled with the persistent objector principle, 
preserves the sovereignty of states. Furthermore, traditionalists argue that the principle also 
threatens the sovereignty of states by placing too much weight on state practice of widespread 
ratification of a treaty.^ As we have seen, however, the ICJ was clear in Nicaragua^, that 
widespread participation in a treaty alone is not sufficient for a parallel rule of customary law 
to come into being, thus:
‘The mere fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for 
the Court to consider these as being part of customary international law, and as 
applicable as such to those States .... The Court must satisfy itself that the existence 
of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice’.
Alternatively, the traditionalists argue that many treaty provisions are merely aspirational in 
nature and therefore, not capable of creating a customary rule.^  ^As we have seen, however, 
the ICJ in North Sea accepted this point and accordingly held that only treaty provisions, 
which were ‘fundamentally norm creating such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a
 ^Nicaragua v United States (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14. at pp.94-95 at [177].
 ^See, for example: Van Hoof, G., Rethinking Sources o f  International Law  (Hingham, 1983) pp. 107-108; 
Franck ‘Appraisals o f the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v United States (Merits)’ (1987) 81 American Journal o f  
International Law 116, at p. 119.
 ^North Sea [1969] ICJ Rep. 3 para.70-7I.
 ^See, for example: Simma and Alston ‘The Sources o f Human Rights o f Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General 
Principles’ (1988-1989) \2  Australian Yearbook o f  International Law S2,'p^.%9-90.
^Nicaragua v United States (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14 at [174].
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14, p. 184.
Franck, ‘Appraisals o f the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v United States (Merits)’ (1987) 81 American Journal 
o f  International Law  116, at p. 119.
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general rule of law’ Finally, the traditionalists argue that a rule of international law, which 
is not based on the widespread practice of states motivated by a sense of legal obligation 
lacks legitimacy. As we have seen, however, the ICJ has drawn the limits of a parallel 
customary rule arising from a treaty very tightly. That careful analysis by the world court has 
struck the balance of competing arguments and as such, the principle is legitimate.
When analysed therefore, many of the concerns of the traditionalist anti-thesis are unfounded 
in light of the strict guidance of the ICJ. Furthermore, the narrow set of cases where the ICJ 
has taken a more broad-brushed approach to the creation of customary law, are of a wholly 
separate conceptual class to labour law norms. When seen in that context, the meta-debate 
which has arisen around these cases is largely irrelevant to a thesis examining the customary 
status of certain international labour law norms.
Second, the thesis has demonstrated that it is a principle of international law that a new rule 
of customary law can emerge from an identical treaty provision. That such a rule exists in 
parallel and independent from the treaty provision. However, in order for such a 
transformation to occur, strict rules must be followed. Those rules established the 
methodology of this thesis. In particular, that the prévision must be fundamentally norm 
creating; second, that it enjoyed very widespread participation; third, that the practice of 
states be extensive and virtually uniform. Furthermore, it was crucial in considering whether 
a treaty provision had generated a parallel customary rule, to examine the practice of non- 
parties to the treaty and whether any states have registered a prompt and persistent objection 
to the emergence of the customary rule. Finally, the methodology required an examination of 
the subjective motivations of non-parties practice in favour of the treaty provision. What 
became clear is that a majority of non-parties did undertake practice in similar terms to the 
treaty provision. Their motivation was in many instances expressly to harmonise their 
domestic legislation with the treaty provision, even though as non-parties, they had no 
obligation to do so. What appeared to be the case was that a majority of states felt an 
obligation to align their legislation with the treaty, as a consequence of their membership of 
the ILO and the international community generally. What was of particular note is that the 
ILO has a great hand in creating such a sense of obligation. Further, it then has a strong role 
in harmonising domestic laws in favour of the treaty via its ‘technical assistance’ programme.
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3, p.42 at [72].
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Whilst it is a non-state actor and strictly speaking cannot create customary law, its place in 
the creation of customary rules of labour law is a stark area of unexplored influence. The 
traditional view of states creating custom via their qualifying practice is perhaps a dated 
model and is it possibly time to explore the place of non-state actors in creating a broader 
context in which states feel obliged to act. The question will be whether the ILO has 
promoted a context in which a sense of legal obligation has motivated states to act where 
otherwise they might have done nothing.
Third, the examination of this subject has re-focused the understanding of the sources of the 
law against discrimination in England. The traditional view is that the anti-discrimination rule 
is received into English law via the UK’s ratification of a number of multilateral treaties, 
namely the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and ILO Treaty C l l l .  What this thesis has demonstrated is that a secondary 
source of the rule exists, as a source of the English common law. The rule exists in parallel 
and wholly independent of the identical articulation of the rule in the foregoing multilateral 
treaties. The practical implications of such a proposition is felt in both private law and public 
law. In the private law context, if the UK Government makes good on its threats to leave the 
treaty regimes, which provide the source for anti-discrimination law, and legislates to remove 
them in domestic law, a worker would be able to bring a private law claim, in an English 
court, against his employer for discrimination founded upon the common law. This is 
because, as this thesis has demonstrated, a rule of customary international law, absent a 
number of jurisdictional prohibitions, is a source of the English common law, justiciable in 
the English courts. In the public law context, it means that a claim for judicial review could 
be advanced against the state which acted contrary to the customary rule in its public 
decisions.^^ The unanswered question is essentially one of English private law. It is whether a 
court would draw a distinction between a public sector worker and a private sector one when 
adjudicating on whether to enforce a right derived from international law.
Fourth, the thesis has provided a labour law contribution to the codification of rules of 
international law, which have attained customary status. The purpose of this field of study
See successful argument advanced in R(European Roma Rights Centre) v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 55 Lord Bingham at [23].
See originally: ‘The Law o f Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to the Person o f  
Property of Foreigners’ (1929) 23 AJIL 131. See contemporaneously: Doswald-Beck, L., (eds.) San Remo
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has been to promote the delivery of international standards by bringing the rules together in a 
single document, such as to produce a handbook for legal practitioners, scholars. 
Governments and others. It is motivated in part by the broad failure of the state reporting 
model of enforcement^^ and relies on a different, more direct, model of rights delivery. The 
continuation of this research is obvious.
Drawing these strands together. We have provided an answer to Alston’s multifaceted 
challenge.First, we have provided a ‘regime’ which builds upon the strengths of the 
‘ancient regime’, because the codification of norms is a long established aim of the ILO. It 
will be recalled that following the Second World War, the ILO sought to group its standards 
together into an international ‘labour code’.^^A handbook of norms of conduct in work which 
have attained customary status is therefore true to the ancient regime of the ILO. Second, in 
advancing the place of customary law we have ‘transcended the not inconsiderable failings’ 
of the ILO’ and its state reporting model of enforcement. This is because, as Kellenberger 
observed, customary law is ‘self-executing’ by citizens fi*om within the member states 
themselves and therefore, bypasses the problems of governments failing to deliver rights to 
their citizens. Third, we have provided a means of demonstrating that the principles of the 
Declaration of Fundamental Rights at Work (1998) are ‘clearly rooted’ in ‘international 
standards’, because by Article 38(l)(b) ICJ Statue a rule of custom is a source of international 
law. Furthermore, we have explored Novitz’s tantalising comment that denouncing some ILO 
treaties would be ... pointless because of their implicit status within the international
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), on the customary 
law o f the sea. See also: Lowe, V., and Churchill, R., The Law o f  the Sea (Manchester: MUP, 1999) (3*^  ^ ed.); 
Henckaerts, J., and Doswald-Black, L., Customary International Humanitarian Law  (Cambridge: CUP, 2005).
See in general: Robertson, A. H., ‘The Implementation System’ in Henkln, L., (eds.) The International Bill o f  
Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Donnelly, J., 
‘International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, International Organisations’ (1986) 40(3) Journal o f  Peace 
Research 599. See on international labour standards in particular: Alston, P., ‘Facing up to the Complexities of  
the ILO’s Core Labour Standards Agenda’ (2005) 16 EJIL 467; Simpson, W., ‘Standard Setting and Supervision 
-  A System in Difficulty’, in Les Normes Internationales du Travial: une Patromine Pour L ’avenir (Geneva: 
ILO, 2004).
Alston, P., ‘Facing up to the Complexities o f the ILO’S Core Labour Standards Agenda’ (2005) \6  European 
Journal o f  International Law 467, at p.476.
International Labour Code (Geneva, 1952).
ICRC Study, Vol.I, ix-xi.
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community’/^ We have concluded that Novitz was most likely referring to the fact that some 
of the provisions of ILO treaties have developed into parallel customary rule.
As such, this thesis has comprehensively explored these two scholastic observations, by 
applying a sound methodology, to conclude that the rule against discrimination in Article 2 of 
ILO Treaty C l l l  has developed into a parallel rule of customary law, justiciable in the UK 
courts as a source in the English common law.
Further refinement of the Methodology
20The methodology of this thesis follows the strict rules laid down by the ICJ in North Sea 
and Nicaragua^^ for the identification of a rule of customary law parallel to an identical treaty 
provision.
First, the section which deals with uniform and consistent application bases its examination 
of state practice principally on the reports of the Committee of Experts. Whilst this is a sound 
starting point, as the ILO spends much time investigating state practice, it is open to criticism 
and, with greater tiïrie and resources, independent analysis should be undertaken of state 
material for greater accuracy of results. Furthermore, the reference is often made to the 
General Surveys conducted by the Committee on behalf of the Governing Body. These are 
comprehensive when undertaken, but are infrequently performed. Adjustment should 
therefore be made to reflect the date they were undertaken.
Second, there are many occasions where a state flatly refuses to file a report with the 
Committee of Experts. In these circumstances, there is no ILO report of state practice to 
analyse, notwithstanding that there might be significant substantive implementation of the 
Convention’s provisions at national level. Further research with greater time and resources 
might commission a field study of these non-reporting states to gain the material required to 
undertake an assessment as to custom.
Novitz, T., ‘International Promises and Domestic Pragmatism: To what Extent will the Employment Relations 
Act 1999 Implement International Labour Standards Relating to Freedom o f Association’ (2000) 63 Modern
Law Review 379, at p.379. 
[1969] ICJ Rep. 3. 
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14.
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Third, there is yet no method of determining the ‘quality’ of custom norms on each part of a 
Convention or the point at which a standard became customary in nature. Further analysis of 
the material would reveal these points that would further refine the methodology.
Original Contribution
The examination of this thesis has made a number of contributions to the learning.
First and foremost, this dissertation concerns international labour standards. As such, it is 
principally conceived as a contribution to the learning on the enforcement of international 
labour standards. That discourse has been on-going since the ILO settled on its model of 
enforcement at the 1921 Genoa Conference. It peaked, however, in the year 2000, when the 
ILO reconsidered its role and the best method to enforce labour standards. The state 
reporting model has largely been discredited as not being fit for the purpose of effectively 
delivering rights.^^ A number of alternative methods of enforcing labour standards have been 
floated and explored in this dissertation; however, none have considered the relevance of 
customary international law.
Second, the International Committee of the Red Cross came to the same conclusion when 
considering the enforcement of humanitarian standards of conduct.^"  ^That enquiry adopted a
See: Valticos, N., ‘International labour standards and human rights: Approaching the year 2000’ (1998) 137 
International Labour Review  135; Novitz, T., ‘International Promises and Domestic Pragmatism: To what 
Extent will the Employment Relations Act 1999 Implement International Labour Standards Relating to Freedom 
o f Association’ (2000) 63 Modern Law Review 379; Creighton, B., ‘The Future o f Labour: Is There a Role for 
International Labour Standards?’ in Bernard, C., Deakin, S., and Morris, G., (eds.). The Future o f  Labour Law  
(Cambridge, 2004); Alston, P., ‘Facing up to the Complexities o f the ILO’S Core Labour Standards Agenda’ 
(2005) 16 EJIL 467; Langille, B., ‘Core Labour Rights -The True Story (Reply to Alston) (2005) 16 EJIL 409.
See: Langille, B., ‘Core Labour Rights -The True Story (Reply to Alston) (2005) 16 EJIL 409; Creighton, B., 
‘The Future o f Labour: Is There a Role for International Labour Standards?’ in Bernard, C., Deakin, S., and 
Morris, G., (eds.). The Future o f  Labour Law (2004); Simpson, W., ‘Standard Setting and Supervision -A  
System in Difficulty’ in ILO, Les Normes Internationales du Travail: une Patromine Pour L ’avenir (2004); 
Alston, P., ‘Facing up to the Complexities of the ILO’S Core Labour Standards Agenda’ (2005) 16 European 
Journal o f  International Law 467.
‘Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2005) 87(857) IRRC 175.
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methodology which was subject to some significant academic criticism/^ That criticism has 
been comprehensively explored in this thesis and where appropriate, incorporated into 
refining the methodology of this thesis. By engaging with that debate, this enquiry has 
furthered the learning on customary law when considering an appropriate methodology to 
identify customary rules of international labour law, which have arisen parallel to an identical 
treaty provision.
Third, by exploring the reception of customary rules into UK law, this enquiry has 
contributed to the understanding of the sources of the English labour law. In particular, by 
demonstrating the rule against discrimination in work is customary in nature, the thesis has 
demonstrated the domestic rule against discrimination in work has a secondary source, 
independent of the UK’s treaty obligations, as a part of the English common law. A worker 
should therefore be able to sue his employer for a breach of a common law rule against 
discrimination in work, independent of the legislation (which implements the UK treaty 
obligations). Further, a properly interested person could sustain a claim for judicial review 
against the state for acting contrary to the customary rule.
The value of the Study
Some might well question why research the customary status of a treaty provision when it 
already enjoys widespread participation. This was addressed by ICRC President Jakob 
Kellenberger in his forwarded to the ICRC Study.^^ In essence, he suggested there are two 
important reasons for this field of research, which we can apply to labour law:
(a) a rule of customary international law may be self-executing and apply directly in the 
municipal sphere, whereas treaties may not;
(b) customary international law may supervene and prevail over an inconsistent rule in a 
treaty. There is no hierarchy of sources of international law and, in principle, a 
recently formed rule of custom may prevail over an older, inconsistent treaty rule.
25 See Wilmsburst E., and Breau, S., (eds.) Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, 2007).
ICRC Study, Vol.I, ix-xi.
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Against the current policy context of the UK Government those propositions gain added 
value. If the Government chooses to liberalise the employment regime by freeing itself from 
its treaty obligations, then a worker will only have recourse to custom to sustain a claim.
As a finished project, comprising of a customary set of rules, the study will provide a key 
work for labour lawyers.
We can read across some of the effects of the ICRC study to this examination of labour law. 
As the President of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal has observed:
‘[the ICRC Study] will be a significant aid to international tribunals in exercising their 
functions consistently with the legality principle’.
The same could be said of the Committee of Experts or the ILO Governing Body in its 
determination of complaints. Furthermore, the ILO is the relevant body to determine labour 
complaints of the International Criminal Court staff and, therefore, already enjoys a 
permanent adjudicative role.
The Study may be cited in judicial decisions, as indeed customary international labour norms 
are already cited.^^ The Rules of the ICRC Study have been deployed in several decisions: 
most notably in Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic^^on the international stage, and Adalah v GOC 
Central Commancf^dind Hamdan v Rumsfelcf^ on the domestic stage. The eventual handbook 
of labour rules would provide a useful interpretative tool for the quandary Glidewell J. found 
himself in, having to rule on the application of ILO Conventions in GCHQ?^
Meron, T., ‘Revival o f Customary International Law’ (2005) 99 A.J.I.L. 817, p.833.
See: Rodriquez v Drummond Company Inc 256 F Supp 2d 1250 (ND Ala 2003).
^^No.IT-01-47-AR73.3, paras.29-30 (11, March 2005); see also: Prosecutor v Stakic No. IT-97-24-A, (22, 
March 2006) para.296.
Israel Supreme Court, 23 June 2005, (HCJ 3799/02) paras.20, 21 and 24.
US Supreme Court, 29 June 2006, 248 US [Supreme Court Reports] 196.
R V Secretary o f  State fo r  Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p  Council o f  Civil Service Unions, Ors 
[1984] IRLR 309, p.324.
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The transformative potential of an objectively divined, objectively proven set of labour 
standards is not to be underestimated. Indeed, the ICRC Study is accredited with spurring the 
development^^ and revival "^  ^of humanitarian law.
Finally, the production of a customary set of labour standards can lend some substance to the 
grey area, which is often filled by normative jurisprudence once the positive law has run out. 
As Fleck observed (of the ICRC Study):
‘Where there are gaps in existing positive law. States should be encouraged to use the 
Study with a view to closing such gaps ...
Further work
There are several obvious areas of further study.
First, using the methodology, it should be relatively straightforward to apply its questions to 
all the provisions of conventions adopted by the ILO and determine a corpus juris lahoro or 
handbook of customary labour standards in a similar fashion to the ICRC study. This work 
should be conducted under the close supervision of the ILO.
Second, the methodology of this dissertation has clear application for other fields of 
customary codification. Indeed, it might be used to revisit and justify the results of the 
criticised ICRC study.
Third, the place of non-state actors in the creation of customary law is a topical debate. Some 
valuable research could be undertaken to explore the role of the ILO in motivating states to 
create customary rules.
Finally, as explored in Chapter Four there has traditionally been no common law rule against 
discrimination in work in the UK. The rule has only formed a part of UK law via the UK’s 
accession to a number of treaty regimes. Even then, the rule has been narrowly construed to 
avoid a rule of general application, rather merely the implementation of a treaty obligation. In 
demonstrating the customary status of the rule against discrimination in work, this thesis has
Maclaren. M., and Schwendimann, F., ‘An Exercise in the Development o f International Law: the New ICRC 
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1217.
Meron, T., ‘Revival o f Customary International Law’ (2005) 99 A.JJ.L. 817.
Fleck, D., ‘International Aecountability for Violations o f the lus in Bello: the Impact o f the ICRC Study in 
Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 11 Journal o f  Conflict and Security Law, 179, p.l81.
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questioned the accuracy of the traditional view of the source of the rule. Indeed, this enquiry 
has opened up the possibility of a secondary source of the rule in the English common law, 
via customary international law. That being the case, there is a clear further line of enquiry to 
redraft the traditional understanding of the sources of UK labour law rules in general.
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